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Editorial: Raising Expectations

KEITH L. JOHNSON

> "Theology ... should expect more from God than that He should simply provide ideological support for the goals we happen to set for ourselves. That theology today by and large expects no more from God than this is a scandal."
>
> —Bruce L. McCormack[1]

One of the challenges posed by a multidisciplinary journal like *Koinonia* is that even within the relatively narrow field of religious studies, every discipline carries its own set of presuppositions. Biblical scholars, theologians, historians and practical theologians each approach the scholarly task with unique goals and methods, and it is not uncommon for the values of one discipline to conflict with those of another. This problem is not unique to academic journals. Many if not most religion departments and seminaries experience some kind of tension between the disciplines. These differences even make their way into the world of academic publishing. Brazos Press, for example, recently commissioned a group of theologians and historians—not biblical scholars—to author the "Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible" series. The self-stated goal of the project is to resist many of the methodological presuppositions of contemporary biblical scholars and instead encourage "an unashamedly dogmatic interpretation of Scripture."[2] Such events seem to reinforce the notion that the differences between the various disciplines within religious studies have never been more pronounced.

These kinds of tensions go hand-in-hand with life in the academy, of course. Yet for scholars who confess Jesus Christ as Lord, these differences should not simply be accepted as the unchangeable *status quo*. Scholars of this type see their academic vocation as part of a larger one: service to

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1 Bruce L. McCormack, "A Scholastic of a Higher Order: The Development of Karl Barth's Theology, 1921-31," (PhD diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1989), p. 677.

2 R. R. Reno, "Series Preface," in Jaroslav Pelikan, *Acts*, Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2005), p. 15.

the church of Jesus Christ. This shared vocation means that otherwise very different academics share something in common—a common task, purpose, audience and Lord—which transcends whatever differences may exist. One of the goals of *Koinonia* is to provide a forum for this kind of scholarship to take place. The multidisciplinary nature of journal means that the subject matter varies and the methodologies often differ greatly from one another. In the end, however, every contribution remains united under the common goal of contributing to the academy and to the church which benefits from it.

Volume XVIII represents the very best of this kind of scholarship. The 2006 Annual Forum, comprising the first six essays of this issue, provides an example of the kind of multidisciplinary conversation that is much needed in today's academy. The forum was built around the work of legendary Princeton Seminary professor James Loder, and it dealt with the question of how his trinitarian soteriology might be relevant for adolescent identity formation. Former Koinonia executive editor **Sandra Costen Kunz**, who studied under Loder, provides helpful opening reflections about the forum and Loder himself. Her piece is followed by **Michael D. Langford's** centerpiece essay and responses by **Almeda Wright**, **James F. Cubie**, and **Renee S. House**. They maintain the delicate balance of challenging one another's arguments in an irenic and constructive way, and the result is a profound multidisciplinary discussion about some of the most central doctrines of the Christian faith and how they relate to some often overlooked members of our churches.

The forum is followed by an excellent and diverse set of open submissions. **Jon D. Wood** offers an intriguing essay about research on Heinrich Bullinger's *Sermones Synodales*—a previously untranscribed set of manuscripts containing speeches, prayers, notes, and diagrams jotted down by Bullinger over the course of thirty years. Wood uses these notes to provide a deeper picture of Bullinger's involvement in the Zurich synod and his rather surprising emphasis on eschatology. **Nathan D. Hieb's** essay explores Jürgen Moltmann's millenarianism and recent criticisms of it. His study serves as a helpful engagement with Moltmann's thought as a whole, and his argument in defense of Moltmann's view raises important and timely questions about how eschatology relates to the present life and

work of the church. **Adam Stokes** examines the subject of the nature of human existence and the afterlife at the book of Ben Sira, working with both the original Hebrew and later Greek versions of the text to draw conclusions about how the text was used and redacted by its early readers. His essay serves as an important study of the book of Ben Sira in its own right, and it also offers a glimpse of the wider phenomenon of how commentary upon scripture can become just as authoritative as the original text itself. **Micah Kiel** draws on the traditional symbolism of fish within Judaism to examine the use of fish as a symbol in the feeding narrative of Mark 6:34-44. He ultimately argues that the fish served to both describe and qualify the eucharistic meal within Mark's text, and his conclusions provide a stimulating reading of this text, its place in Mark's gospel, and how it may have been read in the earliest Christian communities. The open submissions conclude with **Marcus A. Minninger's** lengthy and engaging review essay of Dale Martin's *The Corinthian Body*, one which tackles some of the key questions about Paul's use of body language and the interpretation of Paul's letters to the Corinthians as a whole.

The issue concludes with a stimulating slate of book reviews, including several prominent offerings in the areas of biblical studies and theology. Many of the reviews stand as constructive pieces in their own right, and each one provides a useful and important engagement with the selected volume. Of special note are the excellent reviews of Luke Timothy Johnson's recent commentary on Hebrews, David H. Kelsey's *Imagining Redemption*, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen's Gifford Lectures, and Roger E. Olson's *Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities*.

As always, the publication of *Koinonia* involves a collective effort of the entire editorial board, and I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to its members for the long hours they put in to make this issue possible. I would also like to thank President Iain Torrance and Professor Katharine Doob Sakenfeld of Princeton Theological Seminary for their support of *Koinonia* and its mission.

Koinonia's 2006 Forum: James Loder and Interdisciplinary Method

SANDRA COSTEN KUNZ

Koinonia's 2006 annual forum followed three previous forums with themes that lent themselves to broad, interfaith, interdisciplinary discussion. It was, therefore, very intentionally focused more narrowly on consideration *of* Christian theology *by* Christian theologians. This decision was partially in light of the 2004 editorial board's resolve to offer both types of forums in different years. But it was also in response to thoughtful requests from students and faculty that we sponsor a gathering with a more in-house, Princeton Seminary emphasis.

Michael Langford's thought-provoking paper, "A Very Present Help: James Loder's Trinitarian Soteriology and Adolescent Identity Formation," gave us an opportunity to reflect upon the work of one of Princeton Seminary's immensely creative scholars. As Professor of the Philosophy of Christian Education, Loder had a profound academic and pastoral influence on three decades of PTS students and faculty.

Prof. Loder died while on sabbatical in November, 2001. The following year Dr. Dana Wright, whose dissertation was directed by Loder, offered an excellent doctoral seminar on his advisor's work. Langford, who took an M.Div. course with Loder, thus had the opportunity to review and discuss almost all of his published work. Our forum's central paper was thus one fruit of this seminar. Langford's contributions to the class combined a systematician's passion for explicating the core teachings of the Christian faith with clarity and relevance, and a practical theologian's passion for engaging theological and nontheological disciplines in ways that illumine and refine the practices by which the church lives out that faith. In this seminar, and in his current pastoral position, he has focused both of these passions upon the church's ministry with, by, and for youth.

Langford argues that Loder's writing concerning adolescent development is grounded in a soteriology that draws out of the shadows and into the foreground the work of the Holy Spirit in the Triune God's saving work. Such a focus on God's immanence, Langford demonstrates, offers a pastorally helpful addition to Second Person-centered soteriologies whose primary concern is either the salvation accomplished through Christ in the past, or the salvation Christ's work will bring to believers in their post-mortem future. Langford examines both the content and interdisciplinary methodology of Loder's chapters on adolescence in *The Logic of the Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective* to highlight Loder's emphasis on the way the Holy Spirit communicates the salvation won by Christ to the particular ways adolescent human beings experience, existentially, their need for salvation. Loder's convictions about adolescent experience are grounded in a theological anthropology constructed by means of what he termed a "Chalcedonian" interdisciplinary methodology: listening to and then critiquing nonChristian learning in the light of Christian teaching, followed by transforming and reappropriating this learning in the light of the revelation and work of the Triune God within Christ's incarnation.

Loder's sudden death was a tragic blow to Princeton Seminary and Reformed theology in particular, and to the field of practical theology globally. The festschrift begun by editors Dana Wright and John Kuenzel before his death, and published afterwards, demonstrates the myriad ways in which Loder's students and other colleagues engaged his work during his lifetime. *Koinonia*'s 2006 forum gave scholars new to his work a chance to engage it both face-to-face in our mealtime and formal discussions, and in print.

Almeda Wright's and James Cubie's papers focus primarily upon Loder's methodology as Langford presents it in his paper. Wright questions the paper's investment in "archaic theological concepts" (p. 20) and "universal or normative" (p. 19) solutions and its lack of inclusion of the actual voices of adolescents. Taking what could in some ways be seen as an opposite tack, Cubie questions the way in which Langford's explication of Loder's methodology and engagement with the language of developmental

psychology "requires we depart significantly from the well-established grammar of the language of the Bible and the tradition." (p. 30)

Renée House addresses Langford's first question, "How does Loder see God's ongoing Spiritual presence as a reality that finds social expression?" (p. 6) by making more explicit the ecclesiology she sees as implicit, but vital, in all of his work. In this rich constructive piece, she draws upon her engagement with both Loder's writings and with his actual pedagogical practice in the three of his last doctoral seminars we were privileged to attend together.

In these seminars it was obvious that Loder drew upon the work of Tillich, Barth and Kierkegaard to construct his interdisciplinary method, but also that he held T.F. Torrance's interpretation of Barth's approach to natural theology in particular esteem. Loder also had great respect for the work of Van der Ven and other practical theologians who pioneered the field's engagement with qualitative research methodologies which use interview and survey data to highlight the actual voices of adolescents and others. Although not a primary investigator, he was involved in both grantor-sponsored and collegial conversations with PTS practical theologians Kenda Dean and Richard Osmer around empirical studies on adolescent faith (e.g. a study on globalization). But it is clear that, in his own writing, the empirical research he usually drew upon was case study material from his own clinical practice, a practice conducted within the cultural limitations of the Princeton, New Jersey.

Given the immense theological, philosophical, and scientific muscle, nuance and decades of pedagogical experience Loder brought to his explication of his interdisciplinary method in *The Logic of the* Spirit – and given what I see as Langford's clear grasp of what Loder wrote –Wright's and Cubie's criticisms give me pause. They underline for me how difficult the task of theology-science-culture dialogue is. They also make explicit the depth of the conviction that Wright, Cubie, House, Langford, and Loder share: a conviction that continuing to refine such efforts is a crucial responsibility for those of us gifted with a calling to practice theology.

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A Very Present Help: James Loder's Trinitarian Soteriology and Adolescent Identity Formation

MICHAEL D. LANGFORD

At once, adolescents are thought of as the scourge and hope of our society. Just as some point to youth-driven popular culture as signaling the death knell of community and responsibility, so others identify adolescents as the compassionate leaders of tomorrow. But these generalizations, which probably each hold some truth, too often ignore the very role of society in creating and perpetuating them; adolescents merely serve as a funhouse mirror of our culture, emphasizing and distorting its contours. And what does this mirror reveal? Simply this: The domestication and marginalization of the activity of the Holy Spirit in our culture has both domesticated and marginalized the identity-forming role of salvation in the lives of adolescents. To wit, the lack of Trinitarian focus in our soteriology affects the extent of salvation in our culture, which in turn projects that lack of salvific efficacy upon adolescents with magnified focus.

James Loder, Professor of Philosophy of Christian Education at Princeton Theological Seminary until his death in 2001, based his work as a practical theologian upon the interdisciplinary conversation of these spheres: theology, anthropology and culture. In this paper, I will examine what I am calling his "Trinitarian soteriology" through the lens of his writings concerning adolescent development. In Loder's soteriology, the present transformative activity of the Holy Spirit – the "Third Person" of the Godhead – is critical, just as are the creative and redemptive activities of the First and Second Persons of the Trinity. Loder is not the first to emphasize the need for a fully Trinitarian understanding of salvation, one that pays adequate attention to the "spiritual" ("Holy Spirit related") aspects of salvation. But in his examination of the interplay of the human

spirit and the Holy Spirit, we are able to glean more carefully *why* it is important. And in seeing why Trinitarian soteriology is essential for us, we are able to see how its recovery is especially crucial for adolescents.

Loder termed his methodology of interdisciplinary conversation "Chalcedonian," using the declaration of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 as his archetype. Just as the human and divine natures maintain their own indissoluble integrity as they indivisibly exist within Christ, so science and theology are distinct but inseparable lenses upon all reality.[1] However, Loder claimed that Christ's divine nature ultimately held a sort of ontological priority over his human nature; Christ was like us in all ways *but* sin. In the same way, theology always holds a position of "marginal control" over science in their dialogue which enhances rather than diminishes the claims of both. Loder's interdisciplinarity thus called for an "asymmetrical, bi-polar relational unity," a methodology I hope to employ in my examination of his work.

Integral to Loder's Chacedonian methodology is his assertion that all scientific theory ultimately rests upon a divinely creative and transformative "grammar" or "logic" of order, disorder, reorder, and relationality.[2] The question of whether the creative logic is even partly discernable prior to or apart from special revelation is not my concern here. Rather I am asking how we might let Christian revelation about human origins, human salvation, and especially human ends inform our understanding of current social realities. So my question is this: How does Loder see God's ongoing Spiritual presence as a reality that finds social expression? More specifically: How does Loder define the divine act of salvation within the context of human development? And even more specifically: How does identity formation, especially in adolescence, reveal, reflect and spiritually reassert our salvation?

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1 Loder's book *The Knight's Move: The Relational Logic of the Spirit in Theology and Science* (Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1992) (co-written with physicist Jim Neidhardt) describes the interaction between science and theology, where the former describes a grammar determined by the latter.

2 A detailed description of his paradigm can be found in Loder's *The Transforming Moment* (Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1989), 2-4.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT UNDERSTOOD FROM ABOVE, OR FROM BELOW?

I first want to look briefly at an account of anthropology that holds great sway in the realm of developmental psychology. Psychologist Erik Erikson argues that the developmental task of the adolescent is to apprehend social identity.[3] If, as Erikson argues, the *whole* of life is the process of continually developing identity formation, adolescence is that period in this process when *inner* need for consistency in identity runs most obviously, or perhaps most urgently, head-on into *outer* social reality. Though the adolescent has hitherto spent her life developing a consistent sense of the self, the resultant identity has largely been internally localized to the self and her immediate environment, normally the family and other social groups close at hand, e.g., peer groups. Analogous to the newfound ability of formal manipulation within the intellect[4] – the ability to process abstract symbols within a more complex imaginative environment – the adolescent must now go about the task of constructing a clearer identity within the more complex context of a much broader world.

Psychiatrist Carl Jung identifies the developmental task of humanity as "individuation," whereby the individual moves toward an equilibrium between opposing forces within the psyche. This concept of individuation seems to accurately reflect Erickson's process of adolescent identity formation when we locate Jung's sought-for equilibrium in the internal space between the *self* and "not self," or *other*. Martin Buber pointed out that there can be no recognition of one's own "personhood" without recognition of the integrity of the other. Thus, when the adolescent is able to individuate her own particular identity as it is found within the context of society, or "others," she has completed the developmental task of identity formation.

So we witness the adolescent spending her years trying to figure out who she is in the world, provisionally answering what Loder claims are the

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3 See Erickson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1993), 261-263.

4 I speak here of Jean Piaget, whose work revolutionized the study of childhood cognitive development, and posits adolescence as marking the developmental crux of intellectual development. See *The Psychology of the Child* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

two primary existential questions – Who am I? Why am I here? However, while developmentalists largely agree upon the kinds of questions first encountered within adolescence, they usually leave it to philosophers, theologians, politicians and poets to provide the answers. While modern sciences may have given us better vocabulary to describe the journey of life, they do not appear to have been able to describe the *purpose* of that journey.

It has been noted by many – by philosophers such as Michael Polanyi, scientists such as Albert Einstein, and theologians such as T. F. Torrance – that the object of examination must define the means by which it is understood. In other words, that which is studied must be allowed to dictate its own parameters of study. In this type of understanding that Polanyi calls "personal knowledge," the "knower" is never separated from her knowing. Clearly, this is most intensely the case in the study of humanity. Loder points out that there can be no absolute objectivity in the study of human development when personal knowledge squares the studier face to face with her own oblivion in death, and this helps explain why scientists assert themselves unable to understand the purpose of life's journey. But how then can they make claims about any part of that journey? This begs the question: Can we accurately describe the unfolding process of human development without discussing the purpose or endpoint of that development? If science brackets out consideration of life's *telos*, can it really give us comprehensive understanding about *how* we move toward that *telos*?

Loder's work is helpful at this impasse. Loder endeavors to examine the nature of reality and the phenomena of human experience in light of their purposes as understood from the standpoint of Christian theology.[5] In line with his Chalcedonian methodology, he allows this theology to critique the limitations of human sciences, developmental psychology in our present case.

Loder claims that human development as defined by science alone operates from a reductionistic understanding of existence that flattens out human experience to two dimensions: the self and the other. But Loder's

5 This forms the theme of perhaps Loder's *magnum opus*, *The Logic of the Sprit: Human Development in Theological Perspective* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc., 1998).

theological vantage point – with its largely existential overtones – insists upon four dimensions: the self, the other, the Void, and the Holy. While the Holy is defined as the source of our existence, namely God, Loder defines the Void as the annihilation or "negation" of our existence, namely death, or the absence of God. Thus we can see that the proper *telos* of human development must be informed by the existence of the Void and by the transformation of the Void by the apprehension of the Holy.[6]

Key to Loder's understanding of human development is the fact that we constantly hide from acknowledging the reality of annihilation, of negation, of death. This, in turn, keeps us from true acknowledgment of the Holy. Consequently, we completely misunderstand our purpose. What is this purpose? Again, for Loder, it is Chalcedonian: the end of all human existence can be found in the union of the divine and human natures of the God-man, Jesus Christ. Therefore, in order to properly understand human development, Loder views it through the lens of Christian teleology whereby the purpose of our development is incorporation into this God-man. Just as the Chalcedonian union of God and humanity triumphantly unites the Holy with the Void with transformative effect, so does our reluctance to recognize these dimensions of reality impede our development into this union.

In the profoundly robust anthropology found in his book *Logic of the Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective*, Loder points out that the human ego sets up defenses against the Void in infancy.[7] He argues that the inevitable experience of losing the presence of the primary caregiver begets acute anxiety in the child, generating fear of abandonment and death. Loder refers to this "presence of absence" as the loss of "the Face." The ego springs to the infant's defense in order to protect her psyche, struggling to maintain order in the presence of frightening aloneness experienced as negation. Of course, we see this aloneness and meaninglessness again at the onset of adolescence.

Loder suggests five crucial axes of human development that come into play as the child grows up. She comes to understand herself in terms

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6 For a detailed exposition of these four dimensions, see *The Transforming Moment*, 67-91.

7 See *The Logic of the Spirit*, 109-124.

of such psycho-social realities as objective space and time (the axis of "body"), the interplay of freedom and compulsion ("authority"), real and imaginative constructions of reality ("ideology"), relationships ("love"), and productivity and its relation to self-worth ("work"). As the child develops through these stages, the ego strives to bury the loss of the Face in order to protect the psyche from realizing the ever-present threat of the Void. But when these axes are negotiated only according to two-dimensional reality in an egoistic defensive posture against the Void, authentic development will be retarded. For Loder, human development dictated by socio-cultural forces is merely a provisional and imperfect solution thrown up by the ego, like a wall of sand before a rising flood. The Void can be ignored or temporarily filled, but the spectre of nothingness remains, even if it is not acknowledged within two-dimensional reality.

For proper development, each axis must be experienced in the light of the Presence of God in Christ by means of the Holy Spirit. Only then might our *telos* be approached, not through the suppression of the Void, but through its negation and transformation. To be conquered, the Void must be confronted within the light of the Holy, in which it is "swallowed up." This requires a "figure-ground shift" of reality into four dimensions; in other words, we must come to understand ourselves not simply as human, but as *homo religiosus*. By the power of the Holy Spirit within development, redemption is found when our identity finds its real ground, its eternal ground, within the *unio Christi*. Only through Spirit-to-spirit connection might the axes of development be recalibrated in a salvific manner, whereby the adolescent might locate her identity, her *being*, in Christ. This new paradigm does not replace culture as the context of personal identity, just as the Holy does not deny the reality of the Void. However, one's identity, one's *reality* is transformed, such that all else becomes lesser realities themselves captive to the ground of all being.

In summary, human development, rather than merely a scientific exposition of experience or biology or sociology, becomes intelligible only as it moves the individual toward the Christocentric end that has been divinely defined for her. Our development becomes fully understood when viewed through a theological lens which tells us that as we approach our *telos*, human development becomes inseparable from salvation:

As our development moves us ever-closer toward the completion of our intended identity, we move ever-closer toward the full apprehension of our eschatological reality. Who we are meant to be is identical with God's economy for our salvific formation. This new intelligibility within human development can only become apparent when viewed within the theological claims of revelation.

THE PROBLEM OF ADOLESCENCE

As we have noted, the developmental task of the adolescent is to answer the existential questions "Who am I?" and "Why am I here?" in light of the overarching realities to which she is now exposed. These realities force the adolescent into developmental *constriction* and *saturation*. By developmental constriction, I am referring to the adolescent's search for distinct individual identity ("Who am I?") in light of her broadening social context. By developmental saturation, I am referring to the adolescent's search for meaning ("Why am I here?") in light of a broadening market of ideological options.

Erikson argues that this twofold dilemma might be solved through a *moratorium* on identity, whereby more precise self-identification might be approached within a cultural safety net, a liminal and boundaried "in-between" state where the adolescent is free to "try on" various ideologies and identities offered by the world. While in the past the family has provided this moratorium, in Western culture the family has for far too many adolescents been largely removed. The technological and cultural de-emphasis of family in particular and community in general brings about forced independence at a younger age, often before intellectual or social abilities are sufficiently formed. This independence forces the adolescent to find or build alternate or even artificial community.

In her book *A Tribe Apart*, Patricia Hersch conducts an extended case study of a group of adolescents at a Virginia high school.[8] Her conclusion, in agreement with numerous other studies, is that most adolescents are *alone*. Never before in our cultural history, perhaps in any culture's history, has any age group become so sequestered. Adolescents are left

8 See Hersch, *A Tribe Apart* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1998).

largely to themselves, faced with the task of developing their own norms and values – indeed, their own culture – without guidance or protection. The consequent loss of security ends any moratorium on identity before it can even begin. Without the guidance and safety of the family, the answers to questions of identity are suddenly critical. No longer is adolescence a time to examine identities, but rather it is a time to frantically and radically grasp at one for some sake of existential belonging and meaning. The adolescent's window for psychic and social moratorium, and thus development, is constricted to near oblivion.

At the same time that Western culture has encouraged social constriction within adolescent development, it has also turned loose a fire-hose of ideological saturation. In an increasingly globalized world, many adolescents are inundated with options for identity from across the ideological spectrum. Boundaries of time, space, and norms are tenuous or non-existent, creating the possibility for perpetually un-foreclosed identity as the adolescent endlessly tries on different ideological outfits. In this light, we might say that the adolescent moratorium sans safety net and sans boundaries may be indefinitely extended as graying adolescents face unlimited choices alone, without guidance. It is no surprise that adolescent elements appear in a contemporary culture that values choice in self-identification, and prizes identities that can be constantly and provisionally re-defined.

Thus we see that the normal developmental realization of individuality is exaggerated to isolation, creating a desperate *need to belong*. Further, the normal developmental task of evaluating social ideologies, norms, and roles is made exponentially more complicated, creating a desperate *need for meaning*. The heightened "closed-ness" of social isolation and the heightened "open-ness" of ideological saturation create a stressful situation for the adolescent.

Two typical solutions to this situation are *rigid* adoption of identity, where the adolescent strictly adheres to an ideological and social role, and *diffuse* or "protean" ambiguity, where the adolescent avoids committing to a firm identity. Of course, both of these solutions are unsatisfactory because they disallow the adolescent from honestly evaluating and owning

an identity, and lead to what Erikson terms "role confusion."[9] Without a safety net and without boundaries, the adolescent is forced by the glaring existential questions into entering a perpetual cult of adolescence.

SOTERIOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM

I will now shift to considering what I believe to be the dominant soteriology operating in Western churches, an understanding of salvation that I will suggest ends up encouraging its context of protracted adolescent moratorium provoked by accentuated developmental constriction and saturation. What is striking to me in this soteriology is a consistent lack of emphasis upon *present-tense salvation*. An understanding of *perfect-tense* salvation is certainly commonplace; the Reformed doctrine of election, or even the Augustinian notion of God's unilateral act of grace, lead many to point to Christ's atoning work as the actualization of salvation and the foreclosure of an identity sealed in the Book of Life. Similarly, an understanding of *future-tense* salvation is offered as a promise, a salvation understood as "getting into heaven" where our present lives are but a dusky shadow of the *real* reward that will come after we die. However, when we limit our soteriologies to these two "tenses," a "present presence" of salvation is conspicuously absent. Consequently, any understanding of an *inaugurated eschatology* is lost, and any experience of *unio Christi* becomes something that we can only hope to experience in some distant future, should we happen to be among the elect.

This reduced understanding of salvation, the loss of the *present tense*, is likely the result of common theological criticisms within soteriology. Mystical and historical concepts of salvation, especially those developed within the liberal circles of Friedrich Schleiermacher and his theological progeny were critiqued by neo-orthodox theologians as espousing a present salvation not properly located in Christ. The Mediator instead became a tool to find one's own presently personal actualization of inner peace. Traditional understandings of objective salvation, such as Christ's finished work on the cross, were subjugated to nearly utilitarian status as

9 See Erikson, 261-263.

the means to an individual apprehension of "Christ's spirit," or to the inner state first realized by the fully human Jesus of Nazareth.

Critics claimed that present-tense understandings of salvation were *subjective* and *individual* – "subjective" in the sense that they did not correspond to any objective, ontological redemption of the believer, and "individual" in the sense that they did not correspond to any needed ecclesiology for the believer. The intentions of these criticisms of present-tense soteriologies were well founded; post-liberal critics felt that locating salvation within cognitive or emotional experience ignored the primacy of God's activity in salvation and underestimated the effects of sin in the individual's attempt to attain salvation. In Barthian terms, humanity had replaced God as the Subject of salvation. Confidence, thus, trumped any notion of human fallen-ness and discarded any needed ontological distinction of Christ as Redeemer.

Ironically, in attempting to stamp out the modern soteriologies of subjectivism and individualism by promoting theological conceptions of perfect- and future-tense salvation, theologians actually helped promote cultural individualism and subjectivism. Over-emphasis upon the decision of the Father and the work of the Son obliterate any understanding of the Holy Spirit's present actualization of salvation in the believer. By locating salvation strictly within the past or future, the absence of any present Spiritual and therefore salvific solidarity with Christ hinders identity formation. If "Who am I?" is answered only with "You are one who has already been elected to become 'saved' at some future point," there lacks a sense of present identity other than that which is highly individual and subjective. Without any sense of Holy Spirit-empowered assumption into the *Body of Christ*, the Christian is left alone with only her own constricted and individual experience to hold onto. And without any sense of Holy Spirit-empowered participation in the *ongoing work of Christ*, the Christian is left ideologically adrift with only a saturated and subjective experience to rely upon. The Body and work of Christ remain ambiguous, formal, and highly rhetorical for the adolescent who is grasping for some sense of identity, and she thus turns to whatever communities and ideologies are presently useful and immediately at hand.

LODER'S *SALUS PRAESENS*

Loder rarely refers explicitly to "salvation" as such. However, within his corpus the overriding theme of *redemptive transformation* consistently indicates a soteriology centering upon a Christocentric identity formation made real by the present activity of the Holy Spirit. For Loder, redemption involves an ongoing interaction between the human spirit – our "exocentric" human tendency toward relationality – and the Holy Spirit. This redemptive and transformative interaction radically changes our reality. When the human spirit reaches out for a solution to the threat of negation, the Holy Spirit's gift of grace may transform the Christian's self-understanding through the eschatological in-breaking of the Holy and its triumph over the present Void, such that her being becomes not merely "I," but "I-yet-not-I-but-Christ."[10]

Loder thus sees our whole life as a process of identity formation in which we become who we were meant to be, indeed who we already are in Christ. This is salvation: an opening up of our present reality such that we apprehend the current state of our God-ordained *unio Christi* through the presence and power of the Holy Spirit. This concept of salvation moves beyond strictly forensic justification or future eschatological assumption. For Loder, salvation is *now* as the Holy Spirit presently forms us as clay into our true being though intrinsic, though perhaps unrealized, spirit-to-Spirit relationality.

This process seems to closely approximate so-called ontological notions of salvation, whereby Christ comes to create, or re-create, our being. Salvation perceived in this way as ontic "recapitulation" is well known in theology, going as far back as Irenaeus, Athanasius, and the Cappadocians. Within this understanding of atonement, God long ago began a creative process that the divine will is loath to leave unfinished. The *logos* therefore takes up its creative task of formation – a task it began at the birth of the universe in the first chapter of Genesis – by becoming the Second Adam, redeeming our infected humanity.

Within Loder's understanding of ontological redemption as re-creative transformation, salvation becomes more Trinitarian, and attains a more

10 In describing the result of transformation, Loder refers to Galatians 2:20. See *The Transforming Moment*, 106-107, 170.

present-tense reality through its emphasis upon the work of the *Spiritus Creator*.[11] The revelation of God in Christ is made *presently* real to us in the inward yet objective work of the Holy Spirit that actualizes the already-but-not-yet in-breaking of divine reality as a "foretaste of glory divine."

RESTORED LOCATION OF ADOLESCENT IDENTITY FORMATION

We have established that for Loder, within identity formation, the Christian experiences salvation by means of the Holy Spirit who redemptively re-creates or transforms her into the image of Christ. Post-liberal critics would be happy to note that this present-tense salvation is neither individual to the point of Pelagianism, nor subjective to the point of Manichaeism. Rather, it is a salvation that may happen only in the presence of spiritual *koinonia*, and only at the hands of God in Christ by power of the *Spiritus Creator*. And these characteristics of redemptive relationality and transformed reality make Loder's Spiritual soteriology of identity formation crucial for adolescents as they answer their urgent existential questions. Who am I? Why am I here? Within identity formation, Spirit-to-spirit relationality answers these questions with a definitive *unio Christi*.

We noted that adolescents lack *belonging* in a constricted isolation, and that they lack *meaning* in a saturated cafeteria of ideologies. Loder shows us that the safety net and the boundaries needed by the developing adolescent might be found only through the Holy Spirit, namely in authentic Christian community. The physical presence of Christ in the world by means of the Spirit-created community of *koinonia* may provide the adolescent with the ultimate safety net bestowing the greatest freedom, the ultimate boundaries allowing the greatest security. Questions of developmental constriction and saturation are answered with a moratorium protecting and guiding adolescents through Christ's Body as animated by the Holy Spirit. In the presence of God-with-us, the Face is finally and fully replaced. Here, the adolescent finds in her developing Christian identity *true* belonging and *true* meaning.

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11 Loder's conception of the *Spiritus Creator*, or "Creator Spirit," comes from the book of the same name by Regin Prenter (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1953).

Adolescents need something more enduring than their constantly shifting environment. They need something real. Something authentic. Something to love. Present-tense salvation provides adolescents with the experiential knowledge needed to apprehend their identity within this hyper-reality. It is not merely an identity that they are taught in catechism or an identity that will await them in heaven. Instead, their identity is bestowed and developed through present participation in the Holy Spirit, growing into the identity *that they already possess*. The figure-ground shift that occurs in redemptive transformation leads the adolescent to recognize the reality of the Holy, and this in turn becomes definitive for all remaining reality. In the new identity of I-yet-not-I-but-Christ, the adolescent finds ultimacy as being part of the *unio Christi*, incorporated into a divine love affair that is more real than the air we breathe.

CONCLUSION

When we say that God is Holy Spirit, we are saying that God is with us and for us here and now. For James Loder, salvation is incomplete without the work of the Holy Spirit within our human development, and this sort of "present presence" is precisely what adolescents need for their task of identity formation. This notion of salvation reveals to the adolescent the presence of a redemptive community and a deep reality within her swirling world. Perhaps the under-emphasis of Trinitarian soteriology can share in the blame for a Church too filled with adolescent Christians of all ages.

For adolescents, salvation will not be found until she understands her identity as it is *now*. Who we *are* ought not to be identified with who we might be someday when we get our degree or job or family, or even when we "get to heaven." On the other end of the spectrum, who we are ought not to be identified with who we have been determined to be by an oppressive history, an abusive family, or even an electing God. Our identity cannot be locked into what amounts to a "legal fiction," as went the criticism of Melanchthon. If our present identity is tied up with mere *epistemic* categories of a determinative past or expected future, it will always fall short. Our identity must be an *ontological* reality, one that is actualized in us by the Holy Spirit. The adolescent requires an identity that fills her

longing for the Face, an identity that provides a timeless and unswerving reality. According to Loder, both of these needs are met in our *unio Christi* as determined from Creation and as realized by the Holy Spirit. If the act of the Spirit is truncated, so is salvation.

In this Trinitarian soteriological model, we see the importance of all three aspects of "tense" within salvation. In the Transfiguration, Peter, James and John saw Jesus in an image of his future glory, accompanied with patriarchs of Israel's past. But could it be that these disciples discovered the most significant part of their present identity in glimpsing "the kingdom of God come in power"? Could it be that they experienced their salvation in the glory of God's presence? Could it be that in the witnessing of a reality stronger than space and time, of a community more profound than the depth of sin, that here the apostles finally emerged from spiritual adolescence? Pointing to the ways in which we might participate in our *own* transfigurations only through the power of the Holy Spirit, Loder would say, "yes." For the sake of a population of adolescents depleted of identity, community, and meaning, may the Church find a way to reach out to them with the same answer.

KOINONIA XVIII (2006), 19-26.

What is Salvation for Adolescents?

ALMEDA WRIGHT

This question can be addressed in innumerable ways. For example it can be approached by seeking to discern how adolescents understand salvation as taught to them in particular Christian churches and traditions, by defining what is salvific for adolescents, and by assessing what adolescents are most in need of and how God responds to those needs. Mr. Langford's paper represents the third approach in that he defines the "problem of adolescence" and gives a theological "solution" to this problem. His treatment of the role of salvation in the lives of adolescents does not engage how adolescents themselves come to understand the theological categories handed down to them; neither does it focus upon adolescents' abilities to "ventriloquate," that is, to parrot theological definitions and perspectives without really being able to name their sources or reflecting upon their meaning.[1] Instead, Langford's approach presumes a telos, a purpose and a meaning given by the Divine that all humans are striving for. This telos transcends the particularities of each human and sees them universally in a search to overcome a fear of the Void and become reconciled to the Divine (Langford, 9-11).

While recognizing the different ways one can approach the issue of soteriology for adolescents, I remain apprehensive about the universal or normative solution Mr. Langford offers. Furthermore, my assessment of the myriad approaches to adolescent soteriology rests in my related commitments to valuing the voices of adolescents and to working for communal justice and transformation. These commitments frame my response to Mr. Langford and his reading of James Loder.

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1 Evelyn Parker, *Trouble Don't Last Always: Emancipatory Hope Among African-American Adolescents* (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2003), 43-4.

ADOLESCENT CENTERED SOTERIOLOGY

So I begin with the question of "Is Langford's appropriation of James Loder's Trinitarian Soteriology an adolescent centered soteriology?" I question whether Mr. Langford's work is primarily concerned with the lived realities of adolescents or if it is more invested in archaic theological concepts that can then be applied to the lives of adolescents. For example, in my opinion his conclusion that adolescent identity issues are resolved by taking on a Christocentric identity, seems to ignore the fact that youth need help making sense of the multidimensional selves or identities that they have—of which their Christian identity is only a part. For example, is an adolescent's *unio Christo* separate from her embodied reality as a female, an African American, a same-gender loving person? Does a Christian identity trump all of that?

Whereas I agree with the premise behind Langford's appropriation of Loder's Chalcedonic methodology, I argue for a somewhat different theoretical starting point. In positing the concept of an adolescent centered theology the starting point must rest in the experiences of adolescents, even before we begin second and third order analysis. For I see adolescent centered theology as theology that takes the experiences and contributions of adolescents as primary for any theological reflection. It is not theology that simply maps onto adolescent experiences the theories and categories of scholars who may or may not consider adolescent experience at all in their theorizing. Neither does it allow the voices of adolescents to become obscured in social scientific theories that value parsimony to the detriment of seeing the complexity and messiness of all human experiences.[2]

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2 The work of feminist philosopher and psychoanalyst Jane Flax further challenges parsimony in theorizing and writes "Perhaps 'reality' can have 'a' structure only from the falsely universalizing perspective of the dominant group...only to the extent that one person or group can dominate the whole can 'reality' appear to be governed by one set of rules...or be told by one 'story'. Criteria of theory construction such as parsimony or simplicity may be met by the suppression or denial of the experiences of the 'other(s).' The preference for such criteria may also reflect a desire to keep others out." See, Jane Flax, *Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 28.

Adolescent centered theology challenges us to create theology with and for adolescents, not simply about adolescents.[3] For example in noting that salvation is *unio Christi,* Langford does not engage the more difficult task of ascertaining what this state of being one with the Divine looks like and how that is manifest. For if he were to engage in this process, he would see the need to move beyond this universalizing category to attend to the particular concerns and experiences of adolescents—in essence recognizing the need to contextualize and center his understanding of *unio Christi* in the lived experiences of particular adolescents.

Adolescent centered theology falls in a long line of contextual theologies, such as some liberation, feminist, womanist, and *mujerista* theologies, that seek to challenge the hegemony of Western theologies, but to more importantly ask the question of "how is God working with and in the lives of this particular group or community?"[4] Contextual theologies also recognize the value of honoring and including the "marginal" voices in the construction of theology.

Furthermore, most examples of what I consider adolescent centered theologies are in the practical theological genres, which seek not to talk about "The Problem of Adolescence," but seek to improve practice with adolescents. Adolescent centered theology then is both contextual and practical theology, as works like Dori Baker's *Doing Girlfriend Theology* and Dean and Clark's *Starting Right* demonstrate. I wonder, therefore, if a *telos*-centered approach can be used for improving practices with adolescents, or if it requires an intermediary step to do so.

Adolescent centered theology, in addition to being eminently practical and contextual, follows the lead of adolescents themselves in recognizing the importance of relationships for teens. This relational focus suggests a second direction for my response to Langford's appropriation of Loder's Trinitarian soteriology.

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3 Here I'm expanding upon a parallel concept raised in response to feminist writings and research in Diane Wolf, ed. *Feminist Dilemmas in Field Work* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), 3. Wolf writes that "there is now a great deal of research about women by women, but there is not much academic feminist research "with" and "for" women."

4 The idea of the hegemony of Western theologies is important because Loder's idea that the theological categories have "ontological priority" begs the question of which theological categories or understanding of theology is Loder giving priority to (Loder 1998: 37, 41).

RELATIONAL SELF, AGENCY AND COMMUNAL SALVATION

One of the major shortcomings of most western theology and human developmental theories is that while most recognize the social dimension as an essential part of theorizing, the resultant theories typically focus on the individual—with less emphasis on the individuals' interactions with the community or as agents capable of affecting change in the community. The same can be said of Langford's appropriation of Loder's Trinitarian soteriology for adolescent identity development.

While Langford describes the societal realities that are leading to an isolated generation and denounces the "technological and cultural de-emphasis of family in particular and community in general [that] brings about forced independence at a younger age," his paper does not focus on transforming a society that is not well equipped to help the adolescent figure out her purpose or meaning in life (11) . By overlooking the potential of a Trinitarian soteriology in transforming society, it also appears that Langford sees salvation as helping adolescents cope with a dysfunctional society instead of also asking how can they transform or redeem society.

Whereas Loder's present-tense soteriology offers an excellent alternative to soteriology that only considers the salvific work as complete in the past or a promise for the future, Langford's appropriation of Loder's soteriology fails to emphasize the results of the spiritual transformation for the communities in which individuals are shaped.

Langford correctly asserts that "The domestication and marginalization of the activity of the Holy Spirit in our culture has both domesticated and marginalized the identity-forming role of salvation in the lives of adolescents...[and has diminished the] extent of salvation in our culture...," but he doesn't take the implied critique of culture far enough (5). For I am skeptical as to whether refocusing on the movement of the Holy Spirit in transforming individual identities will ever be sufficient, if we fail to think critically about how we see or experience the Holy Spirit working to transform communities as well.

Family Therapist, pastor and scholar Archie Smith raises a valuable alternative to how we conceptualize the self. Smith conceives of the human as a "relational self." He bases his conception on the African proverb, "One

is only human because of others, with others, and for others."[5] In Smith's work the individual is not collapsed with society—becoming a passive product of society. Instead, Smith stresses the transformative agency of individuals and groups.[6] He calls for a combination of both inner and outer transformation in order for the salvific work of God to be complete.[7]

The idea of a relational self is helpful in our work with adolescents and in responding to the work of the Holy Spirit in identity formation. Instead of feeding into the notion that youth are in complete isolation, the concept of relational selves calls attention to the interconnectivity of persons and institutions. It also points to the role of persons in transforming the communities of which they are a part.[8]

From a Womanist perspective that takes seriously the needs of adolescents and the rest of our society right now and relies upon the ongoing creative and transformative work of the Divine now, I agree with Langford in noting that a soteriology that includes a significant present-tense component is imperative. However, the present-tense is imperative not merely because other understandings of salvation would leave youth without an "identity now," but because adolescents need much more than a firm sense of identity, based on the work of the Holy Spirit or a sense of belonging to a divine community. The questions of "Who am I?" and "Why am I here?" have both individual and communal implications, and we must be able to see and expect the Holy Spirit to work in transforming both the individual and the society, so that they may flourish now.

Mr. Langford is not alone is neglecting the importance of the communal element of pneumatic transformation. Youth themselves also neglect this

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5 Archie Smith, *Relational Self: Ethics and Therapy from a Black Church Perspective* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1982), 27.

6 Ibid., 80.

7 I recognize Smith's emphasis on the communal and the individual in this conception of the relational self, for he writes that "The human self will be identified paradoxically and ideally as communal and individual, as determined and yet somehow free, as dependent and yet independent" (Ibid., 54).

8 Smith emphasizes the ability of individuals and groups to work toward social transformation by not adjusting "one's response to fit the normative and taken for granted patterns of society," but instead to "move beyond them through recognition that spontaneous and unpredictable activity contains possibilities for placing the taken-for-granted world in question" (Ibid., 84).

element, which suggests that a corrective to individual-focused faith is even more imperative. Religious educator Evelyn Parker in her work among African American adolescents found that the adolescents she interviewed demonstrated a disconnection between their Christian faith and the social ills of the world. She writes:

> Surprisingly, the teens most active in worship, Sunday School, and youth groups, and most articulate about their Christian beliefs and practices were the ones who poignantly talked about racism never ending...Absent from their conversations was the expectation that God can transform racist people and oppressive institutions of domination. ...Even though theological themes of God's protective presence and God's power to transform and save permeated the life stories of the youth active in their congregations, none of them talked about racism in light of their deeply held theological beliefs.[9]

This demonstrates that even when adolescents have a strong sense of who they are in Christ and how the Holy Spirit is working in them now, salvation and transformation of societal ills are not part of the same conversation. I recognize that this "fragmented spirituality" and partial understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit is a result of much of the Christian theology being taught in their churches. Such theology speaks of personal salvation and of personal relationships with Jesus. And therefore youth grow up with an understanding that "I can do all things through Christ who strengthens me," but without an understanding that "all things" include much beyond their individual achievements.

Parker's work reminds us that adolescents are not blind to the injustices around them. The fact that youth see and are concerned about injustices should serve to redirect the focus of Christian churches and theologians. Their concerns demand that we ask "Why are adolescents hopeless about the power of God to transform society? Where is God and how is God working in the worlds that adolescents must inhabit? How is God calling us to respond to the larger societal issues?"

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9 Evelyn Parker, *Trouble Don't Last Always,* 29.

CONCLUSION

While I appreciate the value of Langford's effort to reclaim the Spirit as agent of transformation for adolescents, I also recognize that his analysis does not go far enough. Adolescents need the church to reach out to them with more than a strong unswerving identity in Christ. Adolescents also need the church to re-affirm their agency as social beings. The Holy Spirit has been emasculated—resulting in fragmented spiritualities that affirm God is only working on inner transformation. However, adolescents know and see the injustices around them and know that all of humanity is in need of great communal and social transformation. While we may remain skeptical as to how or when communities will change, adolescents need us to remain hopeful—embracing a present-tense soteriology, building on the creative work of the Divine through a revolutionary messiah, and not simply through a domesticated personal Jesus.

KOINONIA XVIII (2006), 27-34.

Both – And?: Natural Theology in James Loder, A Response to Michael Langford[1]

JAMES F. CUBIE

Michael Langford has brought together – in an impressive, synthetic manner – a number of concerns about the place of identity formation in adolescents, and he relates them in an equally dynamic way to James Loder's treatment of the "present transformative activity of the Holy Spirit." Langford's paper raises a question that surely must be on the minds of most pastors, lay people, and theologians: Should we teach the Christian faith in a relevant, nuanced way that takes account of the hard-won insights of research into adolescent psychology? Not only does Langford answer this question with an emphatic Yes, but also qualifies this Yes along lines consistent with Loder's "Chalcedonian" approach to interdisciplinary work. That is: modern psychology is good, as far as it goes, but it needs to open out into a transcendent dimension modern research intentionally leaves to one side. I should mention at the outset that this is a response to Langford's take on Loder, and to the extent that he gets Loder wrong, I would not want anything I attribute to Langford to be imputed to Loder.

Loder's interdisciplinary method has been described as "dialectical", but it seems to me to be, at least in the way Langford has presented it, more correlational in practice. I take "dialectical" – broadly – to be an approach which uses the language of the Bible and the Christian tradition as the primary critical force in any dialogue with disciplines other than theology. And I understand "correlational" to mean an approach that gives far greater freedom to discourse other than first-order Christian language

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1 This response is dedicated, such as it is, to Rev. Dr. Christopher Morse, of Union Seminary (NYC), who put me through my first dogmatic paces, and encouraged me to pursue the dogmatic task without "fear or favor." *In Christo Patri.*

(i.e. the Bible, Christian tradition) to interpret, and even correct, what is seen to be inadequate or worn out Church rhetoric. I am aware that these methods are generally attached to two major Protestant theologians of the last century, and without wishing to settle the debate between them, I will now cite one of them in order to indicate the direction of my critique.[2]

1. Karl Barth in III/2 of the *Church Dogmatics*, after describing four anthropological approaches to the human subject, writes this:

> [A] knowledge of man which is non-theological but genuine is not only possible but basically justified and necessary even from the standpoint of theological anthropology. The Word and revelation of God is not the source from which this knowledge, even in the final form, draws its information concerning man. In all its forms it is the general knowledge which man derives from consideration of himself. But this does not necessarily mean that what it knows of man is false and worthless .... It cannot, of course, lead us to the knowledge of real man. But it may proceed from or presuppose a knowledge of real man .... It will then see them more modestly, less metaphysically, but for that very reason so much the more precisely and strictly and completely.[3]

"Knowledge of real man" would, for Barth, mean knowledge of our selves as elected and called in Christ, and all that that entails.[4] Any interaction with what might be garnered from humanity's consideration of itself (e.g. in the field of adolescent psychology), may presuppose or proceed from knowledge of "real man". Though it is fair to maintain that in his permissive recommendation – "it *may* proceed . . . " – Barth is both guarding the freedom of God to witness to himself as he sees fit, and is

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2 See Bruce McCormack's *Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), for a full development of this controlling aspect of Barth's theology. I am using "dialectical" in a broad sense to make a dogmatic point. My approach is not necessarily consistent with McCormack's historical analysis – though it is not, I think, inconsistent with it.

3 Karl Barth *Church Dogmatics*, III/2, trans. Knight, Bromiley, et al. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960), 202. Ital. mine.

4 There are, for Barth, six points that delineate the "full and sober limits" not to be transgressed in a "theological definition of the nature of" humanity: 1. We are to be understood mediately and indirectly in light of the fact that we come from God and that God moves to us. 2. Every person – without exception – is to be understood in terms of the divine deliverance enacted in Jesus Christ. 3. Our true determination is to be had in participating in the history of the glory of God. 4. Our freedom cannot mean escape from the Lordship of God. 5. Our proper action is to be understood in light of the divine action in God's favor toward us, which means simply "doing justice to the grace addressed to us." 6. That our existence is an event in which we are for God. See III/2, pp 73-4.

giving maximal freedom to the obedient response of humanity to grace, this is still hard to reconcile with the previous sentence, which I would exegete in this manner: All the ways to humanity that do not begin with God's self-revelation in Christ, will not, somehow, get us to him. There are not two sources of revelation, but one: Jesus Christ. And however humble or inadequate we might think the language describing him, in the Bible and Christian tradition, still, these must be given pride of place when we evaluate anything which would claim to give us better insight into who we are and why we are here.

2. Several contemporary theologians have noted "the basic Chalcedonian character of Barth's christology,"[5] and it would seem that if Loder is proceeding along Chalcedonian lines, this would make him and Barth brothers in arms when they turn to theological anthropology. But, as Langford notes: "Loder pointed out that Chalcedon claimed Christ's divine nature ultimately held a sort of [ontological] priority over his human nature." This way of understanding the Definition of Chalcedon becomes, for Loder, a rationale for arguing that theology holds a position of "marginal control" over other disciplines of inquiry. Loder's construal, however, falls short of the language we find in the Definition, and misses that it was formulated in order to fight Apollinarianism, which sought to truncate the humanity of Christ.[6] The second part of the Definition stresses that we apprehend the two natures of Christ "without contrasting them according to area or function."[7] In other words, to play one function – whether divine or human – off against the other, is explicitly ruled out because it privileges one at the expense of the other. If we follow the logic of Loder's "interdisciplinary method – Christology" analogy, then Loder's understanding of Chalcedon lapses into making Christ more God than human, instead of maintaining that "The distinctiveness of each nature is

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5 See George Hunsinger "Karl Barth's Christology: Its Basic Chalcedonian Character" in *Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 131-47.

6 *Creeds of the Churches: A Reader in Christian Doctrine from the Bible to the Present* 3rd ed., ed. John H. Leith (Louisville: John Knox, 1982), 34.

7 Ibid, 36.

not nullified by the union.... the 'properties' of each nature are conserved and both natures *concur* in one 'person' and in one *hypostasis*."[8]

3. Perhaps as a result of giving theology only "marginal" control over other disciplines, Loder puts theology in the position of having to answer "the two primary existential questions – Who am I? Why am I here?" (7) In order to answer these questions in a way more adequate than science, Loder, according to Langford, brings a "theological vantage point" (8) to bear, by insisting upon four dimensions to better grasp the nature of present-tense salvation: the self, the other, the Void, and the Holy. It would seem that because "The Body and work of Christ remain ambiguous, formal, and highly rhetorical for the adolescent who is grasping for some sense of identity" (14) the old word "God" will not do, and must be renamed "the Holy... the source of our existence."(9) The "Void" is meant to do the work that the unholy Trinity: sin, death, and the devil, once did. The Void means "the annihilation or negation of our existence, namely death, or the absence of God."(9) The moves that Loder makes here seem to be yet another indication of a correlational method that gives priority to "needs" (culminating in "the two primary existential questions"), which the language of Christian theology (albeit changed substantially) is meant to *answer* more meaningfully than other disciplines.

Barth's indication that knowledge of real humanity will be less "metaphysical", seems to me especially relevant here. The new language that Loder proposes is "metaphysical" to the extent that it requires we depart significantly from the well-established grammar of the language of the Bible and the tradition. The language of the Church may, indeed, have grown highly rhetorical, such that catechism is only a reinforcement of the fact. But what is not explicitly stated by Loder is that the language of existentialism, of "needs" as construed by adolescent psychological research, and the transmutation of biblical language, *all* require a catechism of their own. What Loder does here seems to me a prime example of what Wittgenstein calls "language gone on holiday," in this case, from the life

8 Ibid., 36. Emphasis added on "concur".

of the Church.[9] If we observe that our traditional language is idling,[10] and therefore not doing the necessary work, this may be less a remark about the language itself than a condemnation of the absence of practices it is meant to shape. A good biblical foundation for interrogating theologians who use language in this way, is 1 Corinthians 14.8: "For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" (KJV).

Loder's transmutation of biblical language also raises the old question of sources of revelation: Are there two sources of revelation? Such that the one that does *not* proceed from Christ can fruitfully determine how we are to receive him? Shall needs, the experience of adolescents – however schematized – function as correctives of God's self-revelation in Christ? It seems that through Loder's misconstrual of Chalcedon, and the resulting methodological approach which only gives "marginal" control to theology, two sources are recognized. Langford's interpretation of Loder exhibits this tendency in a couple of places when Langford attempts to move from identity-formation language to theological language by saying "To put it in theological terms...", "Theologically speaking...", or "through a theological lens" (20) as if adolescent psychology and Christian theology were but two different methods of getting at the same phenomena, in the way that several people might sit around a tree, and attempt to describe how it looks from their perspectives.

The better half of the Reformed tradition has maintained that natural theology[11] is, to a greater or lesser degree, the Rubicon – once we have passed over into humanity's capacity to receive, and therefore fit, revelation according to its needs, we have reached the point of no return, and might as well look at sin as an infection which Christ heals rather than a corruption or enslavement which Christ overcomes gratuitously on the Cross, and we might as well trade *finitum non capax Infiniti* for a model in which

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9 See Ludwig Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), para. 38.

10 Ibid., para. 132.

11 "By 'natural theology' I mean every (positive *or* negative) *formulation of a system* which claims to be theological, *i.e.* to interpret divine revelation, whose *subject*, however, differs fundamentally from the revelation in Jesus Christ and whose *method* therefore differs equally from the exposition of Holy Scripture." Karl Barth "No! Answer to Emil Brunner", in Emil Brunner *Natural Theology: Comprising Nature and Grace*, trans. Peter Fraenkel (London: G. Bles Centenary Press, 1946), 74-5.

grace simply completes nature. Indeed, it would seem that Langford's presentation of Loder's understanding of *Salus Praesens* follows the grace-completing-nature model: "When the human spirit reaches out for a solution to the threat of negation, the gift of grace may transform the Christian's self-understanding."(15) So the gift of grace presupposes that we reach for it. It appears to no longer be freely given, but requires that the "human spirit" work to obtain it.

4. "The finite is not capable of the Infinite." I would like to use this *regula fidei* from the Reformed tradition as a point of departure for the final question I would like to raise. Landford presents Loder's attempts toward an understanding of humanity under the *unio Christi* model. This model has a rich tradition, and has sparked a great deal of current debate.[12] But, once again, Loder, determined by his misconstrual of Chalcedon, and by his adoption of extra-biblical terminology, is presented as proceeding in a way that raises the question whether the distinction between humanity and God is not finally obscured in order to make salvation present tense. Langford insists that the "Chalcedonian union of God and humanity triumphantly unites the Holy with the Void," and our reluctance "to recognize these dimensions of reality impede our development into this union."(9) This union is accomplished, apparently, by the power of the Holy Spirit alone – which raises the question whether what Loder maintains throughout is a form of Tritheism, in which the works are divided according to person.[13] But our development into union with Christ means that, again, *when* we reach out for a solution, grace is given such that the individual believer's "being becomes not merely 'I,' but 'I-yet-not-I-but-Christ'."(15) This understanding is meant to move us beyond "forensic and eschatological assumption", to an understanding of salvation as *now*. And it is a salvation "that may happen only in the

12 See Bruce McCormack, "Participation in God, Yes, Deification, No: Two Modern Protestant Responses to an Ancient Question," in *Denkwurdiges Geheimnis: Beitrage zur Gottelehre, Festschrift fur Eberhard Jungel zum 70 Geburtstag* Heraus. I.U. Dalferth, J. Fischer, H.-P. Großhans (Mohr Siebeck: 2004), 347-374.

13 Langford seems to maintain that this is the case: "For James Loder, salvation is incomplete without the work of the Holy Spirit within our human development, and this sort of 'present presence' is precisely what adolescents need for their task of identity formation." (17) This would seem to be a perfect example of biblical language ("Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God the Lord is one!" Deut. 6.4) being made to fit human experience.

presence of the spiritual *koinonia*."(16) Salvation is pushed even further into the realm of the Church, because the developing adolescent can only find the boundaries needed "through the Holy Spirit, *namely* in authentic Christian community. The physical presence of Christ in the world by means of the Spirit-created community."(16) Part of the concern that has driven Langford to draw upon Loder's work to make these moves is that an inadequate understanding of salvation might lock out "any *experience* of *unio Christi*."(13) The end-result of this understanding of *unio Christi* is meant to effect what Loder terms a "figure-ground shift" of our four-dimensional reality into the *homo religiosus*.(10)

One way to approach what Loder has put forward here is simply to begin with Genesis 3.5, which identifies the temptation to be like God. Does Loder maintain that my state of being as *homo religiosus* is so transformed that I cannot discern whether it is I or Christ at work? There is certainly Pauline language that would seem to suggest this possibility, but to presume that there is not critique internal to the Bible on this matter (even within the Pauline corpus) is to take a few passages and run with them. Eberhard Jungel (following Luther) might also be of help in this matter: Jungel would maintain that God differentiates savingly between himself and us, precisely in order to preserve our humanity, and keep us from attempting to become more than human.[14] Another approach would be to ask whether Loder views the Church as the continuation of the Incarnation. Is the Church to be identified strictly with the work of the Holy Spirit? If the Church is the continuation of the Incarnation, then it would seem that Incarnation is improperly understood as *not* absolutely unique, but repeatable in some fashion. Finally, we can ask, with Bonhoeffer, whether our development into a *homo religiosus* is really the *telos* of the Christian life:

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14 "For in the last analysis, the revelation of God which it is the concern of Christian theology to understand means just this: for the good of humanity God himself intends the proper distinction between himself and humanity, a distinction which humanity itself always neglects. In the above cited exposition of Ps. 5:3, Luther stated that the very reason for God's becoming man in Jesus Christ is that humans become human.... [Luther:] In summary: We are to be men [sic] and not God, it will not be otherwise . . . ." Eberhard Jungel *The Freedom of a Christian: Luther's Significance for Contemporary Theology,* trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), 25. This is a constant theme throughout Jungel's work. See esp. his *Justification* (New York: T and T Clark, 2001).

> The Christian is not a *homo religiosus*, but simply a man [*sic*], as Jesus was a man – in contrast, shall we say, to John the Baptist. I don't mean the shallow and banal this-worldliness of the enlightened, the busy, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound this-worldliness, characterized by discipline and the constant knowledge of death and resurrection.[15]

This is not an approach that attempts to make the posing of "the two primary existential questions" the point of contact for God's answer:

> Christian apologetic has taken the most varied forms of opposition.... Even though there has been surrender on all secular problems, there still remain the so-called "ultimate questions" – death, guilt – to which only "God" can give the answer.... Of course, we now have the secularized offshoots of Christian theology, namely existentialist philosophy and the psychotherapists, who demonstrate to secure, contented, and happy mankind that it is really unhappy and desperate and simply unwilling to admit that it is in a predicament about which it knows nothing, and from which only they can rescue it.... [The ordinary person] has neither time nor the inclination to concern himself with his existential despair, or to regard his perhaps modest share of happiness as a trial, a trouble, or a calamity.16

Perhaps what Bonhoeffer points to here is not the answer needed, and his approach only results in a "rigid adoption of identity, where the adolescent strictly adheres to an ideological and social role" (12). But if asked to summarize my basic response to this proposal Langford has made, based upon Loder's work, it would be: The Church does not give answers, it celebrates mysteries.[17]

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15 Dietrich Bonhoeffer *Letters and Papers from Prison: The Enlarged Edition* Ed. E. Bethge. Trans. R. Fuller, F. Clark, et al. (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1997), 369.

16 Ibid., 326.

17 See 1 Cor. 4:1-5 "...servants of Christ and stewards of God's mysteries." I am indebted to Christopher Morse for bringing this key verse to my attention in "Not Peddlers but Stewards: The Pauline Images" in the 3rd chapter of his *Not Every Spirit: A Dogmatics of Christian Disbelief* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity, 1994), 43. See also the motto for Eberhard Jungel *Justification: The Heart of the Christian Faith*, trans. Jeffrey Cayzer (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2001).

KOINONIA XVIII (2006), 35-40.

"An Ecclesiological Hunch"

RENEE S. HOUSE

Michael Langford's essay has forced me to work through some hunches that I have long held about Dr. James Loder's ecclesiology, but had never taken the time further to explore. Dr. Loder and I seemed always to be discussing questions of ecclesiology, trying to navigate the tension between his very robust sense of the Spirit's unmediated presence and my abiding sense of the God's faithful use of the "means of grace," in the Spirit, to convert and sanctify the world. In my brief response I will attempt to demonstrate the fundamental continuity of Loder's ecclesiology with classical Reformed ecclesiology. I offer this elaboration because I believe it uncovers in Loder's theoretical perspective in a way that encourages us more fully to embrace the church's core practices as trustworthy signs of the God's real salvific presence, now, in relation to adolescent development.

Early in his essay Langford asks : "How does Loder see God's ongoing spiritual presence as a reality that finds social expression?"(6) On my first trip through this paper, I wrote in the margin: "Church would be the obvious answer!" This is *my* first response. My burden is to show that "church" is also where Loder locates "God's ongoing spiritual presence as a reality that finds social expression." I say this recognizing that our teacher and mentor was also of a mind to say that the church was sometimes the *last* place in which to seek the spiritual presence of God.

In an earlier, longer version of this paper, Langford noted that Loder's ecclesiology was never sufficiently developed, but that, nevertheless, it plays a significant role in his perspective. Indeed, Loder embraced the interactionist perspective on human development insisting that persons do not develop apart from a social context. This means that optimal human *spiritual* development, at least, and *all* of human development, at most, requires the church. Langford notes, "Loder seems to indicate that identity formation happens in the midst of, even precisely through, the

community of Christ."[1] Langford suggests that we could center Loder's ecclesiology in the existence of the Spirit-formed *koinonia* of which Christ is the head, and in which is mirrored the eternal relational dance of the Trinity. Through other persons in this *koinonia* of the Spirit we discover God's love for us throughout the life cycle.

Spirit-formed *koinonia* in which believers are joined to Christ who leads them in the dance of divine love is not a bad place to start in setting forth one's ecclesiology. One could begin and end here in confidence were it not for the persistence of sin. Loder was so keenly aware that the *koinonia* in its social reality participates in patterns of ego maintenance that cover the "void," and suppress the "Holy" thereby impeding God's intentions for human development. He never tired of naming the reality that the church happily participates in "socially acceptable patterns of mutual self-destruction."[2] The *koinonia* on this side of the parousia is always both sinful and saintly at the same time. Thus, an ecclesiology that attempts to locate the ongoing, real presence of God entirely in the being and acting of this pre-parousia *koinonia* will be frustrated by a "now you see it, now you don't" reality.

For this reason, Loder offers an ecclesiology in which the spiritual presence of God, as a work of the Holy Spirit, becomes unequivocally, indisputably durable, concrete and visible by other means. There is no question that this ecclesiology exists in the shadows as background and foundation for his construction of human development in terms of spirit-to-Spirit relationality.[3] This ecclesiology does not receive Loder's focal attention, and thus, locating it is rather like finding a needle in a haystack.

I first identified the gleam of this needle in a single sentence in his *Logic of the Spirit* where in his discussion of Luther's apprehension of the full weight of the grace of God in Jesus Christ, Loder writes:

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1 This quote is found on p. 28 of longer, unpublished version of Michael Langford's paper in which he discusses this perspective as found in Dr. James Loder's unpublished lecture notes from his course ED101 at Princeton Theological Seminary.

2 Loder quoting his student, Craig Dykstra.

3 For a fuller account of this Spirit-to-spirit relationality see James E. Loder. *The Logic of the Spirit: Human Development in Theological Perspective* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998). Hereinafter cited as *The Logic*.

> The experience of the Spirit cannot be identified with any particular psychological manifestation, such as an altered state of consciousness, a sensation of warmth, or a tingling in the hands. ...[nor with] any particular pietistic or spiritualistic manifestation, yet the Spirit *is* experienced. Physical manifestations may accompany the action of the Spirit, as in Luther's famous tower experience...but [*here's the sentence*] in the sphere of the Spirit, the only physical manifestations are the Word of God and the Sacraments.[4]

This sentence, buried as it is in the *Logic of the Spirit* among stunning accounts of persons who experience the Spirit immediately, or unmediated, caught me completely off guard. When I asked Dr. Loder about it he responded by simply saying, "Of course, that's true." Although I pressed him, that's all he would say about it: "In the sphere of the Spirit, the only physical manifestations are the Word of God and the Sacraments." To my mind this is another way of stating the crux of Reformation ecclesiology: The Church is that reality in which the Spirit perpetually instantiates the ongoing, real presence of Christ through audible Word and visible Sacrament, thereby creating and sustaining a receptive community of the Spirit to glorify, worship, enjoy and serve God in the world forever. There may appear within the experience of individual persons other physical manifestations that bear witness to the presence of the protological / eschatological Spirit, but these do not *ground* the Spirit's witness, nor *create* the church's existence.

If we read Loder's works from this ecclesiological starting point—church as the site of the Spirit's working by means of Word and Sacrament, that is, by means of the Gospel of Christ—then we can see that church thus understood is prior to the re-creation or transformation of individual persons who make up the *koinonia*. Admittedly, this church is *just barely* prior to the re-creation of individual persons since, in the power of the Spirit this public Good News immediately births the visible *koinonia*, such that this *koinonia* appears (almost) simultaneous to the announcement of Gospel. If, through this ecclesial lens we read the stories of Helen and Lucy[5] and others who are thrown to their knees and propelled into Christ's

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4 *The Logic*, p. 117.

5 For Helen's story, see, "Human Development Reenvisioned: The Case of Helen," in *The Logic*, pp. 46-78. For Lucy's story, see, *The Logic*, pp. 85-86, 118-119.

life we find there, decidedly in fragments, the presence of Spirit and Word (as Scripture, or icon, or as another person who has been re-created by Word and Spirit).

That is why Loder says of these personal experiences which bear physical manifestations of the Spirit that they "belong to the church." They unfold from the church where the Spirit's makes real the presence of Christ through Word and Sacrament, and they return to the church to be tested and received by the *koinonia* as witness to the Trinity's past, present and future work in the economy of salvation. They are trustworthy works of the Spirit given in utter excess of the spiritual salvific reality already given in Word and Sacrament.

The question of the precise relationship between Spirit, Word and Sacrament is not addressed by Loder, but I am prepared to argue that the relationship is not ontological for him. Word and Sacrament do not exist in a hypostatic, bipolar, differentiated, assymetrical union with the Spirit. This way of being in relationship with the Spirit is reserved for persons. Yet, Loder could say that Word and Sacrament are the *only* manifestations of the Spirit, and, I take this to mean that they are also *always* manifestations of the Spirit. This means that, in the Spirit's work, Word and Sacrament always offer Christ—they always sign and seal the real presence of Christ. The Spirit does not engage in false advertising. That is why Loder can say without elaboration that those who receive the Sacrament of the Table become members of Christ's family. Christ's blood flows in their veins. They become blood relatives.[6] Similarly, Loder asserts, in baptism God acts to bring us into the *koinonia*.[7] At the Table and Font, God keeps God's promises to adopt, nourish and transform us.

I will venture to say that, for Loder, this unbreakable relationship between Spirit, Word and Sacrament is realized by God's covenantal commitment to always make good on the promises that are given in the life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ. God promises and grants to us in the present the salvific work completed by Christ in history, by means of which we participate already in the new heaven and the new

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6 James E. Loder, unpublished ED105 "Educational Ministry" notes, Chapter VII, "Society: Koinonia and Social Transformation," p. 26.

7 Ibid., p. 25.

earth, which is also yet to come in fullness. The eschatological banquet Table of the Lamb is already set in the church on earth. Calling from the future, The Spirit and the Lamb say, "Come." Here adolescents and children and adults can feast on Christ. Here the Spirit will transform linear time into eternity and really give what is offered.

But Loder stops here to remind us that we need a robust theory of divine *and* human action in order to talk about how we receive what the Spirit really offers. Remember the story of the student who, following one of Loder's lectures, asks Loder to pray for the Spirit's descent on him? Always eager to pray, Loder placed his hands on the student's head, only to be stopped by the student's saying, "wait, wait, I'm not ready."[8] The *koinonia's* transformation by the Spirit unfolds within the *koinonia's* very human *epiclesis*: "Send your Holy Spirit upon us that this Word, water, bread and wine may be for us communion with Christ." This *epiclesis* is first formed on the lips of Christ who intercedes for us to the Father. And joined to Christ as we are, Spirit-to-spirit, in that strange loop union, this *epiclesis* is really on our own lips both creating and confirming our own agency within the grace-full, super-abundant agency of the Trinity.

So, what does this ecclesiological understanding have to do with adolescent development? What does this mean for fifteen year old Alyssa who prayed the *epiclesis* with God's people two weeks ago; Alyssa who brought her emaciated anorexic body to the Table of the Lamb; Alyssa who opened her mouth to feast on Christ even though she abstains from eating at other tables? And what does it mean for me who offered her the body and blood Christ, and consumed them myself? For me in and through whom the Holy Spirit has been groaning and praying for Alyssa and myself, "Send your Holy Spirit" that together in Christ we might become who you intend us to be. It means what Dr. Loder says: we become who we are precisely through the *koinonia* of Christ where God's ongoing spiritual presence is, through the Spirit, physically manifest in Word and Sacrament, and where we dare to pray, with the Spirit, the *epiclesis* for ourselves and one another: Lord, send your Holy Spirit upon us! Amen.

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8 I heard this story from Dr. Loder on more than one occasion.

KOINONIA XVIII (2006), 41-48.

Response to the Respondents

MICHAEL D. LANGFORD

I want to thank my three respondents, for the time they put in to reading my attempt at "Loderian" analysis of salvation and adolescence, and for their thoughtful responses. Each of them has caused me to think more deeply about Loder's soteriology and methodology, and how they relate to identity formation. However, I am not sure how deeply the responses – namely the first two – engaged the actual soteriological theology of Loder himself on its own grounds, focusing largely instead on methodological or formal issues.

It is interesting to note that the two main critiques of Loder that I encountered are the same charges leveled at the liberal theologies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, namely charges of individualism and subjectivism. I will attempt to respond to these critiques, paying close attention to how Loder's Trinitarian soteriology speaks to adolescents.

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It seems that the crux of Ms. Wright's response is that Loder's soteriology (which she strangely seems to confuse with *my* soteriology) places too much emphasis on *individual* transformation and not enough emphasis on *communal* transformation. She points out that we exist in a community of interconnectedness, and to ignore that fact is to ignore a locus of salvation that properly speaks to adolescents within their communities. I very much appreciate her acknowledgment of the role of the community in transformation, and Loder (and I!) would go even further than her. The Holy Spirit is *only* active in the community of Christ, and therefore present salvation by means of the Holy Spirit is *necessarily* found in community and *must* ultimately result in the transformation of that community.

There can be no question that Loder's ecclesiology was underdeveloped; indeed, Ms. Wright has zeroed in on the most popular critique of Loder, namely that for him salvation seems to be found only via individual

rather than communal transformation. However, I have always seen this conclusion as arising from either an incomplete, caricatured or uncritical reading of Loder's corpus, and I want to take Ms. Wright's critique as an opportunity to reflect upon Loder's understanding of community.

For Loder, individual human development can *never* be separated from his or her socio-cultural environment. Any development – retarded or redeemed – only happens in the midst of a non-atomistic dimensionality; recall that the epigenesis of human development is always in the encounter of and through the "Other," or the "Thou," qua Martin Buber. Following Erik Erikson and Jean Piaget, not to mention Sigmund Freud and Søren Kirkegaard, Loder certainly grants significant influence to internal realities. But following the same thinkers, Loder also attributes human development to a sort of dialectic between these forces and *external* reality, which he terms the "interactionist understanding of human development."[1] Just as the community – both as cultural reality and venue of the Holy Spirit – forms and transforms the individual, so does the individual form and transform the community. Loder and Ms. Wright can happily agree with this theological and sociological truth.

I think Ms. Wright is spot on when she points out that too much of our Western theology, indeed our soteriology, is individualistic in both form and content. That our understanding of salvation has neglected the redemption of the collective – especially its weakest and poorest – and become too "me-centered" is borne out in the fact that adolescents have become so culturally isolated, begetting an excruciatingly protracted development. However, I believe that by emphasizing the present work of the Holy Spirit, Loder militates *against* this individualism. He would very much appreciate Archie Smith's presentation of humanity understood as "relational selves," whereby we are created, as Loder would say, intrinsically "exocentric," designed to reach out from the self in relationality to others and to God. It is in this exact sense that we are "spirit," just as God is also exocentrically "Spirit." When we say God is Holy Spirit, we immediately say that God works presently in the "communion-creating presence" of Christ by means of the Holy Spirit, to paraphrase Paul Lehmann and T. F. Torrance.

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1 Ms. House also notes this in her response.

Ms. Wright seems to think that I undervalue the role of community in the salvation of adolescents; I fear that *she* may actually undervalue the real, objective, foundational, grounding, definitive, teleological, normative Spiritual presence of Christ found in Christian community in all of its unity and diversity. In her desire to point adolescents toward the transformation of community, Ms. Wright could use this direction. It is *only* through the proper re-connection to this *koinonia* as transformed sociality that adolescents apprehend the fully salvific work of the complete Body of Christ by means of the Holy Spirit. As writes Loder:

> [T]he result of Christ's action is a *very definite social reality* but ... the origins, sustaining vitality, and ultimate destiny of that social reality are not bound up in socialization and the larger society. Koinonia is the consequence of grace ... it is a unique meeting of people whose preeminent commonality, in but apart from all distinctions due to socialization, is the continuing Spiritual Presence of Jesus as the Christ.[2]

Salvation does not come through and for community full stop, but rather only through and for Holy-Spirit-breathed community, in all its imperfection and holiness.

Ms. Wright claims that the starting point for any contextual theology ought to be found in our experience, and therefore adolescent soteriologies ought to begin with the experience of adolescents. While I agree that the experience and voice of the marginalized must be heard and weighed heavily as we reflect upon the work of the Holy Spirit, I cannot agree that what she terms "adolescent-centered soteriology" must *begin* with their experience. In fact, I don't even see Loder's Trinitarian soteriology as adolescent-centered. I see it as *Christ*-centered and human-focused, and because it is human-focused, it is particularly critical for adolescents as those who embody an amplified version of the human spiritual condition. It is only as the presence and power of God in Christ by means of the Holy Spirit are communally mediated that we will be saved. And *of course* if it is to be complete, this Spiritual presence and power must originate from and extend into the practice, the experience, and the catechism of the whole community, including the marginalized, the powerless, the poor, and the

2 *The Transforming Moment*, p. 112, italics mine.

sequestered; these are, namely, our adolescents, who live separated from a full and healthy apprehension of a communally-mediated Christ.

That is our *telos* – a redeemed *unio Christi* found only in Spirit-led *koinonia* filled with transformed and redeemed individuals in, through, and for that *koinonia*. As Christians who communally bear the presence of Christ by the Holy Spirit, we have the duty to mediate the Holy in order to stamp out the cultural Void that socializes the church into a compliant, conservative, *human* institution of just "we," that it might be transformed into a "we-not-we-but-*koinonia*." This *koinonia* is then charged to mediate the Holy into the world that it might become the "world-not-world-but-Kingdom of God." Loder writes:

> The spiritual presence of Jesus Christ becomes the relationality among persons, so that their interaction is simultaneously profoundly intimate and thoroughly functional. Such a communal relationship is like that which always accompanies the bestowal of the Spirit and creates a unique context for understanding ... relationships. When Jesus bestows the Spirit on the disciples in the upper room, he gives them a task. When the Spirit is poured out at Pentecost, those who receive it go then into the world to proclaim the good news.[3]

If this is not a revolutionary, messianic, prophetic Christ-centered redemption of our world, I'm not sure what is. And this is not "archaic" "theorizing," but rather the truth of God's revelation in Christ; it is only when we attempt to fit the work of Christ into our own expectations, our own desires, our own limits, our own individual experiences, or even our own particular desires for transformation that the Holy Spirit becomes marginalized and domesticated.

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For Mr. Cubie, Loder's methodology and soteriology are deficient as a result of misunderstood Chalcedonic Christology, one that seems for Mr. Cubie to be alternately too Alexandrian and too Antiochian. His critique is astute; Loder's construal of Chalcedon may not be sufficiently rigorous in light of the original Definition. However, interestingly, Mr. Cubie's critique of Loder is almost entirely formal, dealing with his methodology.

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3 *The Logic of the Spirit*, p. 194.

This leads me to an opportunity to reflect upon another of aspect of Loder's theology, namely the theme of transformation.

I would be wary of saying that Loder's Christology is identical to his Chalcedonian understanding of interdisciplinary study. Jesus Christ unites humanity and divinity within a single Subject. No earthly reality – including humanity or community in any sort of "deification" – could embody divinity in this way; Christ is qualitatively different that us, not quantitatively. I do not think that Loder would have understood his methodology as correlational, nor even critical. Perhaps he would have – somewhat enigmatically – termed his methodology as *transformational*, whereby our partial earthly and scientific understandings are thrown into full reality in light of Christ. We have to understand Loder's presentation of interdisciplinary study as a "differentiated bi-polar asymmetrical unity" – not as an *ontological* unity, as with Christology, but an *epistemic* one. We can *never* understand the reality of any earthly thing unless we look at it theologically; reality understood from above will always, in this way, hold "pride of place."

Though this is not a paper on Karl Barth, because Mr. Cubie brought him up, I will briefly follow suit. In his section on the "Baptism of the Holy Spirit" in *Church Dogmatics* IV.4, Barth grants that humanity has *always* had ideas of and motivation toward personal transformation. What differentiates Christian transformation from other answers to this native yearning is its divine nature; Christian transformation has its foundation within the history of Jesus Christ, and its actualization is by means of the Holy Spirit.[4] This might help us to understand Loder, who is trying to – through the lens of faith – understand a native reality fully by looking at its foundation in Christ and its actualization by means of the Holy Spirit. Loder does not want to co-opt Biblical language and revelation for more "useful" terms; rather, he wants to transform our language, indeed our understanding of reality, that it might form our identities.

In fact, I think that Loder would extend Mr. Cubie's presentation of Barth's infamous "*Nein!*" from an epistemic rejection of the natural revelation to a rejection of our understanding of the ontology of all things "natural." It is only through the Spirit of Christ that we might see things

4 See *CD* IV.4, p. 10off.

as they truly are. Loder would never say that our psychological states or our existential questions are sources of revelation. Rather, he would say that they are partial explanations of our reality that, if anything, reveal themselves as inadequate. We only find true and complete understanding of reality in Christ as mediated by the Holy Spirit. But Loder goes even further, saying that the presence of Christ transforms our reality such that we are present to the work of the Holy Spirit, no longer captive to two-dimensional reality alone, but now formed into our full ontology as created and redeemed by God. *This* is the mystery that the Church celebrates – not that we are given answers to our human problems, but that God has somehow chosen to take us in our present fallen reality, and has transformed us that we might actually be his people.

Mr. Cubie questions if Loder's understanding of spiritual transformation continues an improper human-Divine admixture whereby we achieve our own subjective salvation through the satisfaction our self-defined needs, perhaps by reaching an appropriate inner state, akin to so-called "spirit Christologies." Mr. Cubie wonders if such a *homo religious* too closely approximates deification in its *unio Christi*. As with Ms. Wright, it is not clear whether he has read any of Loder's work, but I think I can safely say that Loder would be crushed – perhaps to the point of weeping! – if he thought that he was presenting a Christ that was not sufficiently objective, real, and *solely* the agent of salvation. Simply because present salvation happens Spirit-to-spirit does not mean that it is a reality only to the believer, or that it subsumes the believer, or that it simply and pragmatically "baptizes" general terms with Christian names. As with Irenaeus' recapitulatory soteriology, for Loder, the re-creation of the sinful individual through the ongoing work of Christ is an eternal intention of the Godhead. Loder writes:

> Our redemption by God's love through the incarnation and atonement restores us to our true nature in Christ through his Spirit. We now live out the life of faith in love as we reappropriate our personal history in light of and by the power of his presence. Thus we actualize 'that wonderful communion' of which Calvin spoke. As Christ is born in us, the old Adam, the man of flesh and death, is replaced by the spiritual

> man; what began in flesh and death now becomes spirit and eternal life (I Cor. 15:45ff.).[5]

God, from all eternity, is at work creatively to re-form us. This salvation is not "accomplished" when we reach out for the Divine, but rather salvation is teleologically or existentially "actualized" when the Holy Spirit comes to us with faith in Christ.[6] The *Spiritus Creator* is ever active in the creation, re-creation, and redemption of all that is God's. Just as Father God created reality, and re-creates reality in Jesus Christ, so the Spirit actualizes that re-creation within us.[7] The doctrine of the Trinity shows us that the subjective application of objectively real salvation to the individual in community is not only a decision of God, but a consequence of the *ontology* of God's very self in the action of the Holy Spirit. And it is only by this work of God, not of us, that we are saved.

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Finally, Ms. House's response attempted to draw out Loder's "hidden" ecclesiology by pointing to the Holy Spirit's extension of Christ into present history through Word and Sacrament. I very much appreciated this elaboration, and hope I have addressed Loder's understanding of community above. While Loder talks significantly of the community of Christ, of *koinonia*, he talks little about the Church *per se*, of the *ecclesia*. I believe that this is because he saw much of the Church, especially in the West, as un-transformed, as locked into two-dimensional reality, as neglectful of the work of the Holy Spirit. Perhaps he gave insufficient regard to the *eschatological* reality of the Church, of the absolutely unmitigated presence of Christ in our midst even as it is also incomplete and sinful in its tendencies toward socialization. Perhaps he made the mistake that Dietrich Bonhoeffer warned against – of making the Church as the Body of Christ an ideal reality rather than a sacramentally "real" reality. Perhaps Loder even undervalued his potential contribution to the transformation of the Church as institution. Nevertheless, I believe that Ms. House is

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5 *The Logic of the Spirit*, pp. 275-276.

6 Barth says much the same thing in *CD* IV.4, 21-40, that God's salvation in Christ is aimed, in a sense, ultimately toward the transformation of the individual believer.

7 In *CD* IV.1, p. 643ff., Barth points out that that God as Trinity means that the present transformation of the individual is as much a part of God's economy as Creation and Incarnation.

exactly right when she says that Loder believed that ultimately, salvation happens only by means of the Church, when we define the Church as the Holy-Spirit-created-and-empowered Body of Christ on earth. It is when we neglect to understand the Church as a means of inaugurated eschatology, as now-and-not-yet presence of Christ by means of the Holy Spirit that we – including our adolescents – ignore the crucial reality of the presence of the Holy Spirit in its salvific identity-forming role.

We are all growing in our identity. We are all, again and again, day by day, learning more and more what it means to fully embrace our identity as children of God, an identity that has already been set, and will be fully consummated. Let us listen intently to the Holy Spirit as it speaks through adolescents, for they have something valuable to teach us – namely that God in Christ is present here and now, that God is here to continually re-create us to live out the reality that we are loved, that we are never, ever alone, and that we have been transformed through the Holy Spirit that we might bear God's power and presence into the world that so desperately needs its identity transformed as well.

KOINONIA XVIII (2006), 49-60.

Bullinger's *Sermones Synodales*: Eschatology and the Here and Now

JON D. WOOD

Theological thought and action helped consolidate sixteenth-century societies within increasingly distinct political boundaries. Historical sensitivity to that era must reckon with the fact that religion was not a mere instrument of supposedly more foundational or 'real' social and material concerns. Confessional identity – whether Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or Reformed, and indeed in a high degree of structural parallel among all three – was inseparable from the development of particular socio-political identities.[1] This is the basic perspective of historians of "confessionalization."[2]

My work focuses on confessional consolidation of the territory of Zurich during Heinrich Bullinger's tenure of church leadership. The story runs in significant continuity with the rise of the Zurich synod as an instrument of social sacralization already at work in the later Middle Ages.[3] As codified

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1 Cf. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., "Confessionalization – The Career of a Concept," in *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555 – 1700. Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan*, ed. John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand, and Anthony J. Papalas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 3-8.

2 I am here roughly following in a path mapped out by Wolfgang Reinhard and Heinz Schilling. Their methodology has combined somewhat earlier historical contributions regarding on the one hand the more explicitly religious formation of confessional identities and on the other hand the social exercise of coordinated discipline within a unit of political sovereignty. Scholars of confessionalization thus closely attend to forms of coordination between church and civil authority. One benefit of such an approach has been the potential for evaluating the early modern period with a methodology that evaluates the era's nuances more on its own terms. Cf. Wolfgang Reinhard, *Glaube und Macht: Kirche und Politik im Zeitalter der Konfessionalisierung*, Herder spektrum, vol. 5458 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2004); and Heinz Schilling, *Kirchenzucht und Sozialdisziplinierung im frühneuzeitlichen Europa* (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1994). Also from Schilling, see his article, "Confessional Europe," in *Handbook of European History, 1400 – 1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation*, ed. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), vol. 2, *Visions, Programs and Outcomes*.

3 Pamela Biel has provided insightful information into the emergence of specifically Reformed coordination between church and magistracy in Zurich. Pamela Biel, *Doorkeepers*

in the Zurich Reformation, the synod in particular functioned directly in issues associated with confessionalization – elaborations on the nature and locus of authority, clerical quasi-bureaucratic civil service among the people, and contributions toward formation of a coherent cultural mentality through social discipline within the borders of a self-aware church-state entity.

This article gives special attention to a corpus of speeches, prayers, notes, and diagrams (collectively known as the *Sermones Synodales*) jotted down by Bullinger between 1535 and his death in 1575. These were Bullinger's personal preparations for the semi-annual synod sessions. Scholars examining Bullinger heretofore have paid only passing attention to these manuscripts, mostly simply referring to their sheer existence. Besides my own transcription completed in Zurich during the year 2005-2006, there exists no edited or otherwise printed version of the text.[4] I hope here to give a brief preliminary sketch of the hitherto understudied significance of this material, while offering a hermeneutical key to the whole. Of particular interest will be the way that Bullinger's eschatology consistently eludes simple pinning down to either: (a) a supposedly non-institutional kerygmatic phase of early Reformation; and, to the other extreme; (b) a supposedly pessimistic retreat following the mid-century's intimate coordination between ecclesial and social efforts.

THE *SERMONES SYNODALES*

Bullinger prepared his corpus of notes now known as the *Sermones Synodales* for sessions of the Zurich synod. As codified in the 1532 *Synodalordnung*, the entire Zurich clergy of city and countryside convened along with eight members of the Large Council twice a year. Sessions were held behind the closed doors of the *Rathaus*, while the head of the clergy (in these years, Bullinger) and the *Bürgermeister* co-presided. Synod sessions were held on the Tuesdays after Mayday (1 May) and after St. Gall (16 October). The assembled clergy functioned as a collective bishop

at the House of Righteousness: Heinrich Bullinger and the Zurich Clergy 1535 – 1575, Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformationsgeschichte, ed. Fritz Büsser, vol. 15 (Bern: Peter Lang, 1991).

4 This transcription itself is therefore already a contribution to the field of Bullinger research and of that era's history in general.

overseeing and, where necessary, censuring, all pastors and teachers with respect to doctrine and lifestyle.[5] Beyond this crucial practice of *censura*, the present members of the Large Council also had things to say. These closed-door sessions functioned as an accepted venue for making and coordinating suggestions regarding Zurich's existence as a Christian society.

In the tense atmosphere following the 1531 defeat at Kappel, Zurich's clergy were explicitly warned against interfering with political matters. This was especially true with respect to parish sermons. Nevertheless, the clerical injunction to interpret Scripture in the light of the times effectively called for a significant degree of clerical involvement at the socio-political level. Bullinger's *Sermones Synodales* provide another testimony of that. His synodal notes address topics from public feast days, attendance at parish worship services and communion, upbuilding of parish churches along with suppression of irregular field churches and chapels (which were explicitly characterized as both superstitious and socially disintegrative), as well as matters of luxury, excessive and financially ruinous consumption (especially of alcohol), organized care of the poor and sick, education of children, and the distinctive dress and duties appropriate to well-ordered social stations.

The *Sermones* are catalogued as Manuscript D220 in the *Handschriftenabteilung* of the Zurich *Zentralbibliothek*. The originally loose pages were bound and given their current title in the eighteenth century. Someone has meanwhile pencilled in page numbers at the top right of the recto pages but since these numbers are not entirely regular (i.e., they skip the entry for 3 May 1569), I have used my own numeration system. For greater precision I have furthermore counted recto and verso as different pages. Beginning with the page already noted as number one, my final page is number 167 (as opposed to the number 83 indicated in pencil). In the *Sermones Synodales* we have Bullinger's personal notes to almost all of the 81 semi-annual synod sessions from 1535 to his death in 1575. On the very few occasions when he was not present, more often than

5 One should also keep in mind – as Bullinger's synodal tinkering with outlines of episcopal duties indicates – that the rubric "doctrine" was a highly dynamic category not equated simply with propositional orthodoxy.

not his notes still record which previous prayers and admonitions were delegated to others to be recited for him.

To be sure, the eighteenth-century title "*Sermones Synodales*" is misleading. This volume consists not so much of sermons proper as of Bullinger's personal, often fragmentary notes in preparation for synodal prayers and exhortations. The text is almost exclusively Latin, despite occasional bits of marginalia and interlinear commentary in Swiss German, and despite the fact that synod sessions themselves were conducted in vernacular. One can scarcely imagine all of Zurich's rural clergy or even the city councillors conversing in fluent Latin. In his synodal notes, Bullinger himself positively exhorts his ministerial colleagues to conduct parish worship in a *landtlich* (i.e., vernacular) manner, and that is just the tip of the enormous importance attached throughout the *Sermones* to interpreting the Word in light of the ministers' specific time and place. Such topics do come clearly to view despite the fragmentary nature of the *Sermones*. And the handwriting itself (with a bit of effort and acclimation) is only seldom indecipherable. Nevertheless, due to the frequent lack of complete sentences and the Reformer's use of keywords intended strictly to jog his own memory, the modern reader must often make use of an informed creativity in order to reconstruct the text. In such light, questions of sermonic rhetoric and style are probably better addressed via other source materials.

What we do, however, possess in the *Sermones* are portions of exhortations and prayers not contained in the *Synodalakten*.[6] As prescribed by the *Synodalordnung*,[7] Bullinger prepared notes for exhortations both leading into and following up on the clerical exercise of *Censura*. His consistent theme: reminding the clergy of their primary duty to interpret the Holy Scriptures for their contemporary context. Great historical significance for the phenomenon of confessionalization in sixteenth-century Zurich lies in the way that Bullinger's *Sermones Synodales*

6 The *Akten* are located in the Staatsarchiv Zürich E II.1.

7 For this text, see #1899 in Emil Egli *Actensammlung zur Geschichte der Zürcher Reformation in den Jahren 1519-1533* (Zurich: 1879). Pamela Biel provides an English translation in Appendix 1 of *Doorkeepers at the House of Righteousness: Heinrich Bullinger and the Zurich Clergy 1535 – 1575*, Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformationsgeschichte, ed. Fritz Büsser, vol. 15 (Bern: Peter Lang, 1991), 207-13.

reveal the Reformer 'reading' his context through an eschatological lens. Eschatology gave particular – even to our eyes counter-intuitive – urgency to institutional and social consolidation.

THE FRAMEWORK FOR BULLINGER'S THINKING: COVENANT OR ESCHATOLOGY?

One could well anticipate that Bullinger's synodal exhortations would make much of explicit covenant thinking. The *Sermones Synodales* are, after all, his direct, unpublished and therefore uncensored reflections on topics typically associated with confessionalization. Arguing on the basis of other source materials, J. Wayne Baker in particular has presented the thesis that covenant thinking determines Bullinger's thought in general. Baker's point about an undifferentiated unity of church and state goes too far, but he speaks aright when emphasizing Bullinger's consistently corporate thinking, oriented toward coordinating church and state in the process of consolidating a single society.[8] It is therefore all the more striking how very seldom Bullinger makes explicit covenant utterances throughout the *Sermones*. The term *foedus* (covenant), for example, appears only eleven times. Of those eleven, seven are direct quotations or paraphrases of Malachi 2:1-9 (covenant with Levi). Bullinger uses this term almost exclusively in the context of the higher standards for *Doctrina* and *Vita* expected of Zurich's "priestly" class. *Foedus* throughout the *Sermones* is not used to demarcate the Zurich citizenry as a whole; nor does it couch discussion of their rights and responsibilities as a people of God. The term is subordinated to the ministers' own primary and urgent role to contribute in turn to the consolidation of a peculiar people.

It appears that eschatology provides a better perspective for evaluating Bullinger's synodal preparations. Certainly no other theme is propounded with as much force and regularity in this particular source. It is precisely in his conviction that world history has entered the final phase of End Times that Bullinger found his most urgent hortatory impulse. One could

8 J. Wayne Baker, "In Defense of Magisterial Discipline: Bullinger's 'Tractatus de Excommunicatione' of 1568," in *Heinrich Bullinger, 1504-1575: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum 400. Todestag*, eds. Ulrich Gäbler and Erland Herkenrath, vol.1, Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformationsgeschichte, ed. Fritz Büsser, vol. 7 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1975), 155-56.

perhaps even enter into the scholarly dispute concerning Bullinger's putative "central axis" – be that "covenant" à la Baker or "sanctification" à la Mark Burrows and Fritz Büsser[9] – to suggest that eschatology may be a central axis in the Reformer's thought and action. Certainly, the *Sermones* help dispel the notion that eschatological thinking belongs to an earlier phase sometimes given the periodization of "Reformation proper" as distinguished from an "age of confessionalism."[10] One must emphatically refute any bias that would suggest that thoughts of an imminent End belonged to a more kerygmatic and a less institutionally-concerned phase of history, only to give way to the more "realistic" workaday world in which the Lord seemed to tarry to return. Eschatology provided a constant conceptual framework and a real impetus to Bullinger's efforts during more than four decades of consolidating Zurich society as a people of God.

PROCLAMATION AND ESCHATON

It may seem paradoxical to associate eschatology with the institutional and social consolidation of confessionalization. Someone may ask: "Why expend so much energy in the here and now when all of human history teeters toward its final end, anyway?" Partly due to their particular emphases and partly due to their decades-long scope, the *Sermones* address this question better than any other source.

Bullinger uses the term *tempus* (time) and the related adverb *tempestive* seventy-two times, and at least once in nearly every entry in *Sermones* from 1538 to 1574. The word functions consistently as a *terminus technicus*, indicating not just any times but always, specifically the Biblical End Times. Bullinger's exhortations rely on a variety of Scriptural *tempus*-quotations in order to sketch a coherent framework for

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9 Burrows argues that the notion of sanctification is primary. Cf. Fritz Büsser, *Heinrich Bullinger (1504 – 1575): Leben, Werk und Wirkung*, vol. 1 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2004), 277-78.

10 Although he argues with different particular criticisms of traditional periodization, for a similar notion of an earlier beginning of confession-building not characterized as a conceptual departure from "Reformation" precedents, cf. Ernst Walter Zeeden, *Konfessionsbildung: Studien zur Reformation, Gegenreformation und katholischen Reform*, Spätmittelalter und Frühe Neuzeit: Tübinger Beiträge zur Geschichtsforschung, ed. Volker Press and Ernst Walter Zeeden, vol. 15 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985), 60-64.

interpreting the 'signs of the times.'[11] Wars, famines, and other supposed prophecy fulfilments confirmed his conviction of living in the last days. Even more importantly: precisely such days called forth (*excitant*) vigilant action rather than any sort of other-worldly fixation that would neglect the nitty-gritty of institutional and social concerns.

Matthew 24 supplied Bullinger's favorite Biblical passage throughout the *Sermones*. Over and over again he recalls before his fellow clergy the *servus prudens* whom the Lord has placed in oversight over His household so that this faithful and prudent servant may provide nourishment for them *in tempore* (in due time). It is also this servant whom the Lord deems faithfully diligent in such provision when He quickly returns. Bullinger everywhere sees this text as confirmation for the clerical role in social upbuilding. The *cibum* or *alimentum* that a pastor is to provide is nothing short of Christ himself, the bread of life.[12] Just as the Reformer's synodal outlines regarding "episcopal" duties make clear that *doctrina* embraces far more than propositional content, so too does the faithful servant's provision of nourishment involve a broad spectrum of stewardship over God's household. Identifying Christ as the nourishment implies in Bullinger's mind a mission of proclamation that includes but is not limited to theological reflection and pulpit preaching.

Bullinger repeatedly urged that this proclamation must be fitted to the particular circumstances of Zurich society. With his eschatologically-freighted term *tempus* he exhorted the ministers to attend to the particularities of their place and people.[13] Bullinger believed that his times were especially evil principally because of the fulfilment of Biblical prophecies of the Antichrist having culminated in the institution of papal monarchy. But if the days are evil, wrote Bullinger in probable reference to Ephesians 5:16, nevertheless God's ministers must work to redeem time.[14] The final overthrow of Antichrist's reign will not occur until Christ's return. Meanwhile, however, the proclamation of Christ already

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11 E.g., 2 Timothy 3-4, 2 Corinthians 6.2, Luke 17 and 21, Ephesians 5.16, Ezekiel 3, Jeremiah 8 and 23, 1 Peter 4.17, and 2 Peter 3.

12 This is stated explicitly in the entries for May 1564 und May 1569.

13 October 1569 (p.143, = October 1574).

14 E.g., May 1561 (p.109); May 1564 (p.121); May 1574 (p.164).

participates in such a victory.[15] Proclamation is an instantiation of the eschatological end. And confessional Zurich is to be an instantiation of the universal, eschatological reign of God. Thus we see a degree of resolution to the ostensible paradox that Reformational goals of a purified community worshipping internally in spirit and in truth involved such great attention to external institutions.[16] Reformed Zurich utterly rejected an indelible sacramental character of its clergy, only to focus all the more on the institutional consolidation (particularly via the synod) of proper proclamation in terms of *doctrina et vita*.

INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL CORRECTIVE: A HISTORICAL-ESCHATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Bullinger believed that the End times had already long since begun. In a certain sense, as he wrote in his entry for October 1571, God's elect have been yearning for final deliverance since the beginning.[17] In a 1557 work that stands in parallel to much of the synodal material, Bullinger explained his well-reflected opinion concerning the world's end and coming Judgment (*De fine seculi et iudicio venturo*, Basel, 1557).[18] He argued here again principally on the basis of Bible passages such as Matthew 24, as well as Daniel 7, 8 and 11, and 2 Timothy 3-4. The reign of Antichrist broke out openly when a parish priest of Rome managed to set aside what had been holding him in check – namely, the Roman imperial government then based in Constantinople (cf. 2 Thess 2). The *Sermones Synodales*

15 Cf. Joachim Staedtke, "Die Geschichtsauffassung des jungen Bullinger," in *Heinrich Bullinger, 1504-1575: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum 400. Todestag*, eds. Ulrich Gäbler and Erland Herkenrath, vol.1, Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformationsgeschichte, ed. Fritz Büsser, vol. 7 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1975), 73. Cf. also Christian Moser, "*Papam esse Antichristum*: Grundzüge von Heinrich Bullingers Antichristkonzeption," *Zwingliana* 30 (2003), 72-73.

16 Cf. Bruce Gordon, *Clerical Discipline and the Rural Reformation: The Synod in Zürich, 1532 – 1580*, Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformationsgeschichte, ed. Fritz Büsser, vol. 16 (Bern: Peter Lang, 1992), 59.

17 *Sermones* October 1571 entry (p. 153).

18 Incidentally, this work consists of a *Kirchweih* and a *Karlstag* address, not, as Büsser has wrongly remarked, in synod speeches. Cf. Fritz Büsser, *Heinrich Bullinger (1504 – 1575): Leben, Werk und Wirkung*, vol. 2 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2004), 239-40.

echo this sentiment, and repeatedly testify to Bullinger's conviction that all further prophecies regarding the Antichrist have been fulfilled in the meantime. Bullinger exhorts his fellow pastors to keep in mind *qualia tempora* (what kinds of times these are).

There is an interesting parallel between the beginning and the final phases of the Antichristian reign. As Bullinger repeats throughout the *Sermones*, the legal precedent for the institution of the synod lay in the Justinian *Constitutions*, an early sixth-century set of imperial ordinances proclaimed precisely at the time when the End Times began to unfold.[19] One notices that Bullinger presents the institutional codification of the Reformed synod of Zurich at the opposite end of the Antichristian reign. In both cases an institutional corrective (*medela*) served God's people in a time noted for institutional corruption. Bullinger compared those ministers who were not diligent to the *servus malus* of eschatological pericope of Matthew 24. They were the ones who failed in their duty while imagining their Lord's return to be a comfortably distant affair. In his synodal notes, Bullinger reproaches complacency and idle self-confidence (*sequritas*). Spiritual or literal drunkenness (*ebrietas*) characterize the pastors – like the *servus malus* noted for drinking with the drunkards – who fail in their duty to provide salutary stewardship over the Reformed people of God in Zurich.[20] It was fundamentally an eschatological impetus that led Bullinger to view the synod as an institutional corrective for the Zurich clergy, and by extension for the entire Zurich society. When final Judgment was to come – and it was surely to come quite soon – Zurich's clergy were to appear collectively as a "faithful and prudent servant."

THE IMMINENT END OF THE WORLD DOES NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY PESSIMISM

Erland Herkenrath has interpreted Bullinger's conviction of living in the End Times as an indication of the Reformer's growing pessimism.[21]

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19 Cf. *De fine seculi* 4-5.

20 E.g., entries in the *Sermones* on May 1568 (p.135), May 1569 (p.142 = May 1573), and May 1571 (p.153). Cf. *De fine* p.24.

21 Erland Herkenrath, "Bullinger zu Teuerung und Bettel im Jahre 1571," in *Heinrich Bullinger, 1504-1575: Gesammelte Aufsätze zum 400. Todestag*, eds. Ulrich Gäbler and

Certainly, one cannot but hear a rising note of frustration in Bullinger's later writings. Famines and wars – to say nothing of the resurgent Roman Church following the Council of Trent – caused grave concerns. It would nevertheless be false to view such disappointment and even pessimism in direct relation to Bullinger's eschatology, as though recognizing the world's profoundly bad state of affairs suddenly called for a more explicit, or even resigned, message of soon-coming Judgment. Eschatological impetus is present from the beginning and throughout the *Sermones*; and in every such instance it arouses a sense of positive urgency in the mission of upbuilding church and society. The *Sermones* help disprove any notion that eschatological thinking was a reaction late in the Reformer's career. And these notes certainly never suggest resignation in the face of imminent Judgment. Even in emotional disappointments evinced in moments such as the time when Bullinger characterized both Romanists and Reformed as *conscelerati* (fellow guilty parties),[22] there also appears explicit confirmation that the Zurichers are to fulfill their office diligently. They are entrusted with oversight over the household of the Lord who is shortly to return.

Beyond Matthew 24, Bullinger also frequently refers to Ezekiel 3 and 33-34, as well as to Paul's synodal discourse in Acts 20. Those who have been called to serve as watchmen are guilty of their people's blood if they fail in their duty at the critical moment. The theme of dutiful diligence despite – indeed, *because of* – imminent Final Judgment begins already in Bullinger's synodal notes for 1535. There are episodes of greater eschatological emphasis and there is a twinge of frustration in his later years. Nevertheless, Bullinger's eschatological statements are always a counterweight to, and not identified with, sentiments of disappointment or worldly resignation. Bullinger speaks eschatologically so as to encourage church agency in and for Zurich society, and to exhort laborers to maintain diligence just a little longer now during history's final push.

Historians must take care to exclude a tempting, possible implication in Bullinger's impulse to build up the institutions of Christian society.

Erland Herkenrath, vol.1, Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformationsgeschichte, ed. Fritz Büsser, vol. 7 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1975), 325.

22 October 1572 (p.157).

This impulse turns out to have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with millenarianism. He nowhere suggests the idea of contributing to an incipient, thousand-year reign of earthly perfection. On the contrary, he is quite clear that Scriptural predictions of a millennium have already long since been fulfilled in the first thousand years of Church history.[23] Bullinger's zealous work to consolidate a Zurich expression of the "City upon a hill" differed from millennial, seventeenth-century Reformed visions, whether seen in Puritan New England or in the Swiss and Continental mission of the zealous Cromwellian John Dury.[24] Nevertheless, the eschatological perspective proves significant for the historiography of confessionalization. As we have seen, such concerns did not fade following a supposedly more eschatologically kerygmatic Luther. Conversely, an eye on the End Times in the late 1560s and 1570s did not indicate any late-in-life retreat into resignation or pessimism away from supposedly more confident social engagement of mid-century decades. Eschatology retained significance throughout Bullinger's long and influential term of leadership. Its persistent social importance in the century after Bullinger was a matter of organic development. Bullinger himself had already demonstrated how concern for the salvation of souls and building institutions of earthly society could be effectively connected in a confessional age.

Coordinated within a sphere of political authority, Bullinger sought to reform the Zurich clergy and through them all of Zurich society such that their community could collectively avoid eternal damnation at the time of the Lord's imminent return in Judgment. Christian Moser has recently argued that Bullinger's Antichristology played a constitutive role in the Reformer's thought and action, and that such a topic must not be relegated

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23 Bullinger believed that the Crusades instigated by papal monarchy signaled the culmination of the end of such a millennium of ecclesiastical order. Cf. Fritz Büsser, *Heinrich Bullinger (1504 – 1575): Leben, Werk und Wirkung*, vol. 2 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2004), 328.

24 Already on the first page of the *Sermones*, Bullinger mentions Zurich's mission to be a 'city upon a hill' as a fundamental reason for the very institution of the synod. Cf. Bruce Gordon, "'The Second Bucer': John Dury's Mission to the Swiss Reformed Churches in 1654 – 55 and the Search for Confessional Unity," in *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555 – 1700. Essays in Honor and Memory of Bodo Nischan*, ed. John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand, and Anthony J. Papalas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 207.

to discussion of more or less superficial, or "mere," polemic.[25] In light of the *Sermones Synodales* one may further argue that eschatology (including its antichristological component) was fundamental to Bullinger's entire confessionalizing program.

25 Christian Moser, "*Papam esse Antichristum*: Grundzüge von Heinrich Bullingers Antichristkonzeption," *Zwingliana* 30 (2003), 98-99.

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The Eschatological Millenarianism of Jürgen Moltmann

NATHAN D. HIEB

Jürgen Moltmann envisions the millenium as a bridge of connection that endures in spite of apocalyptic rupture and that preserves the meaning of contemporary social action in the eschaton. In *The Coming of God*, he interprets the reference to the resurrection "from the dead" in Philippians 3:10-11 as referring to a selective resurrection of only those who suffered and died "with Christ" that will herald the beginning of a literal, millennial reign of Christ on earth.[1] To clearly explicate Moltmann's view of the millennium, I will explore the difference between historical millenarianism and eschatological millenarianism, the distinct relations of time and God's presence to both the millennium and the eschaton, and Moltmann's understanding of the mediating role of the millennial age. I will then discuss two criticisms of Moltmann's millenarianism, the first of which hinges upon Moltmann's failure to root his millenarianism sufficiently within the Christological foundation of his eschatology as established in *Theology of Hope*.[2] The second criticism, raised by Miroslav Volf, argues that Moltmann's millennium lacks the transitional capability necessary to adequately mediate between the present age and the eschaton.[3] I will offer

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1 Jürgen Moltmann, *The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 151, 194-196. The millennium is understood here as being restricted to martyrs and the people of Israel; Ibid., 152, 198-199. Also, Richard Bauckham, "Eschatology in *The Coming of God*," in *God Will Be All In All*, ed. Richard Bauckham (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 22.

2 Jürgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*, trans. James W. Leitch (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).

3 Miroslav Volf, "After Moltmann: Reflections on the Future of Eschatology," in *God Will Be All In All*, ed. Richard Bauckham (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001). Though this is not Volf's primary criticism in this article, I have selected it for special focus because Moltmann does not address it in his response and yet this concern exposes what I consider to be one of the greatest weaknesses of Moltmann's millenarianism.

a response to Volf's criticism demonstrating that an adequate solution to this difficulty may be found within Moltmann's system.

HISTORICAL MILLENARIANISM VS. ESCHATOLOGICAL MILLENARIANISM

Moltmann makes a crucial distinction between historical and eschatological millenarianism that must be clearly set forth before any adequate understanding of his eschatology in *The Coming of God* may be achieved. Moltmann differentiates eschatological millenarianism from "the millennial dream of modernity," or historical millenarianism, which regards the millennium as realized in the present age and is an idea that first gained prominence in the early church through the influence of Tyconius and Augustine.[4] Historical millenarianism was easily incorporated into the secularized, humanistic eschatologies of the 17th and 18th centuries, which claim that the improvement of humanity through the Enlightenment project will eventually raise society to a state of utopia understood by its proponents as the ultimate goal of history. Thus, millennial hope is interpreted as being entirely "this-worldly" and as achievable through the unfolding of humanly engineered societal ascension culminating in a humanistic "heaven on earth."[5] That such a belief held sway among Europeans and North Americans during the 18th and 19th centuries is hardly surprising given the territorial expansion of European empires, advances in science, and the spread of Christian missionary activity during this time.[6]

Moltmann tells us that an important aspect of historical millenarianism is the way it is used by powerful ecclesiastical institutions to legitimate their authority and to validate their unique form of existence as the sole intermediary, "millennial" embodiment of the kingdom of Christ.[7] This

4 Bauckham is correct in pointing out the confusion in Moltmann's terminology, for historical millenarianism is treated by him as being identical with post-millenarianism. In common usage, though, Moltmann's historical millenarianism would be termed "a-millenarianism," and "post-millenarianism" would be considered a futurist rather than a presentative millenarianism. Richard Bauckham, "The Millennium," in *God Will Be All In All*, ed. Richard Bauckham (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 131-134.

5 Bauckham, "Eschatology in *The Coming of God*," 26-27.

6 Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 2-4.

7 Ibid., 192-194.

position leads to a rejection of eschatological millenarianism (to be defined later) for the following reason:

> Those who proclaim that their own political or ecclesiastical present is Christ's Thousand Years' empire cannot put up with any hope for an alternative kingdom of Christ besides, but are bound to feel profoundly disquieted and called in question by any such hope.[8]

Though Moltmann does not directly accuse any specific institutions of holding to historical millenarianism for such blatantly self-serving reasons, he does contrast the rejection of an eschatological millennium on the part of "Orthodox, Roman Catholic and mainline Protestant churches" with the acceptance of such an eschatological hope by "many nonconformist communities."[9] Elsewhere Moltmann describes those who reject eschatological millenarianism as "mainline churches," "the established Christian churches," and "the churches of the Christian imperium."[10]

In contrast to historical millenarianism, eschatological millenarianism is rooted in the hope for a new reality that will put an end to current, oppressive global structures through the actualization of Christ's kingdom of justice on earth. As such, eschatological millenarianism resonates deeply with the experience of those whose lives are spent outside the spheres of power and privilege. "Eschatological millenarianism . . . is a necessary picture of hope in resistance, in suffering, and in the exiles of this world," which grants those who cling to it the power "to survive and to resist."[11] Advocates of eschatological millenarianism continue in the tradition of Jewish and Christian apocalyptic prophets who "proclaim God's new beginning"[12] in the midst of the overthrow they herald. Of them, Moltmann writes, "They awaken the *resistance of faith* and the *patience of hope.* They spread hope in danger . . ."[13] Central to Moltmann's eschatological millenarianism is the belief that an actual millennial age will occur between our current world reality and the establishment of God's new creation. Such millennial hope stands in solidarity with the apocalyptic hopes of

8 Ibid., 193-194.

9 Ibid., 192.

10 Ibid., 147.

11 Ibid., 192.

12 Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 203.

13 Ibid. Italics in original.

the oppressed and in opposition to the apocalyptic fatalism of the affluent Western world.[14] According to Moltmann, apocalyptic fatalism commits the error of holding to a partial eschatology by embracing with despair the radical break that will bring history to a catastrophic end without also embracing the eschatological hope of the new creation.[15] The millennium transcends mere fatalism by not only maintaining the eventual "negation of the negative,"[16] but also predicting history's final end in terms of consummation and fulfillment in Christ's earthly kingdom.

THE MILLENNIUM AND THE ESCHATON

In order to adequately develop the specific contour of Moltmann's unique eschatological millenarianism, we must turn our attention to the relation between this millennium and God's new future creation (which I will refer to as "the eschaton"). For Moltmann, the millennium and the eschaton each occupy a distinct place within the unfolding progression of God's final redemption of the world. Millenarianism refers to the realization of Christ's future kingdom here within historical time preceding the eventual, dramatic break with historical time in "the dawn of the new, eternal creation,"[17] which will bring an end to the millennial age and will be characterized by the mutual indwelling of God and creation. In order to sufficiently distinguish the millennium from the eschaton in Moltmann's theology, the relation of time to the created world and the relation of God's presence to the created world in each of these two epochs must be set forth along with the function of the millennium as a transitional period between the present age and the eschaton.

Moltmann explains a primary difference between the millennium and the eschaton:

> [T]here is no adequate Christian eschatology without millenarianism. Eschatology is more than millenarianism, but millenarianism is its historical relevance . . . Millenarianism is the special, this-worldly side of eschatology, the side turned towards experienced history; eschatology

14 Bauckham, "Eschatology in *The Coming of God*," 32.

15 Ibid., 30-32. Also Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 202-204.

16 Ibid., 141, italicized in original. For more on the difference between a humanly versus a divinely initiated apocalypse, see Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 216-218.

17 Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 199.

> is the general side of history, the side turned towards what is beyond history.[18]

Thus we see that a primary difference between the millennium and the eschaton is the relation of each to history, or more precisely, to historical time. Further, though the millennium is located within historical time, the millennial experience of time will be different than that of the present age. There are three categories of time, or modes of time experience, that Moltmann delineates. The first is simply "calendar time," which may be understood as the chronological progression, measured by lunar and planetary motion, within which we currently live.[19] The second category is millennial time, which is marked by the "consummation of historical time *in* history before 'the Last Day' and the dawn of the new, eternal creation."[20] For Moltmann, the millennium will be inside of history and yet outside of calendar time. Thus the exact relationship between history and calendar time is obscure and "the most difficult problem of millenarian eschatology" remains.[21] The third time category Moltmann envisions is the eternity of the eschaton that is thoroughly outside of history, occurring after a radical break between the millennial age and the coming new creation of God.

The second distinction between the millennium and the eschaton is the relation of God's presence to the created world in each. In the millennium, God's presence will be expressed predominantly through the reign of Christ in his realized kingdom. In the eschaton, though, there will exist a mutual indwelling of God in creation and of creation in God (based on I Corinthians 15:22-28) that will effect the transformation of creation by God's "unmediated and direct glory." [22] Further, this interpenetrating Shekinah presence of God "will bring to all heavenly and earthly creatures eternal life and perfect justice and righteousness."[23] Bauckham therefore tells us that, in Moltmann's eschaton, God "achieves his kingdom in

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18 Ibid., 197.

19 Ibid., 199-200. The error of modernity was the anticipation the millennium in terms of our current experience of time.

20 Ibid., 199.

21 Moltmann states, " The most difficult problem of millenarian eschatology is *the time problem*." Ibid., 199.

22 Ibid., 317.

23 Ibid., 266.

creation, he comes to his eschatological rest in creation, he indwells his creation, he becomes 'all in all.'"[24] This mutual indwelling of God and creation during the eschaton should not be confused with pantheism, for Moltmann is clear that distinctions between God and world will not dissolve and that fundamental identity of being will persist.[25] Moltmann finds an analogy to this continued distinction between God and world during the eschaton in the way God currently relates to believers:

> the world will find space in God in a worldly way when God indwells the world in a divine way. That is a reciprocal perichoresis of the kind already experienced here in love: the person who abides in love abides in God, and God in him [or her] (I John 4:16). According to Paul, this presence of mutual indwellings is here called love, but then it will be called glory.[26]

This mutual indwelling is quite different than God's current relation to the created order because, according to Moltmann, God is not yet "omnipresent in the absolute sense."[27]

The last distinction of the millennium is its mediating function between our present age and the eschaton.[28] Moltmann argues that without such a transitional phase, life within current history would be rendered meaningless in the eschaton:

> If we leave out this transition, as the non-millenarian eschatologies do, then world history will end – according to modern fantasy – with an abrupt Big Bang, like the Big Bang with which it is supposed to have begun. These are Hiroshima images without any relevance for the way we live and act here, because they view life and action here as irrelevant for the end of the world . . .[29]

For Moltmann, the transitional nature of the millennium provides the needed connection between this world and the new creation of God. If the

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24 Bauckham, "Eschatology in *The Coming of God*," 24. Moltmann states that the primary characteristics of God's indwelling in creation are holiness and glory in *The Coming of God*, 318.

25 Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 307.

26 Jürgen Moltmann, "The World in God or God in the World?: Response to R. Bauckham," in *God Will Be All In All*, ed. R. Bauckham (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001), 41.

27 Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 306.

28 Moltmann writes, "The transition will be brought about through a series of events and the succession of various different phases." Ibid., 201.

29 Ibid., 201-202.

rupture in historical time between this current world and the eschaton is too radical, then the meanings predicated upon life and action here within history would fail to survive translation into God's future reality beyond history, rendering our current lives meaningless from the perspective of the eschaton. For this reason, Moltmann views the millennium as philosophically necessary.

A CHRISTOLOGICALLY-BASED CRITICISM OF MOLTMANN'S MILLENARIANISM

Though Moltmann goes into great depth developing his formulation of the millennium, he fails to show convincingly the way that it relates to the Christological core of his eschatology established in *Theology of Hope*: the death and resurrection of Christ. Moltmann has constructed his theology upon the foundation of Christology in such a way that he regards the death and resurrection of Christ as the microcosmic basis for future eschatological events. Therefore, the death of Christ provides the interpretive framework for understanding the eventual end of our present age and the eschaton finds its promise in Christ's resurrection. In other words, Christ's history on earth has proleptic significance for our own lives and the world in general. Bauckham interprets Moltmann similarly when he writes:

> . . . God's act of raising Jesus from the dead was the culminating event of promise. In it God *guaranteed* his promise by, so to speak, *enacting* it in Jesus' person. The promise of God's new creation of all things remains outstanding, because only Jesus is raised, but he has been raised for the sake of the future eschatological resurrection of all the dead . . . [30]

Indeed, Moltmann clearly states that we may distinguish actual eschatological reality from utopian dreams by asking "whether all statements about the future are grounded in the person and history of Jesus Christ . . ."[31] Further, Moltmann goes on to claim that by understanding who Christ "was and is" we may learn something about

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30 Richard Bauckham, *The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 33-34.

31 Jürgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*, 17.

"who he will be and what is to be expected from him."[32] While this does not necessitate that every future, eschatological event must find an analogical counterpart in the death and resurrection of Christ, there is required a certain degree of rootedness of eschatological reality within the events of Christ's life. The furthest Moltmann goes in this direction is to link the resurrection of believers "*from* the dead" at the millennium with Christ's resurrection "*from* the dead,"[33] which in my view places an excessive degree of theological weight upon a mere preposition. In light of this, it is puzzling that Moltmann does not attempt to give the millennium a more secure grounding within the death and resurrection of Christ and reveal more explicitly the Christological foundation of his millenarianism, which his eschatological method seems to require. Because of this lack of Christological foundation, the millenarianism developed by Moltmann does not maintain sufficient consistency with the eschatological method he establishes in *Theology of Hope*.[34]

MIROSLAV VOLF'S CRITICISM OF MOLTMANN'S MILLENARIANISM

In his essay, "After Moltmann: Reflections on the Future of Eschatology," Miroslav Volf offers a thoughtful critique of Moltmann's theology.[35] Though Moltmann responds to a number of Volf's concerns in "Can Christian Eschatology Become Post-Modern?"[36], he does not address Volf's concern that his millennium fails to provide an intelligible step of transition between the present age and the eschaton. I will briefly sketch

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32 Ibid.

33 Moltmann, *The Coming of God*, 151, 194-196. For a thoughtful critique of Moltmann's exegesis see Bauckham, "The Millennium," 144-146.

34 Moltmann may be attempting to avoid the need to give a clearer explanation of the millennium's rootedness in the history of Christ by emphasizing the millennium's extreme Christocentric nature, thus relating the millennium entirely to the future of Christ. Yet, even so, he has left the core of his eschatology developed in *Theology of Hope* far behind and has entered the uncertain terrain of speculative theory.

35 One of Volf's primary criticisms is that Moltmann advances an excessively modernist perspective by regarding history as a force of "singleness and unidirectionality" rather than as the complex system of "multiplicity" that history actually seems to be. Volf, 243.

36 Jürgen Moltmann, "Can Christian Eschatology Become Post-Modern? Response to Miroslav Volf," in *God Will Be All In All*, ed. Richard Bauckham (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001).

the most forceful aspect of Volf's argument regarding the inadequate transitional nature of Moltmann's millennium and then offer a solution to this problem that may be found within Moltmann's system.

While Bauckham argues that Moltmann's millenarianism is unnecessary, Volf believes it to be "detrimental."[37] Volf argues that since Moltmann views history as a single movement rather than as a multiplicity of movements, his eschatological millenarianism commits the same error as historical millenarianism in that it becomes "inherently oppressive." If, though, Moltmann attempts to avoid this conclusion, Volf argues, the only way forward is to place "the millennium so firmly in the future that it can do no real work in the present," thus causing a deflation in the meaning of any contemporary social action.[38] Volf writes:

> . . . if the millennium is allowed to set foot in history, the dangers of historical millenarianism loom large; if the millennium is maintained as an exclusively future reality, it cannot direct action toward the goal of history.[39]

A RESPONSE TO VOLF CONSTRUCTED FROM MOLTMANN'S SYSTEM

Though Volf's argument seeks to reveal the inadequacy of the millennium as a transitional phase, it is precisely the mediating function of the millennium that enables Moltmann's system to provide an answer to the criticism leveled by Volf. We must review the three relevant segments of eschatological reality: 1) our present age within history and "calendar time" in which Christ's reign is not yet fully realized, 2) the millennium which will occur within history, though not within "calendar time," in which Christ's reign will be fully realized, and finally 3) the eschaton beyond history during the period in which God and creation will experience mutual indwelling enabling all of creation to express the unveiled glory of God.

Volf is correct in stating that Moltmann is able to avoid historical millenarianism by defining the millennium as sufficiently separate from current reality, but Volf errs in stating that this leads to an invalidation of

37 Volf, 243, italicized in original text.

38 Ibid., 243-244fn.

39 Ibid., 244fn.

all historically meaningful social action.[40] The millennium as transition preserves the meaningfulness of social action in the present age because of the millennium's location within history. Thus, social action undertaken now participates in the trajectory of God's work within history, a trajectory that will continue and be fulfilled in the millennium due to the millennial age's location within historical time. Though within history, the millennium's realization of the full reign of Christ and it's removal from "calendar time" cause it to retain sufficient distance from our current age in order to avoid the feared collapse into a form of historical millenarianism.

Yet, what of Volf's difficulty with the "unstable" transition from the millennium to the eschaton?[41] For Volf, to make the millennium an adequate stage of mediation between the present and the eschaton requires that the millennial reign of Christ "look very much like the new creation" thus rendering such a transitional period redundant.[42] Moltmann's system, though, construes the millennium with a sufficient level of complexity in order to prevent it from collapsing either into the eschaton or into our present age. On the initial "edge" of the millennium, the fullness of Christ's reign distinguishes the millennium sharply from our current reality. On its latter "edge," the end of history along with the mutual indwelling of God and creation clearly separates the eschaton from the millennium. Volf justifiably considers these transitions "unstable," for even with the mediating role of the millennium the shift in regard to the terms of existence between each stage is extreme. However, the extreme step between the millennium and the eschaton is bridged by the unfolding fullness of God's reign just as the extreme step between the present age and the millennium is bridged by their mutual location within historical time. It is within the Trinitarian Being of God that the "unstable" transition between Christ's millennial reign and God's unveiled glory within creation is rendered stable, for the radical break caused by history's end pales in comparison to the radical continuity between the fullness of Christ's reign within the millennial kingdom and the unveiling of God's Shekinah glory throughout all of creation in the eschaton. As such, social action in the

40 Ibid., 243-244fn.

41 Ibid., 244.

42 Ibid.

present age not only preserves its meaning in the millennial age due to the continued trajectory of such action within history (the shared location of both ages), but also maintains its meaning in the eschaton due to the bridging function of the Trinitarian God's continued reign, enabling the work of God's people within history to achieve meaningful translation into the new creation.[43]

CONCLUSION

Moltmann's eschatology draws from the millenarian tradition of the Church in a refreshing way, seeking to provide the oppressed of our world with hope for radical change, for deliverance, and for justice within Christ's millennial kingdom. In this paper I have explored Moltmann's thought by investigating the distinction between historical and eschatological millenarianism, the ways in which time and God's presence will be experienced differently in the millennium and the eschaton, and the role of the millennium as a transitional phase. I then offered a critique of Moltmann's millenarianism based upon its inconsistent lack of sufficient Christological grounding as compared to *Theology of Hope*. I then went on to consider a criticism raised by Miroslav Volf, focusing specifically upon the millennium as transitional phase, and offered a response to this problem drawn from Moltmann's eschatological system. The eschatological millenarianism of Jürgen Moltmann not only incorporates the ancient millennial teachings of the Church without committing the errors of historical millenarianism, but also provides a sound basis for the meaningful translation of social action on the part of Christians into the millennial kingdom of Christ and ultimately into the eternal eschatological reign of God. In spite of the future apocalyptic break envisioned by Moltmann's theology, Christian participation in the mission of God on earth in the present age maintains enduring relevance and bears lasting fruit in both the millennium and the

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43 My argument on this point is also in disagreement with Bauckham's related criticism of Moltmann's millennium as transitional phase in "The Millennium," 140-142. A critic may respond by suggesting that although my argument offers an explanation for how human action in the present age may preserve meaning in the eschaton, it offers no response to Volf's suggestion that Moltmann's millenarianism seems to participate in the same "oppressive character" exemplified by historical millenarianism due to its unidirectionality. I have chosen not to respond to this aspect of Volf's argument in light of Moltmann's reply in "Can Christian Eschatology Become Post-Modern: Response to Miroslav Volf," 263-264.

eschaton because of the continuing reign of the Triune God in each of these radically dissimilar epochs. Within the unbroken reign of God, unfolding with ever increasing fullness, we find revealed to us continuity greater than any disjunction, stability greater than any upheaval, and a new beginning which both incorporates while it also transcends the obedient action of the Church within the present age.

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Life and After Life in the Book of Ben Sira

ADAM STOKES

The book of Ben Sira is in many ways a unique text among biblical literature. It is the only book existing outside of the Masoretic edition of the Hebrew Bible that both Jewish and Christian writers quote from extensively.[1] Its popularity in ancient times is attested to by the fact that it was translated from the original Hebrew into various other languages the most notable of these being the Greek edition as found in the Septuagint[2]. While the translators of Ben Sira attempted to remain faithful to the original text, in many instances they either alter or add verses in order to make the book reflect their own theological positions. One finds notable differences even among those manuscripts composed in the same language and in many cases one can trace the development of particular theological ideas based on the dating of a particular manuscript.

This phenomenon is seen most notably in regard to the subject of the nature of human existence and of the afterlife in particular. Most scholars would concede that Jesus Ben Sira himself viewed human beings as mortal creatures whose existence is confined solely to their present time here on earth.[3] Yet, later versions of the book contain numerous references

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1 The book of Ben Sira is part of the Old Testament canon for the Catholic, Orthodox and Ethiopic churches and quotations from the book are found throughout the writings of the Church Fathers. The book is also quoted extensively in the Jewish Talmud. For a discussion of the use of Ben Sira in rabbinic literature see Benjamin G. Wright III, "B Sanhedrin 100b and rabbinic knowledge of *Ben Sira,*" in *Treasures of Wisdom* (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1999).

2 Versions of the book also exist in Syriac and Latin. For a discussion of the various versions of Ben Sira and the differences between them see Alexander A. DiLella and Patrick W. Skehan, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 51-62. For the original Hebrew version along with the parallel Greek, Syriac and Latin translations see Francesco Vattioni, *Eccleiastico: Testo ebraico con apparato critico e versioni greca, Latina e siriaca* (Napoli: Istituto Orientale Di Napoli, 1968).

3 One exception being Emile Puech who, in his book *La Croyance Des Esseniens En La Vie Future: Immortalite, Resurrection, Vie Eternelle? Histoire D'Une Croyance Dans Le*

to the belief that human existence continues after death and that those individuals who have lived righteous lives in accordance with God's laws will be rewarded with eternal bliss and happiness. While there has been a resurgence in Ben Sira studies within the larger field of biblical scholarship, only a few scholars have looked at the treatment of this particular subject in the book and its development over time in subsequent translations. My intention in this paper is to examine in greater detail the contrasts between Jesus Ben Sira's own position on human existence and the views of the various translators of his work.

I have divided my discussion of Ben Sira into two parts. The first section of this paper looks at the view of human existence as presented in the original Hebrew version of Ben Sira. While Ben Sira himself rejects the idea that either the soul or the body continue to exist after death he does believe that an individual can live on through the memory of his or her good deeds.[4] Related to his views on the afterlife, Ben Sira also rejects any notion of paradise or place of eternal bliss for the righteous after death. For him, paradise exists on earth in the present life through intimacy with Wisdom which one obtains through Torah observance. In this sense, humans achieve a state of bliss similar to that of the first human couple in the Garden of Eden. Ben Sira's position finds parallels with other Jewish Wisdom literature from the period such as Ecclesiastes and reflects his own desire to remain within the traditional framework of both the theology of the Priestly schools and the theology of the later Wisdom schools.[5]

Judaisme Ancien (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1993), suggests that some of the material in the original Hebrew version of Ben Sira reflects a belief in the afterlife.

4 I do not employ the term "immortality" when referring to Ben Sira's own views. As Michael S. Moore notes in his article "Resurrection and Immortality: Two Motifs Navigating Confluent Theological Streams in the Old Testament" *Theologische Zeitschrift* 39 (1983), "since the English word 'immortality' has such Hellenistic overtones, perhaps it has become impossible to employ it to describe this Israelite belief in a state of 'non-deadness.' Perhaps a more appropriate term would be 'deathlessness,' or 'continualness'" (p. 34). Ben Sira's own view in regard to human existence and the afterlife undoubtedly reflects the traditional Israelite view as found in the Hebrew Bible although other aspects of his theology such as his views on the nature of God may have been influenced by Hellenism (Stoicism in particular). When referring to the theology of the second Greek version of Ben Sira I will use the term immortality since both the G2 redactor as well as most first century BCE Jews were influenced by Hellenistic views on the afterlife.

5 I have decided to use the term "schools" in this paper instead of "school" since the latter term implies a sense of conformity and uniformity of thought which, in my view, is inapplicable to the various biblical traditions. The term "schools" better reflects the diversity

In the second section of this paper, I will look at the views on the nature of human existence found in later versions of the book of Ben Sira, focusing specifically on the references found in the second Greek translation of the text known as G2. In the G2 version, the themes discussed in great length by Ben Sira himself, such as reward and punishment in the present life, are reinterpreted and the time period for when these events are to occur is deliberately extended/postponed to the afterlife. In looking at the reasons for this tendency, I will raise the possibility that the G2 redactor might have been influenced by the same group of schools within Judaism that produced the Enoch literature noting the theological similarities between these schools and the Wisdom schools responsible for Ben Sira.

Jesus Ben Sira is similar to other Wisdom sages, such as the authors of Ecclesiastes and Proverbs, in his preoccupation with subjects related to human existence. Whereas the authors of both Proverbs and Ecclesiastes focus on the question of what constitutes as a satisfying life, which for the former would consist of reverent piety towards the Creator and for the latter would consist of enjoying the Creator's blessings to the fullest, Ben Sira chooses to focus on the implications of death for human existence.[6] For all three of these writers, death represents the final stage in the human journey.[7] There is no life after death and for Ben Sira, as for the Wisdom school in general, this is God's intended plan for humanity.[8] As he puts it,

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and variety of thought apparent within the Jewish Wisdom tradition although it can be argued the various schools in this tradition would have been united in that they addressed the same theological issues as related to the subject of Wisdom as a whole.

6 For the importance of fearing the Lord and its relation to daily life see Proverbs 3 (although this subject is addressed in many ways throughout the book). For the importance of enjoying God's blessings in the present life see Ecclesiastes 3.24-26.

7 This is the position taken by most of the various authors of books of the Hebrew Bible, the notable exceptions being Daniel (see Daniel 12.2) and the appended ending to Ecclesiastes which possibly implies a belief in judgment after death (see Ecclesiastes 12.14).

8 The major exception to this, which itself has been the subject of much scholarly discussion, is the statement found in Sirach 25.24 which reads "from a woman was the beginning of sin and through her we all die." Of the possible explanations for this verse, DiLella (p. 349) cites J. Levison's article "Is Eve to Blame? A Contextual Analysis of Sirach 25.24," *CBQ* 47 (1985): 617-623, in which Levison explains the verse as referring "not to Eve but to the evil wife. Therefore it must be translated: 'From the [evil] wife is the beginning of sin,/and because of her we [husbands] all die" (p. 622). John G. Snaith, in his commentary *Ecclesiasticus or the Wisdom of Jesus son of Sirach* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974), notes that the passage is an anomaly in that later "Rabbinic tradition usually regarded Adam as primarily responsible..." (p. 130). My own position is that Ben Sira is simply stating a fact about human existence. Women are the ones who bring about life through conception

death "is the judgment from the Lord for all flesh, so why reject the will of the Most High; whether ten or a hundred or a thousand years, there is in Hades no chastisement concerning life" (Sirach 41.4).[9]

Like the authors of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, Ben Sira accepts the notion found in the Torah and specifically in the Priestly legislation that the righteous will be rewarded and that sinners will be punished.[10] This is seen in his statement that "as doves dwell with those like them so truth will come to the ones who work for it" and that "as a lion waits for prey so likewise does sin operate for the unrighteous" (Sirach 27.9-10). In its traditional form, this doctrine limits reward and punishment solely to the present life and as such fits in well with Ben Sira's own theology. Although some scholars, such as Conleth Kearns, view Ben Sira as remaining "unshakably attached to the older views" in the Hebrew Bible regarding reward and punishment, he does depart significantly from tradition at times.[11] While nearly all of the books in the Hebrew Bible attribute disaster and misfortune for sins committed either by an individual or by a community as a whole, Ben Sira recognizes that such an interpretation of day to day events might not always be accurate.[12] Like the author of Job and the author of Ecclesiastes, Ben Sira acknowledges that in life there are cases in which "a righteous man is destroyed in his righteousness and a wicked man survives in his wickedness" (Ecclesiastes 7.15).

One of the ways in which Ben Sira sees the wicked prospering is through the proliferation of offspring since, in the traditional biblical view, the ability to procreate was one of the greatest blessings that God

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and birth and this life eventually leads to death for all human beings. This life also provides the possibility for all human beings to commit sin.

9 All translations of Ben Sira are mine unless stated as otherwise and are from the original Hebrew where available. In cases where the Hebrew is not available, the first Greek or GI text has been used.

10 DiLella and Skehan, 84, 274. DiLella refers to this notion as the "doctrine of the efficacy of works" and notes that Ben Sira reflects the "Deuteronomic theology of retribution." I would argue that given Ben Sira's Priestly influence that the concepts of reward and punishment in his book stem from Priestly theology, in particular Leviticus 26, rather than Deuteronomic theology.

11 Conleth Kearns, "Ecclesiasticus" in *A New Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture*, ed. Rev. Reginald C. Fuller, Rev. Leonard Johnston and Rev. Conleth Kearns (New Jersey: Nelson and Sons, 1969), 545.

12 It should be noted that at times Ben Sira does attribute disasters, in particular natural disasters, to sin. See, for example, Sirach 40.8-10.

could bestow on a person.[13] He warns his students to "not rejoice in the children of an impious man" (Sirach 16.1) and to "not celebrate with them if they are fruitful" (Sirach 16.2).[14] With both of these statements, Ben Sira admits that it is possible for the wicked to receive those things considered as divine blessings although he attempts to try to place this phenomenon within the context of traditional theology by adding the admonition to "not trust in their lives" (Sirach 16.3). His efforts to reconcile the concept of reward and punishment with the injustices taking place around him ultimately lead him to ask two questions. The first is how the pious are rewarded in the present life if they do not receive wealth, power or posterity – the three main rewards that, according to the traditional view, are guaranteed for the righteous person. The second question, related to the first, is in what ways can the pious experience any sense of happiness and bliss if they do not receive these rewards in the present life and if there is no bodily existence after death. In the end, Ben Sira comes to the conclusion that there are two ways in which all pious people, regardless of whether or not their situation appears less prosperous than that of the wicked, are rewarded. One of these is the reward of intimacy with Wisdom and the other is the continued existence that the righteous obtain through their reputation or "good name." I will begin by looking at the concept of Wisdom as reward.

Nearly a third of the book of Ben Sira deals with the subject of Wisdom. Like the author of Proverbs and, to a lesser extent, the author of Ecclesiastes, Ben Sira personifies Wisdom as a woman.[15] Both the prologue and the erotic poem that closes the book contain eulogies to Lady Wisdom.[16] With the exception of his interest in the meaning of human existence, Ben Sira is more fascinated with the subject of Wisdom than with any other subject

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13 See, for example, Proverbs 13.22, 17.6 and Psalm 17 and 127. For barrenness as a curse see Psalm 109.

14 The phrase *bēnē olāh* can be read a variety of ways referring either to one's own bad children or the children of a wicked person as I have translated it here.

15 References to Lady Wisdom are found throughout Proverbs most notably in Proverbs 8. For references to the profit Wisdom brings but the futility of the author's search for her see Ecclesiastes 7.11,23.

16 The poem on Wisdom in Sirach 51.13-30 that concludes the book was probably not composed by Ben Sira himself but was undoubtedly appealing to him leading him to add it to his own work.

he deals with. The most common metaphor that Ben Sira uses in his description of Wisdom is that of a tree. For example, in one section in which he discusses the benefits of Wisdom, Ben Sira writes: "Blessed is the man who meditates on Wisdom and looks with understanding, who places his possession under her wings and who dwells in her branches, who seeks refuge in her shadow from the drought" (Sirach 14.20, 26-27). In another section, Wisdom praises herself and at one point in the eulogy she gives a narration of her history which reads as follows:

> Like a cedar tree I grew in Lebanon and like a cypress tree on the hills of Hermon. Like a palm tree I grew in Engedi and like a rose plant in Jericho, like a beautiful olive tree on the plain and I grew like a plane tree. I stretched out my branches like a terebinth and my branches are glorious and graceful. I sprout gracefully like a vine and my flowers are glorious and plentiful fruit. Those who desire me, come to me and entangle yourselves in my fruits" (Sirach 13-17, 19)

Related to the metaphor of Wisdom as a tree, another metaphor that Ben Sira uses to describe Lady Wisdom is that of a garden. In one section of his book, Ben Sira argues that one can best discern true and false friendship by taking hold of Wisdom and goes on to encourage his students to "come to her like one who plows and like a harvester and wait for her product" (Sirach 6.19). In using such language to describe Wisdom, Ben Sira explicitly invokes images of both the primordial garden mentioned in the book of Genesis and, more specifically, of the tree of the knowledge of good and bad referred to in the Garden of Eden story. For Ben Sira, the story of the primordial garden with its reference to the tree of the knowledge of good and bad would have been very appealing since the J author of the story notes that this tree "was desirable for understanding" (Genesis 3.6).

According to Ben Sira, a person participates intimately with Wisdom through observance of the Torah. One reason for this is because, as John G. Snaith notes, "true wisdom equals personal devotion (fear of the Lord) and obedience to the law."[17] Yet, the main reason that Ben Sira views Torah observance as crucial for one to interact with Wisdom is that for him the Torah represents Wisdom incarnate. This is seen with the statement he makes in one of his Wisdom eulogies that "all of these things," referring

17 Snaith, 158.

to Wisdom's various attributes, "are the book of the covenant of the Most High, the law which Moses commanded to us" (Sirach 24.23).[18]

The Wisdom one gains through persistent observance of the Torah leads ultimately to peace in the present (and the only) life as seen with Ben Sira's assurance to his listeners that "afterwards you will find her rest and she will turn into joy for you" (Sirach 6.28) although he does not specify what such peace entails. For Ben Sira, this type of peace in many ways parallels the state of the first man and woman in the primordial garden before the fall and for him it is the reward given to all pious, law-abiding persons regardless of their situation or social standing. By observing the Torah and, consequently, eating from the fruit of Wisdom who herself represents the tree of the knowledge of good and bad one not only comes into true rest but lives on after death not physically but through the memory of his or her moral example.[19] This brings us to our discussion of the continuation of life after death through one's reputation or "good name" as found in Ben Sira.

As noted earlier, Ben Sira is deeply troubled by the fact that he sees righteous, Torah observant individuals who, for whatever reason, are unable to have children. Since Ben Sira himself had children (his grandson goes on to translate the original Hebrew text into Greek) this problem obviously did not apply to him but may well have applied to some

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18 For Ben Sira, the term "Torah" probably includes most or even all of the Old Testament in its present form (with the exception of Daniel). While he does explicitly equate Wisdom with the "law of Moses" he also acknowledges the authority of visions that have been sent by God (Sirach 34.6), an almost certain reference to the Prophetic corpus. Furthermore, in his praise of the Fathers at the end of the book Ben Sira refers to individuals such as Job and Nehemiah, showing familiarity with the third section of the Hebrew Bible known as the Ketuvim or "Writings." The notion of Wisdom as Torah finds its earliest expression in Ezra 7.25 in which the Torah is referred to as the "wisdom (Aramaic: *hāmat*) of your God that is in your hand." In Baruch 4.1, Wisdom is explicitly referred to as the book of the law. In the Wisdom of Solomon, Wisdom is not explicitly equated with Torah but the author does note that she has her own νομοσς or "law" that the righteous need to obey. In the New Testament, Jesus is referred to as the σοφια του Θεου (1 Corinthians 1.24) and the portrayal of him in the Gospels strongly and deliberately implies that he is to be seen as the Torah incarnate who like Moses brings a new law to the people of Israel.

19 In his exegesis of the Genesis story, Ben Sira appears to combine the tree of life with the tree of the knowledge of good and bad so that only one tree exists in paradise instead of two but it shares the properties of both. The tradition of linking Wisdom with the tree of life in the Bible is seen in Judaism to this very day. For example, one of the most famous commentaries on the Torah is called *Etz Hayim* or the "Tree of Life."

of his students.[20] From a more theological perspective, the existence of such persons poses a dilemma for the traditional Jewish view in which a man was thought to live on perpetually through his children.[21] A man who was unable to have children (in particular male children) was considered cursed by God who, according to the traditional view, intended to make this wicked person childless in order to blot out his existence forever.

Ben Sira himself is too much of a traditionalist to completely reject the standard Jewish position that biological children are a blessing from God and in many places he acknowledges the validity this idea.[22] Yet, he also re-interprets this idea to include the possibility that some righteous individuals who are childless might still live on through the remembrance of their goodness and piety and the passing on of their moral example to others. According to Ben Sira, one reward that Wisdom grants those who follow the Torah is the ability to live a decent life that will be recounted and imitated by future generations. As Josef Schreiner notes, "in her [Wisdom], the wise man finds...a way to salvation. There will be for him an eternal name. The Lord can provide him with glory."[23] This is seen with the statement made by Ben Sira that "the one who fears the Lord will do this and the one who holds onto the law will be led to her...she will extol him above his neighbors and in the midst of the congregation she will open his mouth. Rejoicing and joy he will find and an eternal name he will inherit" (Sirach 15.1, 5-6).

For Ben Sira, these individuals live on in the memory of others long after they are dead. As he puts it, "a good life has a number of days but a good name has days without number" (Sirach 41.13). While Ben Sira is not

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20 It is possible that some of Ben Sira's students might have been eunuchs and therefore unable to bear children which would account for his emphasis on this particular issue throughout the book. Jewish eunuchs were common within the post-Exilic era as seen in the story of Daniel and it is possible that Nehemiah himself might have been an eunuch given that he explicitly avoids mentioning any of the sexual criteria for admission into the assembly of the Lord as found in Deuteronomy (see Deuteronomy 23.1).

21 This concern is seen most notably with the emphasis on genealogies found throughout the Hebrew Bible. For examples of fertility as a blessing and barrenness as a curse see note 13.

22 See Sirach 3.5 and 30.2-3. Ben Sira sees sons as a greater blessing than daughters since, for various reasons, daughters cause trouble for their parents (see Sirach 42.9-14).

23 Josef Schreiner, *Jesus Sirach 1-24, Die Neue Echter Bibel: Kommentar zum Alten Testament mit der Einheits-ubersetzung* (Wurzburg: Echter Verlag, 2002), 85-86. Translation from the German mine.

the first person to argue for that the righteous live on through their "good name" he is the first to explicitly formulate this concept in his writings.[24] Just as he uses this concept to explain how God rewards those who are childless so he also uses it to explain how God punishes the wicked, especially those who have children. This is seen in Ben Sira's discussion of punishments for the ungodly where he writes that "the offspring of off scouring are bad and the progeny of the foolish are families of evil" (Sirach 41.5-6). As Snaith notes concerning this particular passage, "Sinners' families 'suffer a lasting disgrace' (verse 6) because of the reputation of their parents who 'have no good name to survive them' (verse 11)."[25]

As we will soon see, later translators of Ben Sira found his views on reward and punishment solely in the present life unacceptable and added statements that explicitly mentioned the reward of eternal life after death for the righteous or the punishment of endless torture after death for the wicked. Yet, before I turn to look at those statements I think it appropriate to briefly refer to the work of Emile Puech who himself has done considerable research on Ben Sira's views on the nature of human existence and who has suggested that there is evidence that Ben Sira believed in life after death. In his book *La Croyance Des Esseniens En La Vie Future*, Puech looks at the history of Jewish beliefs concerning the afterlife, beginning with an examination of some of the statements made by the Prophets in the Hebrew Bible and continuing all the way up to the New Testament period.

In his discussion of Ben Sira, Puech focuses on the "Praise of the Fathers" passage at the end of the book, in particular two verses which mention Elijah. The first of these is Sirach 48.11 which Puech translates as "Heureux qui te verra avant de mourir, car tu rendras la vie et il revivra" or "Blessed is the one who sees you before death, for you will render (him) life and revive him."[26] Puech claims that this is the "lecture assuree" or "certain reading" of the Hebrew text, a reading which itself "is surely

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24 See, for example, Isaiah 56.3-5, Ecclesiastes 7.1 and Wisdom of Solomon 3.13b-4.6.

25 Snaith, 203. Snaith also notes that "the ruin implied is interpreted as bad reputation but presumably also includes evil descendants."

26 Puech, 74. All translations from the French edition are mine.

primitive."[27] Puech notes that the verse as it stands in Hebrew, "in the singular and passive, cannot refer to Elijah." He proposes instead that it could possibly refer to an earlier doctrine of the resurrection in which resurrection was limited to "righteous Israelites who convert at the call of the Prophet Elijah" in contrast to "a general resurrection of all of the just, as later in Dn 12."[28] Puech then concludes by citing much later Midrashic interpretations concerning Elijah's role in the resurrection as evidence that these interpretations stem from the earlier view that one possibly finds in Ben Sira.[29]

Puech's suggestion is in many ways fraught with problems. The text of 48.11 in the Hebrew is so corrupt that at best scholars can only speculate as to what the verse might have said in its original form.[30] Furthermore, as various scholars have noted, any suggestion of a resurrection and hence, bodily existence after death, would blatantly contradict Ben Sira's own views on the nature of human existence.[31] Perhaps some light can be shed on verse 11 by looking at it within the context of the previous verse. In verse 10, Ben Sira paraphrases the last verse of Malachi, noting that Elijah will come in the future to "turn the heart of the fathers to the sons and to restore the tribes of Israel." In this context, verse 11 could refer to revived life not in the sense of existence in the hereafter but in the restoration of peace and prosperity in Israel at the end of days which would accurately to reflect Malachi's own utopian vision.[32]

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27 Ibid., 74.

28 Ibid., 75.

29 Ibid., 75-76.

30 Only the first part of the verse exists in the Hebrew (*ăšer rekā wĕmāt*) with just the words *hāya hāya* at the end of the verse. The Greek does not aid in any way to the reconstruction of the text since it probably reflects the grandson's own views on the afterlife. I am of the opinion that the text is too corrupt for it ever to be reconstructed properly but that whatever it might have said in its original form certainly did not imply a belief in bodily resurrection.

31 Snaith, 240. Snaith argues that the last section of 48.11 as it stands in Greek ("for even we shall certainly live") is "a later reference to resurrection, agreeing with later exegesis of the Malachi passage but contradicting Ben Sira's frequently expressed disbelief in any future life." While Ben Sira lacks consistency with certain of his theological formulations he does remain pretty consistent throughout the book regarding this particular subject and it is not likely that he would deviate from it here

32 My explanation assumes that the "him" in 28.11 is referring to the nation of Israel in the singular as one collective unit or body. Many of the biblical authors refer to Israel in this way, the most notable example being Second Isaiah whose "suffering servant" in Isaiah 53 is

Puech goes on to look at Sirach 48.13 which reads: "from his burial place his flesh was recreated." As Snaith notes, this verse appears to refer to a story found in II Kings 13.21 in which a body that falls on the bones of Elisha suddenly comes back to life since the tahat certainly refers Elisha's burial place.[33] Puech argues, however, "that 2 R 13.20 is not evident" in the passage and proposes that this is another possible reference to bodily resurrection supported by the fact that resurrection would have been considered "possible and expected in the time of Ben Sira."[34] Such conclusions are problematic for various reasons. First, while this particular doctrine did exist in Ben Sira's time this does not at all mean that Ben Sira accepted it as valid. It appears that for Puech takes it for granted that all pious Jews of the time believe in a resurrection of the dead which is an incorrect assumption since many Jews, especially those within the Wisdom schools and of Priestly status, did not.[35] Secondly, in no place within the Hebrew Bible or in later Jewish tradition is bodily resurrection described as a *nibr' bãsro*.[36] It is much more likely that the reading as it exists now is due to a scribal error, possibly deliberate, in which a *yôd* was changed into a *rêš* so that the present text now reads as *nibr'* instead of *nĕby*, meaning to prophesy. Hence, the verse in its original form read: "from his burial place his flesh prophesied." This reflects the view that was noted earlier in Ben Sira that one lives on even after death through the witness or testimony of their righteous life. In my opinion, neither example offered by Puech represents definite proof that the concept of an afterlife in which either the body or soul lives beyond death exists in the original Hebrew manuscript of Ben Sira.

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the nation of Israel itself. It is possible that Ben Sira believed in an eschatological restoration of Israel and of the Davidic monarchy in particular. See, for example, Sirach 51.12h in which he refers to the "sprout of the horn of David." While eschatology is often linked to belief in an afterlife the two are not synonymous with each other and it is possible, as Ben Sira does, to separate the one from the other.

33 Snaith, 241. The context of verse 12 makes it evident that Elisha is the subject of verse 13.

34 Puech, 76.

35 Puech himself acknowledges that not all pious Jews believed in the resurrection as seen with his discussion of the doctrine of the Sadducees (p. 202-212) .

36 The book of Daniel uses the term *qiş* which literally means "to awake." The Greek equivalent of this term, as found in both the Septuagint version of Daniel and the New Testament is εγερω.

In summary, for Ben Sira himself, as for other authors writing within the Wisdom schools, human existence was limited solely to the present life. In consequence of issues related to theodicy, Ben Sira did acknowledge the possibility that a righteous person could live on through the memory of his deeds if he was not able to live on through his offspring. Also related to issues of theodicy, Ben Sira uses language that would have figured prominently into Jewish concepts of the afterlife, such as language used in reference to the primordial garden, and integrates it into his views on Wisdom and the Torah. In doing this, Ben Sira argues that paradise exists here on earth at the present time in the person of Lady Wisdom and that all pious individuals, regardless of their social standing, can find her and consequently enter into this paradise on earth through observance of the Torah.

I would now like to look at the additions to Ben Sira found in the second Greek or G2 rendition of the text and how these additions, regarding in particular the subjects of human existence and life after death, differ substantially from Ben Sira's own position. While expansions to the Hebrew text are found throughout G2, for the purposes of this paper I have decided to examine only three passages. The first of these is found in the second chapter of the book which, in its original context, attempts to explain why the righteous suffer.[37] In a manner that parallels the structure of the lamentation Psalms, Ben Sira ensures his students that while suffering is inevitable for those who want to live a pious life God is nonetheless just and will reward the righteous if they maintain their faith during difficult times. The passage, in its original form, reads as follows:

> Children, if you come to serve the Lord prepare your soul for testing. Set your heart right, be steadfast and do not be insolent at the time of contention. Cleave to him and do not let go in order that at your end you may become even greater. Receive all that befalls you and during the times of your abasement, persevere. Because gold is tested in fire and men are made acceptable in the furnace of abasement. Believe in him and he will aid you. Straighten out your ways and put your hope upon him. You who fear the Lord, wait for his mercy and do not turn away so that you may not fall. Do not let your reward fall away. You who fear the Lord, hope for good things and in eternal merriment and mercy. (Sirach 2.1-9)

37 Only the Greek is extant for this chapter

In the G2 version, a phrase has been added to the last verse so that it reads:

> You who fear the Lord, hope for good things and in eternal merriment and mercy **because his reward is an eternal gift with joy**.

Another passage expanded on in the G2 version of Ben Sira is found in the twelfth chapter of the book. Here, Ben Sira discusses the various reasons for why one should not help a wicked person if he or she is in need. In short, he argues that if one chooses to give aid to the wicked in any way such service, however sincere, will be used against him. Furthermore since God will eventually judge the wicked it is best to stay away from them so as not to be destroyed with them by God's judgment. The passage, in its original form, reads as follows:

> It is not good to dwell with the wicked or even with those who do not do righteousness. Do not give him any bread for who among them will take anything to you. For God hates wickedness and will turn wrath on the wicked. (Sirach 12.3, 5-6)

In the G2 version, the passage reads:

> For God hates wickedness and will turn wrath on the wicked **and he keeps them for the day of their judgment.**

The last passage that I want to examine is found in chapter sixteen of Ben Sira in which the sage again discusses the situation of the wicked, addressing in particular the concern undoubtedly raised by one of his peers that God does not notice the actions wicked persons. In response to this concern, Ben Sira reminds his students to remain pious and God-fearing because God indeed sees the actions of all humankind. He writes:

> Do not say "I am concealed from God and who from the most high place will remember me"..."If I sin, no eye will see me" or "Who will know if I am deceitful about any secret." "What about acts of righteousness?" "Who will talk about them and what remains since the decree is far away?" The needy of heart understand things in these ways and the simple minded man thinks thus. (Sirach 16.15, 19-21)

The G2 redactor inserts a response to the questions raised in the passage so that it reads:

> "Who will talk about them and what remains since the decree is far away?" **There is an examination of everyone in the end.**[38]

The following conclusions regarding the G2 redactor's view of human existence and on the nature of the afterlife can be drawn from the passages examined. First, the redactor certainly believed that the consciousness of an individual survived in some form after death. This is not, in order to distinguish this view from the position taken by Ben Sira, a symbolic continuation of life after death through the memory of one's deeds or moral example, but rather the deceased person is fully aware of their existence. Secondly, the redactor believed that God would judge or examine (εξεταση) all human beings *after* death whereas for Ben Sira death itself is God's judgment. Since the additions made by the G2 redactor are brief his views on the specific nature of this judgment after death remain largely speculative but can be determined to an extent by the terminology used. As Di Lella notes, the phrase ημεραν εκδικησεως in the G2 addition to Sirach 12.6 stems from the book of Third Isaiah and is synonymous with the Hebrew phrase yom naqam in Isaiah 61.2 and 63.4.[39]

By the time the G2 version of Ben Sira was composed such passages in Isaiah, especially Isaiah 61.2, would have been interpreted as referring to the Messianic age in which God would judge the dead and bring about the world to come.[40] For the G2 redactor, the righteous would receive at this judgment an "eternal gift" (the δοσις αιωνια of Sirach 2.9), this gift probably being rest in heaven. Di Lella argues against viewing this particular addition as a reference to the hereafter, writing that "the 'lasting joy' is not the blessedness of the afterlife but the well-being of this life."[41] It should be noted, however, that the connection between joy (χαρα) and the notion of an eternal gift within the Jewish tradition usually suggests

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38 The G2 addition could also be translated as another question: "Is there even an examination of everyone in the end?"

39 Di Lella, 244.

40 See Daniel 9.20-12.13. G2, a first century BCE document, dates to a period substantially later than the book of Daniel (second century BCE) and reflects, whether from direct or indirect influence, similar views on the Messianic age.

41 Di Lella, 251.

a belief in a realm in the next life in which the righteous will experience perpetual bliss (i.e. paradise/Gan Eden).[42]

The fate of the wicked, on the other hand, remains uncertain in the G2 rendition. Certainly, some type of punishment is involved but none of the additions are specific as to whether this punishment consists of the destruction of the wicked or, as found in later Jewish and Christian literature, eternal punishment in a place of torment. Most significant in the G2 additions dealing with the afterlife is the absence of any reference to bodily resurrection. While, as noted earlier, the additions are too brief to give a systematic exposition of doctrine one would expect to find a phrase or term at some point supporting either implicitly or explicitly a belief in the resurrection of the dead. The lack of any such reference is probably deliberate and lends support to the conclusion that the G2 redactor did not believe in bodily resurrection but took the position that only the soul survives after death.

Concerning the theology of G2, Conleth Kearns writes that "God scrutinizes every man and 'visits' him with a retribution which apportions him a 'lot' of happiness or misery. In this world, this brings honour and success to the well-doer, and shame and reproach to the evil doer. In the next world it brings vengeance and sudden destruction to the sinner, salvation and life to the just man."[43] This statement is only partially accurate and presumes that the G2 redactor was attempting to reconcile his own views with those of Ben Sira so that reward and punishment in either the present life and in the next would appear as equally valid positions. For the G2 redactor, the concept of recompense for one's deeds in the present life proved unconvincing and ultimately unacceptable.

Whereas Ben Sira would have argued that since God is just it follows that the righteous and wicked will eventually get what they deserve in the present life (even if, for the righteous, only by the memory of their good name), the G2 redactor would have made the counter-argument that the righteous and wicked never get what they deserve in the present life

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42 See, for example, V Esdras 2.19 and 2.36 both of which are in reference to the righteous dead. Also see Matthew 25.14-29 which itself is a parable about the judgment of individuals after death and Revelation 21.4 which indirectly affirms the concept of eternal joy after death.

43 Kearns, 549.

and that if God is indeed just then justice will be done only in the next life. In adding statements to the original text, the G2 redactor changes the meaning of various passages in Ben Sira to suggest that reward and punishment is only possible in the next life rather than this one. As a result, the emphasis shifts in regard to which moment in one's existence is most important. While Ben Sira (along with the authors of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes) would have argued that one's life at the present time is of the utmost importance, the G2 redactor would consider one's life after death and the judgment one will face at that time to determine the eternal fate of his or her soul as being of central importance.

While belief in the afterlife was common in Judaism, by the time the G2 version of Ben Sira was composed there is much evidence to show that the work itself was influenced by the schools responsible for the Enoch literature. In comparing the G2 version of Ben Sira specifically with I Enoch, one notices parallels in their views on the nature of human existence in the hereafter, particularly as this relates to which part of the individual survives after death. Both the G2 redactor and the author of I Enoch lean towards the position that only the soul survives after death and not the body.[44] Such a concept of the afterlife differs significantly from that of other Jewish writings of the same period such as the book of Daniel in which bodily resurrection is explicitly mentioned.[45] In his article on Old Testament doctrines of the afterlife, Michael S. Moore argues that the views of various biblical authors either in support of the resurrection of the dead or in support of the immortality of the soul stem from different theological emphases. He notes that "resurrection was formulated" by

44 See, for example, the "Epistle" of Enoch where the author states that "the souls of the pious who have died will come to life and they will rejoice and be glad; and their spirits will not perish nor their memory from the presence of the Great One for all the generations of eternity." (I Enoch 103.4). Some passages in Enoch suggest a belief in bodily resurrection such as I Enoch 92.3 where the statement that the "righteous one will arise from sleep" could be interpreted as an implicit reference to resurrection. Yet, it appears that with these references the author may be appealing to tradition rather than to his own personal beliefs which lean heavily towards the immortality of the soul. All quotations of I Enoch are taken from *I Enoch: A New Translation Based on the Hermeneia Commentary*, trans. George W.E. Nickelsburg and James C. VanderKam (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004).

45 The Wisdom of Solomon, probably written somewhere between 50 BCE and 50 CE, also leans towards the view that the soul is immortal rather than the body (see, for example, Wisdom 8.19-20 and 9.15). However, some verses imply a type of bodily punishment after death (see Wisdom 4.18). For a discussion this subject, see David Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981), 13, 25-26.

those authors motivated by "questions about the ultimate sovereignty of Yahweh over the universe" while the "belief in the immortality of the soul" was formulated by those authors "motivated by the question of individual suffering."[46]

Moore's proposal, in my view, accounts for the differences between the theology of Daniel and the theology of G2 and I Enoch in regard to the subject of life after death. While the author of Daniel is primarily concerned with showing God's sovereignty over the powers persecuting the Jewish community (implicitly referring to the Antiochus IV regime), both the G2 redactor and the author of I Enoch are concerned with the outcome of pious *individuals* who have suffered in the present life. For the author of Daniel, God's sovereignty results in collective salvation at the end of time through means of bodily resurrection whereas for the G2 redactor and the author of I Enoch salvation is personal and depends on one's righteous deeds hence the emphasis on the immortality of individual souls.

The theological similarities between the G2 version of Ben Sira and I Enoch in regard to their views on the afterlife strongly suggest some type of influence on later redactions of Ben Sira on the part of the Enoch tradition even though the exact relationship between G2 and I Enoch remains speculative at best. It is uncertain whether G2 represents a translation of Ben Sira by a member of one of the Enoch schools or whether the redactor of G2 was a student of one of the Wisdom schools who had himself read I Enoch and incorporated aspects of its theology into his version of Ben Sira. Beyond the theological similarities between G2 and I Enoch, there is evidence to suggest that the Enoch tradition did interact with the Wisdom tradition responsible for Ben Sira in both its original form and in its subsequent translations. For example, Hebrew fragments of Ben Sira have been found in the Qumran caves since the Qumran community itself may have been an Enoch school.[47]

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46 Moore, "Resurrection and Immortality," 18.

47 Scholars are uncertain whether the Enoch and Ben Sira fragments at Qumran are evidence that the community itself was an Enoch school or whether its library contained manuscripts and texts from traditions outside of the community. The evidence as it stands does seem to lean in favor of the view that the Qumran community was connected to the Enoch tradition in some way. For an excellent discussion of this issue see the articles in

It would be difficult to imagine that the Enoch tradition and the Wisdom tradition responsible for Ben Sira were not in dialogue with one another in some way given the fact that the concerns raised in each tradition are remarkably similar to one another. In many ways, I Enoch and Ben Sira represent attempts to address the same issues. Like Ben Sira, the author of I Enoch has a preoccupation with the subject of theodicy and such questions as why the righteous are persecuted and whether they will ever find reward for their good deeds (and consequently, the question of whether or not the wicked will ever be punished for their bad deeds).[48] Related to this is a concern, noted in both Ben Sira and I Enoch, that the delayed punishment of the wicked might lead to moral laxity and that there is a need to remind people to continue doing good deeds.[49] Finally, both Ben Sira and the author of I Enoch are concerned with how the wicked are punished.[50]

In this paper, I have examined the subject of human existence and of life after death as found in both the original version of Ben Sira and the second Greek or G2 translation of the text. In the Hebrew version of Ben Sira, humans are described as mortal and as receiving reward or punishment from God solely in the present life. While Ben Sira himself acknowledges the possibility of the continuation of life after death in a symbolic sense based on the perpetual memory of one's good deeds he adamantly rejects any notion of the body or soul existing after death. The G2 version of Ben Sira reinterprets Ben Sira's views by means of various expansions/additions to the original text in order to lend support to the

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Enoch and Qumran Origins: New Light on a Forgotten Connection, ed. Gabriele Boccaccini (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005).

48 See note 44. See also I Enoch 97.1 which states: "Take courage, O righteous; for the sinners will become an object of contempt, and they will be destroyed on the day of iniquity."

49 While Ben Sira directs his warning about continuing to do good towards the righteous, the author of I Enoch directs his warning towards sinners as seen in the following comment: "I swear to you, sinners, by the Great Holy One, that all your evil deeds are revealed in heaven, and you will have no unrighteous deed that is hidden. Do not suppose to yourself nor say in your heart, that they do not know and your unrighteous deeds are not seen in heaven" (I Enoch 98.6-7).

50 While for Ben Sira such punishment is limited to one's time on earth for the author of Enoch this punishment takes place after death. See, for example, I Enoch 108.2-3 which gives the following vivid description of the punishment that awaits the wicked in the next life: "For their names will be erased from the book of life and from the book of the holy ones, and their descendants will perish forever; their spirits will be slaughtered, and they will cry out and groan in a desolate, unseen place, and in fire they will burn, for there is no earth there."

position that the human soul does live on after death and will be judged according to the deeds which the individual has performed during their time on earth. I have proposed that these additions reflect the influence of the Enoch tradition which in many ways held views similar to those held by Ben Sira and the Wisdom tradition in general.

The G2 version of Ben Sira testifies to the immense popularity of the book in the first and second centuries before the Common Era and that it was read among a variety of different traditions within Judaism at the time. In G2, one sees an example in which the interpretation of a particular religious work becomes part of the sacred text itself. In that sense, one could say that Ben Sira (or, more appropriately, his Greek redactors) paved the way for the fusion between interpretation and sacred writ that one sees much later in both the Jewish and Christian traditions, especially in such texts as the Talmud and the New Testament, in which the commentary on scripture becomes just as authoritative as scripture itself.[51]

51 I would like to express my appreciation to John J. Collins and Dennis Olson for their help with this essay.

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The Apocalyptic Significance of Mark's First Feeding Narrative (6:34-44)[1]

MICAH KIEL

My mother-in-law claims that fish and company smell after three days. The two fish in Mark's first feeding narrative (6:34-44) are not the single linchpin for understanding the pericope, but they do waft something specific. The goal of this paper is to ask "Why fish?" of Mark's feeding narrative and to discern how the fish have been employed in his narrative. Answering this question requires investigation into Mark's environment to understand what fish may have communicated symbolically. A second and related issue is: to what use did Mark put the fish? Were the fish a vestigial traditional element Mark inherited or did Mark add them toward a specific end? Based upon evidence that fish were a *topos* in contemporaneous Jewish apocalyptic literature and that Mark has employed them in his narrative analogously, it will be argued here that Mark intends to describe and qualify the significance of the eucharistic[2] meal as a celebration of victory over a primordial foe.

THE FISH IN MARK CHAPTER SIX

Mark 6:34-44 has a startling emphasis on fish, although the feeding narrative begins with bread as the central issue. In v. 36, the disciples tell Jesus to dismiss the crowd so that the people may go into the surrounding farms and villages and buy something to eat. Jesus tells his disciples

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1 This paper was originally presented to the Princeton Theological Seminary New Testament Colloquium.

2 The language of "Eucharist" here and throughout this paper is perhaps somewhat anachronistic. The feeding narrative in Mark 6:34-44 does not contain the language of thanksgiving, although Mark's second feeding narrative (8:1-9) and the institution of the last supper in Mark (14:22-26) both do use the word εὐχαριστήσας (as does 1 Cor 11:24). When the name for the meal became associated with this word for giving thanks is unclear. I use it here with no assumption that it was named as such in Mark's community.

that they should give the crowd something to eat, and after the disciples' indignation at what such an endeavor would cost, Jesus asks them: "how many loaves do you have?" The fish make their first appearance in the disciples' response: not only do they have five loaves of bread, but they have two fish. The disciples offered more than Jesus asked.

After having the people sit, Jesus took the five loaves and the two fish. From this point on, the fish and bread take separate trajectories in the story. Verse 41 states, "Jesus blessed and broke the loaves and gave them to his disciples in order that they might set them before [the crowd]." No mention is made here of the fish; the only object for the blessing, breaking and giving is "bread." The final clause of v. 41 returns to the fish. Mark here, however, employs a different verb. Jesus broke (κατακλάω) the bread, but divided (μερίζω) the fish. The disciples distribute the bread among the crowd, while the fish are divided among all in the third person singular (ἐμέρισεν), which can only refer to Jesus. After all ate and were satisfied, Mark narrates that there were 12 full baskets of fragments, adding: καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων. Here, at the end of the story, Mark awkwardly singles out the fish, leaving the bread implied.

This emphasis on fish might be balanced out by the reference to bread in 6:44, but a textual problem indicates that bread could just as likely be omitted. Although the evidence is fairly evenly split, Metzger states that copyists were more likely to delete the word than to add it because "the presence of these words [τοὺς ἄρτους] raises awkward questions why 'loaves' should be singled out with no mention of the fish."[3] For Metzger's argument to hold, he must presume that a scribe was more likely to delete the reference to bread than to add a reference to fish. The Old Latin, which adds fish to the bread reference, is evidence of the opposite scribal tendency,[4] and it is easier to explain why bread would be added rather than omitted. Adding bread would "enhance the eucharistic symbolism of the passage,"[5] which is the trajectory of the story as it is taken up by Matthew and Luke. The internal evidence of the pericope, most notably

3 Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament* (London: United Bible Societies, 1971), 92.

4 Metzger, 92.

5 Joel Marcus, *Mark 1-8: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 27; New York: Doubleday, 2000), 414.

the special treatment the fish receive, makes it possible that τοὺς ἄρτους was not originally part of the text. Mark intended fish to be his parting culinary reference in the feeding narrative.

Mark has told this story in a way that emphasizes the two fish. He introduces them unexpectedly, gives them prominence when distributed directly by Jesus, and specifically mentions them among the leftovers, (the last reference to food in the story). Both Matthew (14:13-21) and Luke (9:10-17) subdue the fish motif by making two similar changes to Mark's story. The accounts in Matthew and Luke actually more closely mirror one another than either of them mirrors Mark's account. First, after telling the disciples that they themselves should give the crowd something to eat, Mark has Jesus ask, "how many loaves do you have?" Both Matthew and Luke remove this question, which makes the answer, which included fish, less awkward. Second, Matthew and Luke both omit the references to fish that occur in Mark 6:41 and 6:43. Matthew removes all specific fish references after 14:19a, and specifies the bread as the object of the breaking activity in 14:19. Luke also omits Mark's last two references to fish, and incorporates them fully into Jesus' blessing and breaking activity in 9:16. In both Matthew and Luke, the fish are not singled out for separate division and distribution. The strong similarities between Matthew and Luke indicate that they both may be following a similar tradition of a story that Mark has tweaked in order to emphasize fish.[6] Such a strong Markan emphasis might lead one to ask the question, "why fish?"

Many different accounts of the fish phenomenon have been offered.[7] One of the most prominent of these is the work of Paul Achtemeier, who finds the feeding narrative to be the culmination of a pre-Markan miracle catena.[8] Pre-Markan tradition contained a string of epiphanic miracles

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6 In other words, there is no reason to question the two-source hypothesis here. A story such as this one, which finds attestation in all four gospels, was likely a prominent part of the early Jesus tradition. Matt and Luke may both be following a form of that tradition rather than following Mark.

7 For an exhaustive summary of the research, see Geert Van Oyen, *The Interpretation of the Feeding Miracles in the Gospel of Mark* (Collectanea Biblica et Religiosa Antiqua 4; Brussel: Wetenschappelijk Comite voor Godsdienstwetenschappen, 1999).

8 Paul J. Achtemeier, "Toward the Isolation of Pre-Markan Miracle Cantenae," *JBL* 89 (1970): 265-291, and "The Origin and Function of the Pre-Markan Miracle Catenae," *JBL* 91 (1972): 198-221.

that promulgated a *theios aner* Christology. This catena began with a sea miracle (4:35-41), contained preaching and controversy stories, and then ended with a miraculous feeding (6:35-44), all of which, Achtemeier argues, had its *Sitz im Leben* in the earliest messianic meals focusing on Jesus as a man of great power. The Eucharist in this early Christian gathering was intended to reveal a *deus praesens*: Jesus is "revealed in the meal as present among the participants."[9] Mark, according to Achtemeier, has a different understanding of Jesus' significance, wanting instead to focus on Jesus' suffering. Mark therefore places the miracles in the context of Jesus' earthly ministry, effectively separating them "from any context in which [they] could continue to throw light on eucharistic understanding and practice."[10] Achtemeier claims that Mark's feeding narrative does not portray a burgeoning emphasis on the Eucharist, as is more clearly seen in the other three gospels. In examining how Mark has redacted his sources, Achtemeier concludes similarly to the above investigation: the fish have "indications of peculiarity."[11] Noting this peculiarity, Achtemeier surmises a reason: "[Mark's] redactional activity, in each case calling attention to the fish, is rather clearly intended to *de-emphasize* the Eucharistic reflections in the two feeding accounts."[12] Mark intended to portray the Eucharist in a different context than the catenae, namely, Jesus' passion and death rather than his epiphanic glory.[13]

Richard Hiers and Charles Kennedy take a different approach.[14] They claim that from the earliest days of Eucharistic celebration, fish may have been an actual part of the meal. In their assessment, the earliest

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9 Achtemeier, "Origin and Function," 208.

10 Achtemeier, "Origin and Function," 218.

11 Achtemeier, "Origin and Function," 218. The peculiarities being some of those mentioned above: awkward introduction, not being mentioned in Jesus' question to the disciples in 6:38, etc.

12 Achtemeier, "Origin and Function," 220.

13 One main problem with Achtemeier's work here is that he does not explain when Mark is constrained by the tradition he inherited and when he is not. Achtemeier presupposes that Mark had enough freedom with the traditions to be able to introduce an original element into the story (two fish). At the same time, Mark is so constrained that he must include the blessing and the note of fulfillment which further promulgate the Eucharistic tone Achtemeier claims Mark is trying to avoid. If Mark wanted to disassociate this story with the Eucharist, why not remove the blessing, omit the bread, and include only fish?

14 "The Bread and Fish Eucharist in the Gospels and Early Christianity," *PRSt* 3 (1976): 20-47.

canonical representations of this meal are in Mark 6 and Luke 9, in which fish function more prominently than Matt 14 or John 6. Citing *2 Baruch* 29, Hiers and Kennedy argue that the earliest versions of the eucharistic meal "featured fish as well as bread," and that fish "was proper eucharistic food."[15] This practice did not last long because the subsequent inheritors of the Christian tradition did not understand the fish element. Later versions of the story treat the fish as an "embarrassment;"[16] fish became an element the early church wanted to mute. All four evangelists, on some level, engage in a "subordination of the fish motif,"[17] seen most clearly in the differences between Mark 6:35-44 and Mark 8:1-9, the latter of which portrays less emphasis on the fish. For Hiers and Kennedy, a shift in the demographics of early Christianity from Jewish to Greco-Roman, along with a change in eschatology from hope for the future to a longing for immortality, instigated an emphasis on the eating of sacramental food.[18] This emphasis resulted in a subordination of the fish motif, accompanied by a simultaneous emphasis on the "eucharistic character" of the stories.[19]

The articles by Achtemeier and Hiers and Kennedy read the tradition oppositely. Achtemeier sees, in Mark 6:34-44, an intentional disassociation of the feeding narrative from the Eucharist,[20] while Hiers and Kennedy argue that there is an emerging emphasis on the Eucharist. They both answer the question, "Why fish?" differently. For Achtemeier, the fish removes Eucharistic significance from the feeding narrative, while for Hiers and Kennedy, the fish was an original element that eventually became an embarrassment.[21] At the same time, they both have a similarity: they read

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15 Hiers and Kennedy, 43.

16 Hiers and Kennedy, 34.

17 Hiers and Kennedy, 26.

18 Hiers and Kennedy, 46.

19 Hiers and Kennedy, 29.

20 It should be noted that other redaction-critical studies have come to an opposite conclusion. See Sanae Masuda, "The Good News of the Miracle of the Bread: The Tradition and its Markan Redaction," *NTS* 28: (1982) 191-219, who argues that Mark edited his sources in such a way as to give the story a "Eucharistic implication" (202).

21 They do, however, raise the possibility that this stayed in the tradition, based upon the common representation of the two fish in early Christian Art. It is tough to make decisions based on the art though, since there is none extant that is concurrent with the NT texts.

fish as something incongruous with the understanding and development of eucharistic practice in early Christianity.[22]

Achtemeier contends that the fish are not an original part of the story that Mark inherited, and based on the NT evidence,[23] it seems that Mark may have given prominence to the fish in his feeding narrative in 6:34-44. Achtemeier's conclusion about Mark's theological goal, however, should be revisited. If it was Mark's intention to use the fish to disassociate the feeding from the eucharistic last supper, his effort was a complete failure, as the catacomb evidence and 2,000 years of church history indicates.[24] Mark also could have done more to obfuscate a eucharistic interpretation. As it stands, much of the language in 6:34-44 parallels the institution of the supper in 14:22-26 rather well. Both use the same language of taking, blessing, breaking, and giving. For, as intrusive as the fish seem, it is hard to escape the feeling that we are to see "a relationship between the miraculous provision of bread and the last meal Jesus has with his followers."[25] Achtemeier's hunch that Mark added the fish for theological reasons, however, may yet be instructive. Perhaps Mark was not trying to disassociate the two meals but intended to recast the feeding narrative so that it came into closer alignment with the last supper in the passion narrative. Could the fish have helped Mark associate the Eucharist with Jesus' suffering?

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22 When trying to reconstruct early eucharistic practice, the literary evidence and the earliest archeological evidence often show conflicting pictures. In the NT, only the gospel feeding narratives mention fish, and in them, only Mark gives the fish special prominence. The earliest archeological evidence often depicts a meal with bread and fish, such as the fresco in Callistus catacomb in Rome showing seven figures seated at a table with fish and bread, and seven baskets of pieces in the foreground. See Erwin Goodenough, *Jewish Symbols in the Greco Roman Period* (13 vols; New York: Pantheon Books, 1956), 5:31. The fish eventually came to represent Jesus himself, especially as seen in the acronym ΙΧΘΥΣ (Jesus Christ Son of God Savior). The earliest reference to Jesus as a fish is in Tertullian's treatise *De Baptismo*, in which he refers to Christians as "little fish" since they follow Christ, who is "our fish" (I.3). Most of the evidence used in reconstructing early eucharistic practice and the role of fish therein is later than the NT itself.

23 For the purpose of best understanding Mark, the earliest evidence is that gleaned from the NT itself; most archeological evidence comes from the second century or later (see Goodenough 5:31-61). Although fish were an element of the feeding narratives, they were not a dominant one (as seen in Matt, Luke and John). Furthermore, the accounts of the actual meal (i.e. those in the synoptic passion narratives and 1 Cor 11:23-33), make no mention of fish as part of the meal.

24 For the Catacomb evidence, see Goodenough, 5:31.

25 Donald H. Juel, *Mark* (ACNT; Minneapolis: Augsburg), 98.

THE FISH AS APOCALYPTIC SYMBOL IN SECOND TEMPLE JUDAISM:

A helpful step in understanding the role of fish in Mark is to examine the traditions gathered around the fish as a symbol within Judaism. Perhaps the most pervasive fish imagery was its interpolation into the creation battle, in which God enters the chaotic primordial waters and slays a mythical beast.[26] The creation battle myth exists in early literature such as the song of praise after the Exodus: "The Lord is a Warrior!" (Exod 15:3) and remains prominent in late post-exilic apocalypticism like Daniel: "the four winds of heaven stirred up the great sea, from which emerged four immense beasts" (Dan 7:2-3). The mythical beast appears under three different names in Israel's scriptures. The most common, Leviathan, is a sea creature that God destroyed:

> You stirred up the sea in your might
> You smashed the heads of the dragons on the waters
> You crushed the heads of Leviathan
> Tossed him for food to the sharks. (Psa 74:13-14)

Another name for this mythical creature is Rahab (Job 26:10-13). Leviathan and Rahab are distinctly different names that play the same role—creatures opposed to God whom God destroyed at creation. A third name for this monster/fish is *Tannin*, which refers to a general concept of "sea-monster."[27] *Tannin* was "a mythological term (rather than the name of some real animal), referring to the monster who was struck down . . . by Yahweh when he established his dominion."[28] These primordial beasts were applied flexibly and appropriated into different contexts throughout Israel's history.[29]

The most common example of historicization occurs in appropriating the creation battle mythology into the story of the Exodus. Pharaoh is an

26 Much work has been done to show the way in which these conceptions of creation within Israel were appropriated from other Ancient Near East sources. Especially helpful in finding influences have been the Ugaritic texts and the Canaanite Marduke-Tiamat battle.

27 Mary K. Wakeman, *God's Battle with the Monster: A Study in Biblical Imagery* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 73.

28 Wakeman, 73.

29 The LXX translation of the Hebrew names Rahab and Leviathan both lose their strong sense of being a proper name, becoming either δράκων (snake, serpent) or κῆτος (sea monster). Although there is mythology behind both of these terms (note the scene from

apt evil force who meets his demise in the stormy sea. In second Isaiah (59:9-10), the exilic situation elicits an application of the imagery:

> Awake, awake, put on strength, O arm of the Lord!
> Awake as in the days of old, in ages long ago!
> Was it not you who crushed Rahab, you who pierced the dragon?
> Was it not you who dried up the sea, the waters of the great deep,
> Who made the depths of the sea into a way for the redeemed to pass over?

Here, the cry from Deutero-Isaiah appropriates the Rahab myth in order to describe the battle at creation, to understand the liberation in the exodus, and to hope for liberation from the exile in the future.[30] In such historicization we find that, "the powers of chaos, though subdued at the creation, were still liable to manifest themselves in the present on the historical plane."[31]

The interest in primordial beasts, often depicted as fish, is evident in Jewish intertestamental literature. In Jewish art and literature, E. Goodenough finds what he calls a "fixed vocabulary of fish."[32] There is enough evidence for him to conclude: "Jews were by no means haphazard in using it as a symbol."[33] He finds a variety of symbolism for fish within the Jewish tradition, including the image of the faithful little fish, the fish as sacramental food, and the fish as a symbol of the hope of immortality.[34] In particular, the motif of the fish as sacramental food is one that garners some reflection in apocalyptic literature. Perhaps the most striking example of

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Euripides fragment no. 121 in which Andromeda is almost swallowed by a sea monster, BDAG p. 544), they do not lose their particularity in recalling the primordial creation battle. John Day calls this process "historicization." See, John Day, *God's Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea: Echoes of a Canaanite Myth in the Old Testament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 88-139.

30 So Day, "Rahab is both the monster defeated at creation and Egypt at the time of the Exodus and also, by implication, it may be argued, the thought is extended to Babylon at the time of the prophet himself." p. 92.

31 Day, 88.

32 Goodenough, 5:9. Goodenough's work must not be used uncritically. For a helpful review, see B. Metzger, review of E. Goodenough *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, *PSB* 52 (1959): 68. Goodenough has a penchant for overstating connections between religious cultures and is "impressed by what he interprets to be similarities" (Metzger, 68) rather than by differences. His work is helpful for the data it catalogues, if not always for the conclusions he draws from the data.

33 Goodenough, 5:10.

34 Each of these comprises a sub-heading in Goodenough's second chapter titled, "The Symbolic Value of the Fish in Judaism" (pp. 31-61).

this is in *2 Baruch* 29:4, which states, in a markedly messianic section: "and Leviathan will come from the sea, the two great monsters which I created on the fifth day of creation and which I shall have kept until that time. And they will be nourishment for all who are left."[35] In the Similitudes, part of the apocalyptic collection known as *1 Enoch*, Enoch sees a terrible vision of the heavens and angels numbering ten million times ten million, causing him to lose control of his kidneys. The angel Michael tells Enoch that there is to be a day of great judgment, in which Leviathan will be apportioned to the sea, and Behemoth to the desert. Michael goes on to say: "these two monsters are prepared for the great day of the Lord, when they shall turn into food" (60:24).[36] The book of *4 Ezra* also mentions this tradition of the primordial beasts as food. In recounting the work of creation, Behemoth and Leviathan are mentioned, both of whom have been kept "to be eaten by whom you [i.e., the Lord], and when you wish" (6:49-52).[37] While none of these creatures is ostensibly a fish, in Jewish and early Christian art, Leviathan is usually represented with fish-like characteristics.[38]

A final example of a threatening fish turned into food comes from the Book of Tobit, in which a large fish plays a central role.[39] Chapter two begins at the festival of Pentecost. Before eating his feast, Tobit orders his son, Tobias, to find one of their kin with whom they can share the meal. Tobias returns with the unfortunate news that he found one of their people dead in the marketplace. Tobit immediately leaves and provides a proper burial. Unclean from touching the dead body, Tobit must sleep outside and during the night birds defecate in his eyes, blinding him. Unable to procure support for his family and unwilling to accept the support that his wife can offer, Tobit sends Tobias, accompanied by the angel Raphael (who is disguised as a human), to retrieve some money he deposited in the city of Rages.

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35 Tr. A. F. J. Klijn, in *Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, ed. J. H. Charlesworth (2 vols.; New York: Doubleday, 1983), 1:630.

36 Tr. E. Isaac, *OTP*, 1:42.

37 Tr. B. Metzger, *OTP,* 1:536.

38 See Goodenough, 5:29.

39 The current paper will base its work on the longer LXX version of the text of Tob (S). For a more in-depth discussion, see Joseph Fitzmyer, *Tobit* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 1-33.

On the first night of their journey, Tobias and the Raphael camp on the bank of the Tigris River. Tobias approaches the river to wash himself and is attacked by a great fish (6:1-6). The Book of Tobit is marked by a cosmic outlook that will help in understanding the appearance of this great fish. Although Tobit should not be labeled an apocalypse, G. Nickelsburg's comparison of Tobit with 1 *Enoch* has shown that Tobit "can employ traditional material which also occurs in an apocalyptic collection."[40] Tobit 3:16-17 reports that the prayers of Tobit and Sarah were heard in the presence of God, and as a result, Raphael was sent to help both of them. Although this is not a claim to have seen the divine realm, it shows resemblance to an apocalyptic outlook. Tobit's apocalyptic tendencies are further seen in demonic activity (3:8), a glimpse of the heavenly realm, (3:16-17), and in the sense that God controls human destiny without regard to human action (e.g., ch. 14).[41]

With this cosmic outlook in mind, Tobias' encounter with the fish might be roughly analogous to reflection on Leviathan in apocalyptic literature. While going down to wash, a large fish (ἰχθὺς μέγας) jumps out of the water and prepares to consume Tobias' "foot" (ἐβούλετο καταπιεῖν τὸν πόδα[42] τοῦ παιδαρίου). The potential loss of Tobit's lineage constitutes a threat of the most grievous kind, explicitly stated in 6:15b: "I [i.e. Tobias] am my father's only child. If I should die, I would bring my father and mother down to their grave in sorrow over me." The threat is enough that the fish causes Tobias to cry out (ἔκραξεν). This image, although cloaked in a narrative some have classified as a fairy tale,[43] historicizes the creation

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40 George Nickelsburg, "Tobit and Enoch: Distant Cousins with a Recognizable Resemblance," *SBL Seminar Papers, 1988* (SBLSP 27; Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1988), 67.

41 On this point, Tobit seems to have incorporated differing traditions. While my statement here, that God directs the destiny of both the good and evil characters in the narrative, there is a strong influence of Deuteronomistic theology in Tob as well, to the point that the book has been called, "Deuteronomy revisited." John Craghan, *Esther, Judith, Tobit, Jonah, Ruth* (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1982) 132. While the Deuteronomistic tendencies are undeniable, they do, in the end, seem to be outweighed by the cosmological tendencies that describe a situation where God is controlling destinies regardless of human deservedness.

42 The word πόδα could mean "foot", "leg", or be a reference to genitalia. Judging by Tobias' reaction (crying out), the latter two seem more likely, indicating that this fish is a viable threat.

43 See Will Soll, "Tobit and Folklore Studies with an Emphasis on Propp's Morphology," *SBL Seminar Papers 1988* (SBLSP 27; Atlanta, Scholars Press, 1988) 39-53.

battle in a way similar to Psa 74 or Isa 51. The Book of Tobit portrays a world where all is not well because "the order that is supposed to prevail in the cosmos has been profoundly subverted and inverted."[44]

After the fish emerges from the water as an opponent, of greater importance is noticing how the fish becomes a means of sustenance, deliverance, and restoration. Raphael tells Tobias to grab onto the fish and to haul it up onto shore, which he does. Also at Raphael's suggestion, Tobias retains the heart, gall and liver of the fish, discarding the entrails and keeping the rest as food. When they arrive in Rages, they hear Sarah's story: she has had seven husbands, each of which has been killed by the demon Asmodeus before the marriage could be consummated. Tobias faithfully burns the heart and the liver, which chase the demon away (8:1-3). He also retained the gall, which restores Tobit's sight (11:9-14). For Israel, the "heart of [their] deliverance took place at sea"[45] (in the destruction of Leviathan and the parting of the waters), leading to the genesis of their religion. For the book of Tobit, the heart of deliverance is literally a heart, one that has been wrested from the innards of an aggressive fish.

It is difficult to know precisely what the image of a fish may have conveyed in the Second Temple period, but it was certainly more than a culinary nicety. The fish was associated with Leviathan, God's primordial adversary. At the very least, one can observe a trajectory that extends from the OT reflections on chaos, Leviathan, and primordial waters, to the idea of the mythical beast being food for the righteous, as seen in *2 Baruch*, *4 Ezra*, *1 Enoch*, and Tobit. By the first century, this trajectory found expression in the apocalyptic tradition[46] in which fish represented both threat and opportunity. The great fish/monster Leviathan tried to assert chaos but in the end is thwarted, with the righteous tasting the victory.

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44 J. R. C. Cousland, "Tobit: A Comedy in Error?" *CBQ* 65 no. 4 (2003): 548.

45 Day, 89.

46 Speaking of an apocalyptic tradition is obviously problematic. All that is meant by it here is a body of literature with an apocalyptic outlook. No assumption is made regarding historical continuity of any apocalyptic community singularly responsible for the phenomenon in Israel's history.

WHAT DOES LEVIATHAN HAVE TO DO WITH MARK?

The fact that there was some amount of reflection on fish in the Second Temple period and the fact that fish show up in Mark's feeding narrative is not enough necessarily to connect the two. The association might become more plausible in light of Mark's own apocalyptic agenda. The argument to be made here is not that Mark knowingly emulated any of the literary sources mentioned above; proving such a connection is too onerous, if not impossible. If it can be shown, however, that Mark has an apocalyptic outlook similar to contemporaneous works, it can perhaps help the reader gain insight into what Mark intended in his narrative. Mark was undoubtedly indebted to traditional materials, but he also exercised great license in expressing that material.[47] Here the challenge will be to see Mark's specific "literary and theological creativity."[48]

Mark's Gospel and its Apocalyptic Tendencies

There have been many recent assessments of the relationship between Mark's gospel and the phenomenon of Jewish apocalypticism.[49] When comparing Mark to apocalyptic texts such as the Apocalypse of Weeks found in *1 Enoch*, A. Collins finds history in an apocalyptic mode. Mark depicts a world controlled by non-human forces: demons confront Jesus (e.g. 5:1-20), the spirit drives Jesus into the wilderness (1:12-13), and Satan is the main antagonist (3:23-29; 8:31-33). Thus, Mark combines "realistic historical narrative with an eschatological perspective."[50] Mark's history is not as explicitly revelatory as that in the Animal Apocalypse (*1 Enoch* 83-91) or the Apocalypse of Weeks (*1 Enoch* 93), but when comparing Mark's

47 While this paper has interacted with redaction criticism at several key junctures, it does not intend to adopt such a methodology. It is interesting to note, however, that it is the field of redaction criticism that has most often mused about the fish in Mark 6. Many narrative-critical accounts of Mark skip the fish entirely, e.g., Francis Moloney, *A Body Broken for a Broken People: Eucharist in the New Testament* (rev. ed.; Peabody: Hendrickson, 1997), and Lamar Williamson, *Mark* (IBC; Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1983).

48 C. Clifton Black, *The Disciples According to Mark: Markan Redaction in Current Debate* (JSNTSS 27; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 250.

49 For example: Adela Yarbro Collins, *The Beginning of the Gospel: Probings of Mark in Context* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), Howard Clark Kee, *Community of the New Age: Studies in Mark's Gospel* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), and Dan Via, *The Ethics of Mark's Gospel in the Middle of Time* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).

50 Collins, 37.

perspective to that found in the Qumran histories and commentaries, Collins claims that Mark's narrative has a similar sense of inspiration and revelation.[51] While Collins' argument that Mark is an apocalyptic historical monograph may overstate the case, her work does indicate that Mark can be traced along the lines of contemporaneous apocalypticism and portrays many similar characteristics.[52]

In a classic study of Mark's relationship to apocalypticism, J. Robinson argues that Mark moved the cosmic aspects of Jesus' encounter with Satan in the dessert (1:12-13) into Jesus' earthly ministry.[53] Jesus' encounter with demons (e.g. 1:21-28; 5:1-20) represents the same type of struggle as that which Jesus faced in the desert. The cosmic struggle is also represented in Jesus' healings and in the controversy stories, which take the same form as the demonic encounters: a challenge is raised and Jesus quells it with an authoritative word: "The debates are a continuation of the cosmic struggle initiated at the baptism and temptation and carried into the narrative of Jesus' public ministry first by the exorcisms."[54] At their core, the debates in Mark between Jesus and the authorities (and even between Jesus and the disciples) are about the inability of individuals to see and understand the eschatological nature of history. The Jewish authorities reject the eschatological kingdom, and the disciples try to "dissuade Jesus from the Passion."[55] Robinson posits a situation in the Markan community that explains Mark's redactional activity. A community can either be saved from or saved in the midst of the type of struggle Jesus encountered.[56]

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51 Collins, 36.

52 Richard Horsley has offered a strong opinion against interpreting Mark as having apocalyptic tendencies: "Mark's story lacks more of the features usually deemed key to apocalyptic literature than it contains. And it deemphasizes or seriously adapts the ones it does include." In *Hearing the Whole Story: The Politics of Plot in Mark's Gospel* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 2001), 123. Horsley, however, almost helps make the point for those who read Mark in an apocalyptic matrix. The apocalyptic tradition, to the extent that such a thing can be discussed, is not monolithic and never stagnant. The radical ability to adapt, twist and interpret Israel's traditions in light of new circumstances is actually one of the hallmarks of the tradition.

53 James Robinson, *The Problem of History in Mark* (SBT; London: SCM Press, 1957).

54 Robinson, 46.

55 Robinson, 51.

56 Donald Juel, in *A Master of Surprise: Mark Interpreted* (Mifflintown, PA: Sigler Press, 2002), offers a critique of the position that Mark's community was one experiencing

Because the community continued to have struggles, Mark structured his eschatology such that there is a "continuation within the church of the same kind of history as characterized Jesus' history, i.e., a struggle between Spirit and Satan, until the final outcome of that struggle is reached and the goal of history is attained."[57]

Context of the Feeding: Mark 4:35-6:44

Mark 4:1-8:26 has long been isolated as a literary unit within the gospel.[58] Within this larger unit are two parallel cycles (4:35-6:44 and 6:45-8:26). Before turning specifically to Mark's first feeding narrative, we must note its placement in this larger cycle of stories. N. Petersen claims that the parallelism "interrupts the merely sequential flow of content. . . [and] requires readers and hearers to move forth and back through the text rather than straight through it."[59] Heeding Petersen's call, we note within the cycle of stories in 4:35-6:44 that Mark foreshadows the feeding narrative three times. These anticipations (in 4:35-42, 5:35-43, and 6:7) also exhibit Mark's apocalyptic perspective explored above.

In 5:21-43, Mark narrates the intercalated stories of Jairus' daughter and the woman with the flow of blood. At the culmination of the two stories, Jesus raises Jairus' daughter:

> And taking the hand of the girl he said to her: "Talitha Kum," which is translated: "Little girl, I say to you, get up." And immediately the girl got up and walked about. She was 12 years old. And they were astounded with great amazement. (5:41-42)

In a normal miracle, the story is followed by amazement and proof of the miracle.[60] In this story, both occur in v. 42: the girl gets up, walks around,

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troubles. His argument comes mostly from the ending of the gospel. The impact of the ending, he claims, "does not easily fit the image of an implied audience desperate and in need of comfort. The conclusion offers little comfort" (145). Instead, the surprise and irony of the end of the narrative "work differently if directed at insiders whose problem is indifference or a tired lack of perception about the way things are" (145).

57 Robinson, 59.

58 See Norman Petersen, "The Composition of Mark 4:1-8:26" *HTR* 73 (1980): 185-217. As we saw above, Achtemeier attributed this to Mark's sources.

59 Petersen, 203.

60 E.g., in 2:1-12, Jesus heals a paralytic. After the healing words, the man arises, "in the sight of everyone," and walks away, and which pint the crowd marvels.

and all are amazed. The story ends oddly, however, in v. 43. After ordering silence from the onlookers, Jesus told them to give her something to eat. The reference to eating cannot be the proof of the miracle,[61] because her walking around has already proven it. This command instead anticipates Jesus' command to the disciples in 6:37: "you give them something to eat." Jesus' miraculous raising of Jairus' daughter may be seen as more than a mere miracle. It is symbolic of a transition that finds expression in many early understandings of baptism in which the initiate is transferred from one realm to another. A text such as 1 Thess 5:5-6 describes such a situation:

> For you are sons of light and sons of the day. We are not of night or of darkness. Therefore, let us not sleep like the others, but let us wake up and let us be sober.

Mark's story of the little girl suggests an understanding of transferal from one age to the next. If such is the case, the directive to feed the girl will not prove the miracle, but anticipate nourishment appropriate to that shift. The girl now needs food of the new age.

Mark also anticipates the feeding narratives in his directive to the disciples in 6:7. As Jesus sends out the disciples he gave (ἐδίδου) them authority over unclean spirits. This anticipates Jesus giving the bread to the disciples in 6:41; after breaking the bread, Jesus gave (ἐδίδου) it to his disciples to give to the crowd. Mark brings together the authority over demons and the disciples' mission to feed the hungry. Mark's agenda here fits with Robinson's assessment of the opposition in Mark: "the exorcisms are understood by Mark in terms of the cosmic struggle inaugurated at the baptism and temptation of Jesus ... [and the] historical narrative is itself envisaged in terms of that cosmic struggle."[62] Jesus transfers power to the disciples, which "equips [them] to play a vital role in the feeding story."[63] The language suggests that demonic opposition and the hunger faced in the feeding narrative are of the same nature and origin.

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61 Donald Juel's comment here is typical: "the instructions to give the girl something to eat may be understood as a proof that she has really been returned to life." *Mark* (ACNT; Minneapolis: Augsburg), 87.

62 Robinson, 43.

63 Suzanne Watts Henderson, "'Concerning the Loaves': Comprehending Incomprehension in Mark 6.45-52" *JSNT* 83 (2001): 15.

The calming of the storm in 4:35-41 also foreshadows and provides a proper context for understanding the fish in ch. 6. As Robinson has shown, the opposition in Mark is all cut from the same cloth, a conclusion further confirmed in the correlation between exorcisms and Jesus calming the storm in ch. 4. Jesus' words to the storm are characterized as a rebuke: "and waking up he rebuked (ἐπετίμησεν) the wind and said to the sea, 'Silence! Shut up (πεφίμωσο)!'" (4:39). The language of rebuke evokes a number of different exorcisms from Mark's gospel, most notably Jesus' first exorcism in 1:23-28: "and Jesus rebuked (ἐπετίμησεν) [the unclean spirit] saying, 'Shut up (φιμώθητι), and come out of him." There is little difference for Mark between Jesus casting out a demon and calming the sea. The threat from the churning waters is cast as the chaotic waters of creation, which creates the possibility that Leviathan, up to his old tricks, lurks in the deep, causing the chaos, a subtle anticipation of the fish that will arrive on the scene in 6:38.

Eschatological Perspective in Mark 6:34-44

Robinson's observation that all of the opposition Jesus faces in Mark's gospel is of the same piece warrants another look at Mark's feeding narrative in 6:34-44. There is not any overt opposition in the story, although Jesus is concerned about a shepherd-less people. One could also posit hunger as a type of opposition, although this aspect is brought out much more strongly in 8:2, where Jesus is moved to pity specifically because of hunger. Satiating hunger, however, can be associated with eschatological reflection. A fragmentary eschatological hymn from Qumran (4Q88) describes such a scenario. In the context of proclaiming future judgment on the wicked, the hymn claims that strangers will not plunder the produce of those who are not wicked, and ends with a strong hortatory wish: "Let the oppressed ones eat and those who fear Yahweh be satisfied" (4Q88 IX, 13-14).[64]

A closer look at Mark 6:34-44 shows other eschatological imagery and language beyond the motif of feeding the famished. The green grass in v. 39 has a strong eschatological orientation in its evocation of Ps 23,

64 Tr. James Sanders, *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek Texts with English Translations* vol 4A: *Pseudepigraphic and Non-Masoretic Psalms and Prayers* (ed. James H. Charlesworth; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1997), 207.

which was probably read eschatologically early in the Christian tradition.[65] The people sitting "group by group," is literally language of a garden bed, which might be compared to an image in the Qumran Hodayot: when describing a shoot that will grow in an everlasting plantation, other trees "will grow in their plantation" (1QH XVI.9).[66] The language of "fullness" in v. 43 also brings with it an eschatological dimension, and could be seen in conjunction with Jesus' first public statement that the time has come full (1:15). Such elements lead J. Marcus to state that Jesus' challenge to the disciples in v. 37 is their "apocalyptic mission."[67]

Mark also has strong messianic implications embedded in his feeding narrative in ch. 6. The story begins (6:44) with Jesus lamenting over a people without a shepherd, alluding to Ezek 34 and introducing imagery of a Davidic Messiah.[68] The setting of the story (a deserted place) and the numbering of the groups (6:39-40) evoke the Israelite camps (e.g., Exod 18:21) and call forth a parallel with God's provision for Israel in the wilderness. A more "remarkable parallel,"[69] however, is in 2 Kgs 4:42-44, where Elisha feeds 100 men with 20 loaves of bread, with some left over. Mark 6:34-44 thus "strengthens the impression that Jesus is both the Davidic Messiah ... and a Mosaic figure."[70] The texts in *2 Baruch* 29 and *1 Enoch* 60, examined above, are also messianic texts. In the Similitudes in *1 Enoch*, the text that speaks of Leviathan as food is immediately followed by a reflection on the "Elect One," who, in chs. 45-46, is described as one who will judge on a throne and who is the "Son of Man." In *2 Baruch*, it is only when the "anointed one" will begin to be revealed that Leviathan will be nourishment for all who are left.

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65 Dale Allison, "Psalm 23 in Early Christianity: A Suggestion," *IBS* 5: 132-37. Allison notes other contexts in early Christianity where the Psalm was read eschatologically, such as Rev 7:17, and in light of the parallels of shepherding and the reference to green grass, argues that Mark's feeding narrative is one "whose meaning is to be discerned eschatologically" (135).

66 Florentino Garcia Martinez and Eibert Tigchelaar eds., *The Dead Sea Scrolls Study Edition* (2 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 1:181.

67 Marcus, *Mark 1-8*, 418.

68 See Psalms of Solomon, 16.

69 Juel, *Mark*, 98.

70 Marcus, *Mark*, 406.

If Jesus' question sends the disciples on an "apocalyptic mission," then the two fish are an appropriate apocalyptic response. The chaos that asserted itself when Jesus crossed the lake (4:35-41) has been pulled from the water and lies supine and at Jesus' mercy (6:38, 41). Mark has peppered his feeding narrative with eschatological and messianic references that fit well with the pervasive apocalyptic tendencies in this section of his gospel. The above investigation into the fish as an apocalyptic symbol in Second Temple Judaism indicates that one can add fish to the other apocalyptic elements in Mark 6. Fish enter the story in an unexpected way, Jesus himself distributes them, and they are the last specific food reference in the story. The texts in *2 Baruch*, *4 Ezra*, *1 Enoch*, and Tobit help one understand Mark's intentions: Leviathan, God's primordial opponent, provides nourishment for the chosen people.

Mark's Intention in the Feeding Narrative

Mark's intention is to describe and qualify the nature of the Eucharist. It is certainly an eschatological meal, as many elements of the story indicate, but perhaps we can describe it more accurately. Here it will be helpful to look backward (to Jesus' baptism) and forward (to the last supper) in Mark's narrative. The meal, for Mark, celebrates the defeat of a primordial foe, a defeat that marks the transition from one age to the next. Jesus trumpets this transition in his first public statement in 1:15, which has a verbal connection with the feeding narrative. Mark uses the noun πλήρωμα to narrate the full baskets after the meal, while in 1:15 Jesus announces that the time has come full, using the verbal form, πληρόω. J. Marcus has explored the meaning of this word for Mark.[71] He argues that Mark views the fullness of the time as announcing "the termination of one age and the beginning of another."[72] Marcus then notes how Jesus' words here are similar to several Pauline phrases that are thought to have originated in baptismal circumstances, for example, Rom 13:12: "the night is far gone, and the day has drawn near." He also notes 1 Thess 5:5-6, Col

71 Joel Marcus, "'The Time has been Fulfilled!' (Mark 1.15)" in *Apocalyptic and the New Testament: Essays in Honor of J. Louis Martyn* (eds. Joel Marcus and Marion Soards; JSNTSS 24; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 49-68.

72 Marcus, "Fulfilled," 56.

1:13 and Acts 26:18, texts that seem liturgical in their solemn declarations and that reflect the same situation of transition from one status (or age) to another. Those approaching the baptismal water "would have heard this announcement of cosmic juncture as a promise that they might now enter the kingdom."[73] The likelihood that Mark 1:15 found its origin in a baptismal setting and that Mark agrees with this association is increased by the fact that, in Mark's narrative, it follows after Jesus' baptism and encounter in the desert. The language of time's fullness, along with the other apocalyptic aspects of the baptismal story (i.e., rending of the heavens, a voice from heaven), show Mark's apocalyptic understanding of the significance of baptism: it is the rite that transfers individuals from one age into the next. If baptism, as the entrance into the community, is presented as an apocalyptic shift from one reality to another, then Mark's understanding of the Eucharist should be appropriate to that shift.[74]

The baptism presents a microcosm of the larger issues of the gospel as a whole. Jesus is outside of the sacred city being baptized with those who needed to confess their sins. His life is already on a trajectory that will not end well. We are offered, in the baptism, a "glimpse of what the good news is about—and what it will cost."[75] A glance at the last supper in Mark's passion narrative confirms that Mark's understanding of the Eucharist bears resemblance to his description of Baptism. After his arrival in Jerusalem (11:1), Jesus cleanses the temple (11:15-19), gives a comparatively long-winded eschatological discourse (ch. 13), and is anointed in Bethany (14:3-9). Interwoven with these stories are conflicts with the authorities (the chief priests, scribes and elders in 11:27-33 and the Pharisees and Herodians in 12:13-26) and details of the conspiracy to kill (14:1-2) and betray (14:10-11) Jesus. In the passion narrative, the controversy and opposition to Jesus that pervade the narrative culminate.

While Jesus and his disciples eat the Passover meal, Mark casts a pall over the occasion. In the midst of the meal, Jesus declares that one of the disciples will betray him (14:18). After this shocking statement Mark

73 Marcus, "Fulfilled," 59.

74 Here we can again note the raising of Jairus' daughter. Mark's apocalyptic view of transferal from one age to the next fits that story as well, and the directive to feed the girl further supports the idea that Mark intends the Eucharist to be indicative of the new age.

75 Juel, *Mark*, 42.

narrates the Lord's Supper; "the central story of Jesus' final meal with his disciples [comes] within the frame of two narratives that predict their betrayal of him and their abandoning him in flight."[76] The references to his body and blood clearly anticipate the crucifixion that will befall him and the Passover meal is now "stamped with Jesus' interpretation that focuses God's deliverance on his own impending suffering and death."[77] Nevertheless, after all present had eaten the bread and drunk from the cup, Jesus says, "Truly I tell you: I certainly will not drink from the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God" (14:25). Despite the reality of the opposition, the meal anticipates the victory over that opposition. The apocalyptic perspective inherent in the significance of the meal is explicit: the event that will usher in the Kingdom of God is imminent.

Returning to the feeding narrative in ch. 6, we can better see how Mark provides a theological understanding of the Eucharist in the way he has presented this story. As in the last supper narrative, in 6:34-44 Mark has also interpolated both the opposition and its overthrow. Juel's assessment of the Eucharist as Mark presents it in the passion narrative may also explain the significance of the feeding of the multitude: the meal "will be henceforth bound to Jesus' act of deliverance. Israel's past and future are to be viewed in light of what is to happen to God's Christ."[78] Mark has chosen fish to explain his understanding of the Eucharist. The opposition facing Jesus is of a cosmic origin, and the meal celebrates the overthrow of that opposition. Rather than intending to disassociate the feeding narrative from the meal in the passion narrative, as Achtemeier claimed was Mark's goal, the exact opposite is the case. Mark intends, by including the fish, to show that the two events have a similar significance. In the Eucharist, Mark celebrates triumph over the insurgent, chaotic, primordial foe.

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76 Francis J Moloney, *A Body Broken for a Broken People: Eucharist in the New Testament* (rev. ed.; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson), 47.

77 Juel, *Mark*, 194.

78 Juel, *Mark*, 194.

CONCLUSION

For some reason, Mark's feeding narrative in ch. 6 contains fish. It could have been a traditional element he inherited, or he could have added the fish himself with a specific intention in mind. In light of the larger apocalyptic agenda in Mark's gospel and its specific relation to both baptism and the eucharistic institution in the passion narrative, it might make more sense that Mark intended to recast the feeding narrative in such a way that it would fit with his overall agenda of the apocalyptic significance of the arc of Jesus' life and death. If such is the case, then Mark added the fish as a symbol of the opposition that Jesus thwarts. This opposition, however, is not just cast aside. That which opposes is turned into sustenance. In Mark, many expectations are overturned. The disciples, those on the inside, often fail. The uncontrollable demons are bound. The authorities and experts are rendered speechless and ineffective. Most strikingly, common forms of strength are rejected; Jesus instead accepts his lot of suffering. It is this suffering that somehow ends up as constituent for victory. In the feeding narrative we see a small example – fish as an element of opposition turned into victory – of what is painted with larger strokes in the passion narrative as Jesus' willingness to experience a crucifixion that ends with the crucified one being raised.

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Review Essay: Method and Assumptions for Studying the Body in Paul

MARCUS A. MININGER

In *The Corinthian Body*,[1] an ambitious and fascinating study of 1 Corinthians, Dale Martin attempts to illumine all of the conflicts evident on the pages of the epistle as "consequences of a more fundamental, though never explicitly acknowledged, conflict regarding the construction of the body" (xvii). Martin proposes that two groups of believers in Corinth (the Weak and the Strong), which divide along socioeconomic lines as higher and lower class[2] or status, conflict theologically because of opposing ideologies about the body. These ideologies are products of the respective statuses of each group as well as means of expressing and defining those statuses. In keeping with this framework, Martin attempts to reconstruct the characteristic upper and lower class views of the body in "the urban culture of the eastern Mediterranean" between 300 BCE and 300 CE (xiii), so as to contextualize the upper and lower classes in the Corinthian church and to locate Paul's responses in relation to these groups.

The book is divided into two sections entitled "Hierarchy" (chs. 1-5) and "Pollution" (chs. 6-9), the titles of which identify the ideologies of the upper and lower classes, respectively. Within each section, the first chapter focuses on reconstructing the ideology under consideration from Greco-Roman sources, before the remainder of the chapters show how it is manifested in chosen sections of 1 Corinthians. Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of representative philosophical views of the body, from

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1 Dale Martin, *The Corinthian Body*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

2 Martin is comfortable using the term "class," despite denials by many scholars that it properly applies to Greco-Roman society at this time, and speaking of some of the Corinthians as upper class, despite acknowledging that probably none of the Corinthians were among the truly elite of society (xvi). Moreover, despite this latter admission, Martin is still comfortable using the literature of the period, which he acknowledges comes primarily from the truly elite, to reconstruct the views of the relatively upper status members of the Corinthian church.

Plato to Ptolemy. Martin argues that, unlike moderns since Descartes, ancients believed that the elements of the body (flesh, soul, spirit) are not distinguished ontologically as material versus immaterial. Instead, they lay on a hierarchical spectrum of material, with flesh being the densest material with the lowest status and spirit being the finest material with the highest status. This hierarchy existed at the cosmic level and also pertained to the parts of the person. The mind, having a higher status than the body, was therefore naturally the governing part of the person, which the other parts rightly serve in order to maintain the balance proper to the person.

The ideological function of this hierarchy is explored in chapter 2, "The Rhetoric of the Body Politic." Upper class rhetoricians used a hierarchical view of the body to defend the social hierarchy of the polis, which must be maintained for this communal body to be healthy. Thus, the lower class ought not to seek to upset this hierarchical arrangement, one in which the small ruling class enjoyed power and wealth disproportionate to its size. From here, Martin discusses rhetorical ability as one of the chief status markers for members of the upper class, something which was valued by the high status members of the church at Corinth and in which Paul was thought to be lacking. The chapter concludes by tracing out Paul's rhetorically skilled subversion of the upper class ideology in 1 Cor 1-4, in which he advocates alternative status indicators.

In chapter 3, Martin details the economic nature of the Corinthian divide and links Paul's discussion of lawsuits between believers to it. The high-status Strong, in whose favor the courts are inherently predisposed, are dragging the Weak into court.

In chapter 4, Martin discusses problems about speaking in tongues. He argues that speaking in tongues was a high status marker in Greco-Roman society and therefore tongues in Corinth were another way of the Strong asserting themselves. In response, Paul gives an extended discussion of the church as a body (12:12-25), but in a way that subverts the hierarchical view by emphasizing the mutual dependence of the parts and maintaining that the lower status parts deserve higher honor.

Chapter 5 turns to Paul's view of the resurrected body in 1 Cor 15. Martin rejects the view that some of the Corinthians held to a realized eschatology. Rather, the church was divided because the Strong deprecated the human

body as made up of the lower elements of the cosmos. For this reason, they denied bodily resurrection as something unfitting and beneath their dignity. Martin gives an extended discussion of Greco-Roman views of afterlife and suggests that Paul's teaching about the resurrection of the dead (νεκροι) would most naturally have been understood by the Corinthians as a revivification of corpses, something which the Strong would have seen as a crass and unbecoming prospect. In this case, Paul seeks to accommodate the sensibilities of the Strong, mostly because he is simply constrained by the physiology of the hierarchy of materials in which flesh and blood are in fact unworthy materials. Therefore, Paul articulates the view of the πνευματικος body, namely one which is composed of the fine, high status material of πνευμα.

Relying on analysis of different disease etiologies in the ancient world, chapter 6 articulates the lower class conception of the body in Greco-Roman society, namely one in which the body was perceived as a vulnerable structure continually under the threat of invasion from hostile forces, such as spirits. Whereas the upper class conceptualized threats to the body as imbalance among its parts, particularly the imbalance caused by lower parts failing to be subordinate to the higher, the lower class conceptualized threats as penetration of the body by harmful agents outside itself. The antidote for the threat perceived by the lower class was to establish or reinforce boundaries around the bodily structure. This is a view which Paul advocates and uses in addressing the Strong.

In chapter 7, Martin applies this ideology of the human body to the social body. In particular, he argues that Paul treats the problems of sexual relations with a stepmother (1 Cor 5), visiting prostitutes (6:12-20), eating food sacrificed to idols (chs. 8-10), and improper eating of the Lord's supper (11:17-34) as particular instances in which the communal body is threatened with pollution by the actions of individual members of the body. By their actions, individual members become undefended orifices, as it were, through which pollutants can enter their bodies and thereby the communal body. In contrast to the Strong, who are unconcerned with the sexually immoral man's actions in ch. 5 because they do not accept the ideology of bodily pollution, Paul argues that the part will in fact infect the whole. In this way, Paul once again subverts the dominant ideology.

In chapter 8, Martin addresses "The Dangers of Desire" that Paul discusses in 1 Cor 7. Martin sees Paul's treatment of gender relations as a partial exception to his normal subversion of dominant views of weakness and strength. With regard to gender, Paul is constrained by views of physiology in which females are inherently weaker. Thus, Paul sees females as particularly vulnerable to the invasion of desire, which, in Paul's apocalyptic worldview, is a threatening power akin to the elemental spirits of the world. Despite the fact that the Strong and Paul view indulging in sexual activity as a sign of weakness, Paul argues that marriage must be allowed in order to protect the communal body from the invasion of desire through the weaker members.

Finally, chapter 9 addresses the issue of women wearing veils (11:2-16). Martin sets this topic within the context of ancient views of prophecy as invasion of the body by a possessing spirit and of veils as a protection against such invasion. Within this context, women being unveiled is a sign of openness to invasion and therefore constitutes being unprotected or exposed. Here again Paul adopts the invasion ideology and argues for the necessity of wearing veils because he views them as a prophylactic against invasion. Martin therefore interprets the much debated phrase "because of the angels" (v. 10) upon analogy to sexual penetration—the angels in view would be drawn to the unveiled woman as open and accessible. In contrast, veils function as a deterrent by covering the vulnerable head. With the bodily defect of a publicly unveiled head remedied, the angels are deterred during prophecy and disruption of the social order avoided.

Even this brief overview gives some indication of how impressive is the panoramic view opened up by Martin's analysis. His analysis of texts in 1 Corinthians, like that of Greco-Roman sources, ranges from broad and sweeping to minute and detailed. His syntheses of the material to reflect a tightly constructed bipartite opposition is strikingly simple. He deftly explains how seemingly opposite positions of libertinism and asceticism can coexist not only in a single church but in a single group within that church (the Strong). In almost every passage, Paul is addressing the Strong through a reconceptualization of the body and appealing to them not to preserve status but to give it up. Martin's writing and structure are clear enough not to confuse and complex enough to draw the reader's interest

along the process of discovery. Moreover, his discussion of ancient texts and topics is interspersed with enough allusions to or reflections upon modern ideologies and concepts to enliven the reader's thoughts about historical methodology and contemporary views and practices. The book is truly creative and thought-provoking, even provocative.

Beyond such general strengths, this book is medicinal for contemporary scholarship on the body for several reasons, among which three deserve particular mention.

First, Martin's continued reflection on the differences between ancient and modern conceptions of the world, the body, and society assists readers in keeping Paul's texts in proper historical perspective in order not to import their own preconceptions into the discussion and falsely make them Paul's own. In particular, scholars would do well to pay more heed to Martin's guidance in ch. 1 concerning how to speak about the body when analyzing ancient texts and views. Modern terminology, such as speaking of the "physical" body, and modern distinctions between material and immaterial, are still used frequently in scholarly discourse about the body. But using such terms without careful reflection and definition of terms can have an unintended and unperceived distorting effect because the very words used to describe ancient texts can import foreign conceptions into the discussion.

Second, Martin gives sustained attention to how ancient views of the human body and of the social body cannot be separated. Paul himself shows that he does this in directly drawing a comparison between the two in Rom 12 and 1 Cor 12. Discourse about the social body is no less realistic than discourse about human bodies. Any explanation of Paul's view of the body in which corporate bodies are mere metaphor is sadly lacking.

Third, by placing his interpretation of Paul firmly within a carefully reconstructed ancient rhetorical context and by focusing on many of the concrete social and sexual issues with which Paul concerns himself, Martin leads interpreters away from the abstract nature of much past theological discourse on the body. From Bultmann to the present day, theologically minded interpreters have defined terms like σωμα in ways that show no

clear connection to the human body itself.[3] In contrast, Martin reorients discussion of Paul's discourse about the body to the real, fleshy, concrete world of human existence. Paul is not content with abstraction, nor does he merely use anthropological terms as theological ciphers. In conjunction with this, the human body and the real world of experience do not exist in isolation from the activity of God and spirits for and against God. Recognizing the interpenetration of the two, in which things done in the body have spirit-ual causes and results, is crucial for Pauline interpretation because it shows how Paul's anthropology is theological, though Martin himself does not argue in this direction.

At the same time, several criticisms of Martin's book need to be made. The combined breadth and simplicity of Martin's reconstruction veil what appears to be some profound, systemic oversimplification. Three major areas are representative of this problem.

First, Martin's taxonomy of the ancient world is based on a strikingly homogenized use of sources. In reconstructing the high and low status ideologies, he targets urban culture in the eastern Mediterranean between 300 BCE and 300 CE, which he says is composed of Greek, Roman, and Jewish sources. This broad definition allows him to move at will between Jewish and non-Jewish sources, as well as to ignore major chronological distinctions, as if all Greco-Roman cities were one big melting pot of views in which the only relevant distinctions are those of class. With regard to chronology, Martin's discussion of the social status of esoteric speech (88-92) relies mainly on texts significantly later than Paul without offering any discussion of the appropriateness of retrojecting their views into Paul's. With regard to use of Jewish sources, in his discussion of astral immortality (117-120), Martin flatly asserts that "Jews held similar, often identical, beliefs" to everyone else about afterlife (118). However, many of the texts he cites do not say that the soul becomes a star or is remade into the material of a star (the view noted in non-Jewish texts). They merely contain loose comparisons between the soul and stars (Daniel; 2 Baruch)

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3 Bultmann's own view that the σωμα signifies a person's self-understanding is a prominent example, which still survives, with some qualification, in Udo Schnelle recent work. See Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament* (ed. Kendrik Grobel; New York: Scribner, 1951), I:194-198; Schnelle, *Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology* trans. M. E. Boring (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 498.

or say that souls will reside in the same location as stars (TestMos; 4 Macc). In other instances, he confines Jewish texts to a footnote (e.g., 108 n. 11; 118 n. 57) or simply asserts, "there is no need to seek a particularly Jewish source of the asceticism of the Strong" (207). In other places, he treats Paul's views as essentially consonant with the moral philosophers except that for Paul apocalypticism "slips in" "when push comes to shove" (133). In these ways, Martin's use of sources belies the importance of date, provenance, and sociocultural background, despite his insistence throughout on the sociological production of knowledge (3).

Second, Martin's ambitious thesis that *all* of the conflicts in Corinth stem from different views of the body is too sweeping and is not ultimately supported by his argumentation. In fact, views of the body itself do not actually enter into his discussion of some topics at all, and in others these views pertain only indirectly through loose appropriation of metaphorical language. For example, in the "Problem of Money" (79-86), concerning Paul's conflict with the Corinthians over whether to accept money from them, body language does not occur. Similarly, in discussing "the Strong and the Courts" (76-79), Martin uses body language to describe the problem, but Paul does not. Nothing about Martin's or Paul's discussion of the problem shows that the problem itself was specific to views of the body. The case is not substantially different regarding the importance of rhetoric as a status-indicator in 1 Cor 1-4. At issue here is really status differentiation alone, which need not be discussed in terms of the interrelations of parts of the body. Other types of language could be and are used by Paul to address these status concerns, showing that the link between the problem and conceptions of the body is fairly loose – looser than Martin allows in saying that all the problems "stem from" different views of the body.

Third, Martin's reconstruction of the groups involved in conflict in Corinth (that there were only two of them, which divided exactly along upper and lower class) and the reasons for their conflict (different views of the body) is simplistic, cannot account for the diversity of evidence in the epistle, and is not sufficiently documented. These shortcomings can be seen in numerous ways. First, on numerous occasions Martin admits that different positions expressed in the book, such as those in 6:12 and

7:1, *might* not be held by the same group (the Strong) but rests his case that they *are* merely on the assertion that Paul's rhetorical strategy seems consistent throughout the book (addressing the Strong to accommodate the Weak). At the very least, this reasoning is question begging, since an assessment of the rhetorical strategy and its consistency depends on knowing whom Paul is addressing in what ways.

Second, Martin assumes that there is only one axis along which to measure high and low status, with several indicators used to place people on that one axis. He never considers, however, whether there might have been multiple, competing ways to measure, perhaps through different, competing status indicators. For example, in discussing the status-significance of ecstatic speech, Martin assumes that either tongues are a sign of high status or it is not the Strong who were speaking in tongues. However, this is reasoning from false alternatives merely to support his thesis. Afterall, it is distinctly possible that tongues were perceived as an alternative way of raising one's status-level within the church for those who could not raise their status by other measures. Despite being a person of lower status based on other societal criteria, people might make claims to a relatively higher status through practicing tongues and insisting that tongues represent the highest source of knowledge. Such an alternative axis for measuring status might help explain why tongues seem to be practiced competitively in Corinth: lower class members were seeking to establish a higher status than would otherwise be available to them. However, Martin assumes his simplistic schema for categorization and never considers multiple or competing ways of measuring and achieving high status.

Third, though Martin reconstructs ideologies of the body exactly along class lines, he gives no explanation for why Paul, whom he believes was relatively upper class (xv-xvi), held to the lower class ideology. The evidence suggests not just that Paul appropriated imagery from the lower class ideology, but, unlike other upper class believers, that he actively believed in invasion and pollution as real threats. This prominent inconsistency tends to undermine the belief that competing ideologies correspond directly to class distinctions – a tenet central to Martin's whole reconstruction.

Fourth, Martin's simplified reconstruction fails to account sufficiently for why Paul himself was not consistent in his views on the body, inasmuch

as he occasionally supports elements of a hierarchical viewpoint. Martin proposes that in such cases Paul was simply constrained by physiological "facts." However, this explanation admits a separation between physiological views of the body and their corresponding ideologies, one which Martin refuses to countenance anywhere else in his reconstruction. It also does not explain why Paul is sometimes constrained by a hierarchical physiology and sometimes not. Martin himself points out the apparent inconsistency in Paul's application of the pollution ideology, since sex with a prostitute-outsider is polluting but sex with an unbelieving spouse is not (256). Martin lets this stand as an unexplained *aporia*. However, in combination with the other inconsistencies just mentioned, evidence like this suggests that Paul's own views and the solutions he proposes to the problems in Corinth are not actually products of a particular construction of the body. Rather, other explanations must enter into the analysis, such as that Paul came to his views through other means (such as from Jewish mores, interpretation of Scripture, etc.) and only used various views of the body selectively in order to explain and advocate his position. These inconsistencies in Paul's view of the body also urge the question why in Martin's reconstruction Paul alone stands outside of and transcends the otherwise universal "rules" for production of the body along ideological and class lines. What makes Paul unique in this way? Is his knowledge alone not socially constructed?

In the face of such inconsistencies, it would appear that Martin's impressive edifice stands ready to crumble. Despite his aggressive criticisms of the simplistic models applied by others to Pauline interpretation (e.g., 6, 58), he has proposed too simplistic an explanation himself. In the end, this book is a creative, insightful and truly thought-provoking series of arguments, some of which are compelling and illuminating, but it is also a book in which both the overarching thesis and model of analysis remain unproven, simplistic, and restrictive.

The Ending of Mark and the Ends of God: Essays in Memory of Donald Harrisville Juel. Edited by Beverly Roberts Gaventa and Patrick D. Miller. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 2005, 184 pages.

Donald Harrisville Juel (1942-2003)—an engaging teacher, a perceptive critic, and a brilliant NT scholar—loved the ending of Mark. He believed it defies any attempt to domesticate the power of the gospel to an easily resolved, "happy ending." In his memory, Beverly Roberts Gaventa and Patrick Miller present a collection of essays from contributors that knew Juel and appreciated his work. The authors demonstrate a variety of approaches to a variety of subjects—NT texts, OT texts, and present-day practices in discipleship and theological education—but all reflecting on the interface between Juel's insights and their own scholarship. This cornucopian collection testifies to the fact that perceptive exegesis knows no bounds in its influence.

The essays engage biblical texts and contemporary issues with the focal points of literary endings, theological issues raised by Juel's exegesis, and the repercussions of both for ecclesial and academic practice. A brief summary of each article follows.

"A Disquieting Silence: The Matter of the Ending," an excerpt from Juel's commentary on Mark (*A Master of Surprise*), stands fittingly at the head of the collection. Juel squarely critiques interpreters who try to explain away the tensions and ambiguities of Mark's original ending (16:8). Juel counters Frank Kermode's reading, that Mark's ending proffers only secrecy and closed doors, with the understanding that Mark 16 shows a God who is "on the loose" and an open door that gives reason for hope. Brian Blount follows Juel's essay with a differing but complementary assessment of Mark's ending, arguing that its portrayal of disciples as failures does not simply derail all faith in human actors (so Juel)—it demands the response of the reader. Blount argues that the narrative engages the reader with a story of a God who calls disciples, and that Mark's jarring ending only presses the call more pointedly, compelling the reader to finish the story. Clifton Black, another seasoned scholar of Mark's Gospel, perceptively discusses the profound connections between Jesus' baptism (1:9-11), transfiguration (9:2-8), and death (15:33-41), showing how the nature of

God is mysteriously revealed through this triptych presentation of God's Son. Here Black affirms a point made by Juel concerning the end of Mark, namely, that thinking theologically about biblical texts is less an inquiry into passive objects and much more a clarification of the elusive and sacred ways God pursues humanity. Cameron Murchison engages portions from Mark's Gospel "not as a biblical scholar but as a practical theologian" (52). He compares the experiences of the characters in Mark's narrative with those of contemporary Americans, noting that the same kinds of tensions exist in both situations (e.g., fear and gladness). Here Murchison builds upon the tension between disappointment and promise that Juel found so visible in the ending of Mark (16:7-8).

Juel held that Mark 16 relinquishes the promised end of the gospel into the hands of God, a reading that Marianne Meye Thompson sees also in the Gospel of John. While acknowledging the prevalence of dualistic language and "realized eschatology" in John, Thompson points out that the narrative portrays many of its characters in shades of grey (e.g., Nicodemus in chap 3) and that the reality of a future hope is not at all absent. It is this latter feature, in fact, that inevitably places the ending into the hands of God alone. Beverly Gaventa finds a similar principle at work in Paul's Letter to the Romans. Countering James Dunn's idea, that God is an assumption of Paul's thought (a "taken-for-granted") that is little altered by the revelation of Jesus, Gaventa argues that Romans depicts a God who is linked intrinsically to the radical rectifying of all things through Jesus, and is ultimately and entirely free to do as God chooses.

Far from "taken-for-granted" according to human presuppositions, God in Romans—as in Mark—is free and "on the loose." Thomas Gillespie interprets Rom 9-11 as an example of early Christian prophecy, and argues that Paul's concluding claim "all Israel will be saved" (11:26) stands finally alongside Juel's assessment of the promise at the end of Mark (16:7): the end is still to come, but as long as God can be trusted the promise is reason for hope. Michael Welker finds Juel's reading of Jesus' baptism in Mark (1:10) a fitting understanding of baptism throughout the NT (Mark 1:9-11; Rom 6:4; Acts 1:8), namely, that through baptism God draws frighteningly close and effects a radical change of lordship that involves both victory and hardship.

Patrick Miller finds Juel's idea of an "open door" fitting for the end of Genesis. Miller discusses the mysterious ways God works and speaks through Joseph's words in 50:15-21, and the open-endedness created by Joseph's embalmment and final promises in 50:24-26—promises whose fulfillment lie in the hands of God. Dennis Olson argues that the polarity of disappointment and hope, which Juel saw in Mark's ending, also characterizes the death of Moses in the book of Deuteronomy and the final scenes of the Deuteronomistic history, Josiah's death and Jehoiachin's release from prison (2 Kings 25:27-30). Olson points out that the rather premature and enigmatic deaths of Moses and Josiah and the lack of resolution seen in the story of Jehoiachin's release both complicate a simple theology of retribution. By this the exilic editors conveyed more clearly the experience of faith with a God who defies easy endings. In the book of Ezekiel, Jacqueline Lapsley mirrors Juel's skepticism of happy endings by pointing out how Ezekiel's concluding vision of a restored temple (chaps 40-48), where God and humans dwell together (43:7), does not fully resolve the tensions between human sinfulness and divine holiness (43:8; 46:1-2) that the preceding chapters have depicted so graphically. Lapsley uses architectural understandings to discuss the ways Ezekiel depicts both human bodies and the envisioned temple, which both are mediums for God's word of promise. The final vision of water gushing forth from the sanctuary (47:1-12), however, well symbolizes the power of a God "on the loose." Ellen Charry discusses Juel's idea of "following an unfollowable God" in the context of life experience. Despite the ways that the Bible and life depict a God who is ambiguous and terrifyingly unfollowable, Charry gives methodical ways to overcome the sting of disappointment when it threatens to stifle emotional and intellectual maturity. Patrick Keifert authors the final essay, which relates the story and nature of his and Juel's collaboration concerning a particular need in both church and academy. Keifert and Juel found a serious lack of positive, studied advocacy for the Bible's relevance in the public sphere, and, as a result, they strove together to enhance theological education so as to empower pastoral leaders and faith communities to better articulate the authority and truthfulness of the Bible.

These essays are thoughtful and studied, concise but creative. Juel's colleagues and friends engage his reading of Mark with their own scholarly specialties, producing a collection that both mirrors the work of a marvelous teacher and contributes an original compilation of its own. Each essay ranges from 9 to 18 pages, wisely foregoing an abundance of encyclopedic detail. Considering that Juel himself did not encourage the amassing of secondary sources for its own sake, this collection is the kind of work he appreciated.

Still, it seems that the essays least bound to reflecting explicit themes of Juel's are the ones that offer the most. Clifton Black's essay, for example, does not purport to be the closest reflection of Juel's reading of Mark, but its development of the *Deus absconditus* theme in the Gospel, coupled with perceptive exegesis of pivotal passages, together makes for an excelling article worth reading by all Markan scholars. Another example is Brian Blount's essay, a work that demonstrates skillful interpretation of Mark's ending especially because it differs from Juel's reading in precise ways. Juel would likely not have agreed with Blount's emphasis upon the reader's role to fulfill the story, but then again this seems to make Blount's essay more in line with what Juel appreciated than less. Juel prized himself on being a bit of a maverick among interpreters, and a fierce critic of traditional, hermeneutical assumptions. For this reason perhaps the finest tribute to Juel's legacy would not be a gathering of scholars that affirm his ideas, but a resolve by those same scholars to question the *status quo* of traditional, interpretive assumptions with renewed zeal. Many of these essays engage this task, in varying degrees, and in this they commemorate Juel well. As for the ongoing task of questioning the *status quo,* however, this lies finally in the hands of all Juel's colleagues and friends who continue to engage the texts of Scripture, carrying on a task modeled well in the writings of Donald Juel.

TROY M. TROFTGRUBEN
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Hebrews: A Commentary. By Luke Timothy Johnson. The New Testament Library. Westminster/John Knox Press, 2006, 402 pages.

Luke Timothy Johnson's latest addition to the line of commentaries on the Epistle to the Hebrews is an insightful contribution that will become an indispensable reference for anyone who studies this important voice of the New Testament. A helpful introductory essay tackles many of the important questions that will inevitably arise from a study of Hebrews, including its place in Christian tradition, its first-century setting, the circumstances of its composition, and its theological challenges. The commentary divides Hebrews into twenty-eight sections, interspersed with seven excurses entitled: (a) why the angels? (b) The wilderness as paradigm; (c) suffering and the obedience of faith; (d) the mysterious Melchizedek; (e) old and new covenants; (f) sanctuaries material and ideal; and (g) in praise of Israel's heroes.

As a commentary in the New Testament Library series, Johnson's work typifies the guidelines to provide a new translation, to engage with the historical setting, to note the literary arrangement of the book, and to address the text in a theological way. After a short introduction to each group of verses, Johnson places his translation toward the beginning of each section of commentary. He bases his translation on the long-standing most important manuscripts of Hebrews, and his rendering of the text is refreshingly simple and helps to elucidate some of the more difficult syntactical constructions of the Greek. In the commentary itself, he often highlights interpretations or ideas shared by Hebrews with other works from its time period in an effort to show the symbolic and cultural environment in which Hebrews was written. Pertaining to its literary arrangement, Johnson notes the difficulty of making a judgment on the genre of Hebrews, which contains elements of both a sermon and a letter, but even in eschewing an overarching literary framework (his sections are divided topically following the order of the letter), he frequently notes the literary finesse of the author on the micro level. Finally, he is careful to point out the theological elements of the text and even how the insights of Hebrews challenge modern readers.

Johnson classifies Hebrews as a document written for oral delivery (10), or, more specifically, an example of "deliberative rhetoric with epideictic features" (13). It is immersed in a world of different yet overlapping cultures. Its center is the Christ event — the death, resurrection, and exaltation (24) — through which it alters the Platonic elements it incorporates (20) and through which it views the importance of Israel's Scripture, cult, and covenant. He also notes the perennial problems with the historical setting of Hebrews, but makes well-supported yet cautious suggestions about its background. For Johnson, the audience is more likely Jewish than Gentile (33). However, even though attempts to ascertain their ethnicity can never be beyond doubt, the letter makes clear that the intended hearers are those who have been believers in Jesus for a time, but, at the time of the writing of the letter, are tempted to apostatize. Due primarily to the silence concerning the destruction of the temple, Johnson leans toward an early date for the letter, between 50 and 70 CE (40). He presents a convincing case for the possibility of Apollos as the author, yet concludes "the hypothesis does not substantially affect the reading of the composition," (44).

Johnson wisely warns, "However fascinating, the historical puzzles presented by this composition should not distract from what makes it genuinely difficult and deeply challenging," (2). Hebrews stood as a unique and important witness throughout the early church to both the truth of Jesus Christ and the truth of Christian existence (6). Johnson explicates these provocative truths by highlighting the importance of the word of God, the suffering of Christ and the believer, the necessity of obedience (all three throughout the commentary, but especially 45-60).

The strengths of this commentary are many. While working with a book of the New Testament that has one foot solidly in Greco-Roman metaphors, rhetoric, and Platonic underpinnings and one deeply embedded in Jewish Scripture and the cultic and covenantal system (not that those are, of course, mutually exclusive), Johnson navigates both symbolic worlds with great adeptness. He is as prolific discussing Philonic resonances as he is echoes of literature from Qumran. Moreover, his commentary frequently makes reference to other canonical literature to show where Hebrews stands in relation to other Christian witnesses, both in its contribution to

widespread early Christian themes and in the places where it makes unique assertions. Johnson's grasp of the wide circle of background literature and the narrower circle of other New Testament texts extends to the Epistle itself. Johnson often throws light on a specific passage by appealing to some other section of the discourse. Thereby, he shows himself to be a truly good exegete who can not only appeal to external literature for illumination, but also, due to such command of the primary material, can access his own mental concordance to recognize and explicate connections within the letter itself.

Johnson's superb handling of the letter and the literature around it causes this commentary to be particularly helpful in two respects. First, it serves as an excellent reference guide. If one is curious about a specific topic related to the study of Hebrews, not only will Johnson's thorough bibliography and appropriately weighted footnotes point to further avenues for study, but his clear and concise discussions themselves act almost as small encyclopedic entries. Second, he follows through on the promise to attend to the theological issues of the text, helping the text remain a call for "today" (47). He explicates both what the portions of this sermon meant for the early church and its theological growing pains and what they mean as challenges to modern readers who follow Jesus as their pioneer. His insights into suffering and discipline are particularly helpful. Christians should not anticipate calamity as proof of God's discipline (Heb 12: 7-8), but in pursuing God's will, growth will inevitably be difficult and even painful (149-52). Also, Johnson's treatment of the old and new covenantal theme correctly notes the difficulty of this idea in a post-Holocaust setting and reaches a well-stated conclusion "Is this fair to Jews who stood then and stand now outside the experience of life given by the Lord Jesus? No. But is it true to the experience and convictions of those who experience Jesus as the one who goes before them as pioneer and perfector of faith? Yes" (215). Throughout his treatment, Johnson is particularly attuned both to the frank voice of challenge —God is one to be feared (267) — and the equally strong voice of comfort — there is a perfect high priest who acts as an advocate.

His theological acumen, however, does not seem to be used to its full capacity in one of the most difficult theological problems of the letter,

namely the warnings against apostasy and the impossibility of repentance. He has a short discussion of this difficulty of the text in the early church, particularly between Tertullian and the Shepherd of Hermas (4). Also, he does recognize how foreign this concept might appear to his contemporary readers (163), especially due to its truly shocking nature, "[apostasy] not only falls from grace, it mocks the giver of grace," (264). Finally, he shows that the function of the rhetoric in the letter is to show the greatness of the gift given in Christ (164). While it seems clear that these passages are warnings, not descriptions of a reality in the gathering of those who are addressed, as a theological commentator he stops short of indicating how these harsh warnings might function in the church of the present for those who have left the faith and desire to return. It could be that the discussion of the impossibility of repentance is overshadowed by Johnson's insistence on the importance of obedience. Although this is clearly an important element of the letter, at times, it feels that Johnson raised it to a level of importance the text does not warrant (57, 212). Johnson may have fallen into a common trap of elevating one's favorite theme even in places where it is not explicit. Despite these few deficiencies, this newest commentary will become an invaluable dialogue partner in the burgeoning conversation on the Epistle to the Hebrews.

AMY L. PEELER
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World. By Judith M. Lieu. Oxford: Oxford University, 2004, 384 pages.

Discussions of identity have pervaded western cultures in recent years. Regardless of whether people are concerned with political, national, or religious identities, or even personal identity crises, identity has become a modern buzz word. Judith Lieu's important monograph, *Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World*, works to convince historians that identity is not simply a term that emerged in conversations during the 1950s; rather, it speaks to concerns of sociological definition that were particularly present for Christians in the first and second centuries of the common era. Part of early Christian growth in the Roman Empire

involved constructing an identity defined with and against other groups in the surrounding culture.

Lieu's impressive work is not intended to be yet another search for Christian origins. Instead, Lieu chooses to undertake a series of eight different "explorations" through sociological methods in which she can examine the ways texts themselves might construct identity. Since the evidence we have for early Christianity manifests itself in texts almost exclusively, Lieu's insight into identity theory provides a new approach to these texts in particular, and to the relationships between Jews, Christians, Greeks, and Romans in the first and second centuries. Her work provides a way to bridge the discussions of relationships between Jews and Christians in order to see behind the curtain of "definitions" and into the cultural realities reflected and constructed in these texts.

The difficulty of this subject matter manifests itself in Lieu's careful consideration of the texts at hand. Much of her work is cautious; while this monograph is in conversation with much of her previous research (e.g., *Neither Jew Nor Greek? Constructing Early Christianity* (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 2002), and *Image and Reality: The Jews in the World of the Christians in the Second Century* (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 1996), discussions of identity construction are still a relatively uncharted field in New Testament Studies. Thus, Lieu begins with a definition of identity, claiming, "it involves ideas of boundedness, of sameness and difference, of continuity, perhaps of a degree of homogeneity, and of recognition by self and by others." These motifs are developed in the following chapters. Not all "explorations" in these chapters are created equal, however. Lieu's discussion of the roles of texts, history and memory, and the construction of boundaries establish the ground for the later development on language and practice, gender and the physical body, space and place, the concept of the "Christian race," and the construction of the "other." She concludes with an impressive and comprehensive bibliography that will aid anyone who is looking for further avenues of research.

One of the significant (and notably challenging) goals of this book is its attempt to trace "the emergence of a translocal identity." Early Christian (as problematic as the label is) texts have been used to determine local identities, such as the formation or identity of the Johannine or the Markan

communities. Nevertheless, trying to shape an overarching project to determine what Polycarp meant in the second century when he claimed, "I am a Christian," requires more finesse. Lieu uses her extensive knowledge both of ancient texts and modern theorists to determine the roles and significance of an impressive variety of texts, canonical, non-canonical, and texts that reach well into the second century (and some beyond). She analyzes how texts themselves can construct identity (following Averil Cameron) and how the retelling of "history" can itself create boundaries, particularly between groups of a shared history (here, Jews and Christians). Thus, much of her discussion of history and memory focuses on how early 'Christian' texts read the LXX/Hebrew Bible. The contention over "whose" Scriptures these texts were, or even more poignantly, who possessed both the right interpretation and the right to interpret, were at stake in these identity constructions.

While the primary evidence that remains from this historical period is texts, how to move from the texts that we have to "the social realities to which they witness" is the goal, but also most difficult part of using identity theory. Most conclusions in this volume are provisional; they reflect the texts which claim that identity involves sameness and difference. The negotiation of the "insider/outsider" debate, which sheds light on how much insiders create outsiders who are their own inverse, points to how little we can know about the precise historical realities. While we may not be able to discern the precise nature of those changes and pinpoint all historical causation, Lieu believes the texts illumine some ways, like boundary construction, that describe how social lives could be constructed.

Many detailed texts are considered in every chapter of this work, but the final conclusions which try to amass all the evidence coherently are not very specific. The most comprehensive conclusion Lieu gives her reader is that Christians saw an "experienced continuity of essence" between the members of their own community, regardless of social location. This post-modern formulation is important for Lieu because it provides a continuity, binding the members of this new "race" together, and yet it still allows for dispute, contestation, and confirmation as an experience. Ultimately, her conclusion is that a community must allow for both continuity and discontinuity, structure and permeability, in its boundaries and in its life.

One of the dangers of a sociological analysis like Lieu's, as she so appropriately notes, is the text-boundedness of the enterprise. A significant hardship here is the inability to know what the texts themselves are presupposing. If a text, for example, does not mention Jesus, could the text assume the audience would know information about Jesus already (e.g., 3 Baruch, or James) and would be able to fill in knowledge where appropriate? Lieu excludes both theology and Christology from determining Christian identity. While, as a historian, her use of theological rationales must, by its very nature, be limited, she could still give faith and theology more of a chance to be formative for identity. Even though it is difficult to determine how the early 'Christians' understood their theology (since the same terms may have meant different claims to different communities), claiming an agnosticism here merely discounts the significance of theology rather than acknowledging its importance. Exploring ways in which theology and sociology might work in each other's service, even if they may be unusual partners, could provide another fruitful avenue for work in Christian identity.

Lieu's monograph is particularly valuable for its ability to show the diversity and contestation of early Christianity in terms of sociological dynamics, similar to the way Greeks, Jews, and Romans may have related to one another. Her "explorations" provide new avenues for understanding the relationship, and the eventual separation between, Judaism and early Christianity.

LAURA C. SWEAT
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The Historical Jesus and the Final Judgment Sayings in Q. By Brian Han Gregg. WUNT 2.207. Mohr Siebeck, 2006, xiv and 346 pages.

Following a long drought in the middle of the twentieth century, historical Jesus research is flourishing again. And despite a good many popular (and some academic) Jesus books of questionable quality, there is a healthy crop of sober-minded scholarly contributions on offer, as well. One such book is Brian Han Gregg's *The Historical Jesus and the Final Judgment Sayings in Q*, a revision of the author's 2005 Notre Dame dissertation

which bears the marks of influence by the members of his dissertation committee, especially James VanderKam (on Jewish eschatology in the Second Temple period) and John Meier (on method in historical Jesus studies).

Gregg's project in *The Historical Jesus and the Final Judgment Sayings in Q* is to isolate the final judgment sayings in Q, evaluate each saying according to traditional criteria of authenticity, and draw conclusions about the eschatology of Jesus and the historicity of the Q tradition (pp. 4-5). Gregg identifies twelve final judgment sayings in Q: Q 6:47-49 "Everyone who hears my words and acts on them"; Q 10:10-12 "If they do not receive you"; Q 10:13-15 "Woe to you, Chorazin; woe to you, Bethsaida"; Q 11:31-32 "The Queen of the South will rise"; Q 12:4-5 "Do not fear"; Q 12:8-9 "Everyone who confesses"; Q 12:10 "Whoever speaks a word against"; Q 12:42-46 "Who is the faithful and wise slave"; Q 13:29, 28 "Many will come from east and west"; Q 17:1-2 "Snares are sure to come"; Q 17:26-30 "As it was in the days of Noah"; Q 17:33 "Whoever wants to save his life." In an appendix (pp. 279-289), Gregg treats Matt 7:22-23 // Luke 13:26-27 "I do not know you"; Matt 25:14-30 // Luke 19:11-27 "The parable of the entrusted money"; and Matt 22:1-10 // Luke 14:16-24 "The parable of the banquet," excluding all three from his study on the grounds that in none of these cases are the Matthean and Lukan versions of the saying dependent on the same literary source (viz. Q).

Gregg uses four of the most widely agreed upon criteria of authenticity: multiple attestation, dissimilarity, embarrassment, and coherence. With respect to multiple attestation, Gregg follows the majority opinion in recognizing Paul, Mark, Q, special M, special L, and Thomas as independent witnesses to the Jesus tradition (p. 28). Significantly, following Ben Meyer, Gregg limits the criterion of dissimilarity to apply forward to the church but not backward to early Jewish sources (i.e., single, not double dissimilarity; see pp. 29-30). The criterion of coherence comes into play especially at the end of the book, where it verifies two judgment sayings that Gregg regards as unverified on the grounds of the first three criteria (viz. Q 6:27-29; 17:26-30; see p. 269).

Following an introductory chapter on method (ch. 1) and a one-chapter survey of final judgment references in early Jewish sources (ch. 2), Gregg

devotes a chapter to each of the twelve Q judgment sayings (chs. 3-14). For each saying, he presents a special bibliography, parallel texts of the Matthean and Lukan versions, context and meaning in Matthew, context and meaning in Luke, context and meaning in Q, most primitive version of the saying, arguments for authenticity, arguments against authenticity, and conclusions. Following analyses of the twelve sayings, in ch. 15 Gregg summarizes Jesus' teaching on the final judgment as represented in Q under seven headings: (1) How is the final judgment depicted? (2) Who is the judge? (3) Who is judged? (4) What criteria are used in the final judgment? (5) Where is the final judgment enacted? (6) When will the final judgment take place? (7) What are the results of the final judgment? Gregg's findings, he concludes, "overwhelmingly point to the authenticity of the bulk of these sayings" (277), suggesting that Jesus was more apocalyptic and the Q tradition more reliable than many scholars have supposed.

The merits of *The Historical Jesus and the Final Judgment Sayings in Q* are many. It is a well-conceived project, narrow enough to be manageable but with a significant payoff for research in the field. It fills a gap in the literature that many have noted. Above all, it is characterized by the meticulous sifting of data and sober evaluation of evidence that we have come to expect from John Meier and his students. A case in point is Gregg's skillful handling of the notoriously slippery criteria of authenticity (pp. 28-32; see an example at pp. 257-258). Gregg consistently speaks in terms of greater or less probability and admits when the different criteria render different judgments on a given saying, resisting the temptation to argue from "the sort of thing Jesus would have said." The upshot is that, in the big picture of historical Jesus research, Gregg's conclusions represent an important plank in the platform of the so-called Third Quest.

Its merits notwithstanding, the book will no doubt meet with criticism from certain quarters. Critics of the two-source theory will of course have a problem with one of the keystones of Gregg's argument, viz. that such a thing as Q exists and can be plausibly (if partially) reconstructed. Similarly, the more skeptical among historical Jesus scholars will object that Gregg's criteria of authenticity let too much of the tradition "get through." Other, more generally recognizable, faults might be identified,

as well. Parts of Gregg's review of secondary literature could be criticized for imprecision (e.g., his characterization of G. B. Caird's reading of the final judgment sayings as "non-eschatological"; see pp. 13-14). On another front, one downside to the book's meticulous thoroughness is a relative lack of creativity. There are two types of good dissertations: those that blaze exciting new trails, and those that apply time-tested methods to unexamined data. Gregg's book clearly belongs to the latter category. It will henceforth be an important piece of the overall argument for an "eschatological Jesus," but it does not break any radical new ground.

Nevertheless, whatever demerits the book may have are far outweighed by its merits, which are such as to make it a worthwhile read not only for New Testament scholars, but also for theologians, historians of antiquity, and scholars of early Judaism. Having begun its life as a dissertation and come of age in Mohr Siebeck's WUNT series (which unfortunately means a $115 price-tag), the book is understandably quite technical, which limits its usefulness to those who do not read Greek or are unfamiliar with the state of research. But educated readers from all branches of religious studies stand to benefit from Gregg's conclusions. In short, *The Historical Jesus and the Final Judgment Sayings in Q* is a careful treatment of an important subject by an able scholar from whom we should hope to see more.

MATTHEW V. NOVENSON
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Defending God: Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil. By James L. Crenshaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 275 pages.

In *Defending God*, James Crenshaw offers a deep and spirited exploration of biblical responses to the problem of evil. His analysis draws from a lifetime spent pondering this problem. Crenshaw has a keen eye for many texts in which issues of theodicy are central—some of them expected (e.g., Job) and some of them perhaps not (e.g., Psa 14)—and he explores them with exegetical acumen. Crenshaw also decides that his method will eschew diachronic concerns, which he feels would add the undue burden of having to date texts with accuracy. He opts instead for a synchronic

approach, one that "maps" different responses to the problem of evil over a vast expanse of time and does not hazard an "evolutionary timeline for their emergence" (18). This synchronic approach is salutary and frees Crenshaw for theological probing of individual texts without excessive parsing of their antecedents and subsequent developments.

Crenshaw divides his book into three major parts, each of which contains several chapters. In part one, Crenshaw discusses three possibilities for "Spreading the Blame Around." First, a natural response to the problem of evil is atheism. Delayed punishment for the wicked led to "practical atheism" (31). Psalms 10 and 14 explore this practical atheism because the psalmist is unable to discern any evidence of a divine judge who enacts consequences for human deeds. The possibility of "Alternative Gods" also provides a way to spread blame. In a polytheistic situation the problem of injustice elicits the need for a new deity. In Psa 82 the poet desires a change from polytheism to monotheism and a concurrent shift to an "ethical system that gives priority to the weak and defenseless members of society" (53). In this instance the problem of delayed justice calls for a "different deity" (53). Finally, one can spread blame by "letting benevolence slip" (55). In examining Gen 22 and the narrative frame to Job (1-2; 42:7-17), Crenshaw describes how God has a "dark side" (57). The shadow side of God, seen in Gen 22, develops into an adversary by the time of Job. Even this adversary, however, does not succeed in its intentions; God still bears ultimate responsibility.

In part two, Crenshaw examines different ways of "Redefining God." One possibility is to accentuate human freedom so as to transfer culpability from God to humanity. The clash between divine power and human freedom "leaves an indelible mark on biblical literature" (76). Crenshaw discusses Zeph 3 and Hos 14 as texts that accentuate human freedom in setting the corporate fate of Israel. Crenshaw then correlates human freedom with divine vulnerability, as evidenced in Isa 30:15, 18. Crenshaw next discusses the redefinition of God as a "Split Personality." Making sense of evil often led to "conflicting demands of justice and mercy" as projected onto the deity (91). Crenshaw posits socio-economic causality behind such a divine split personality. God naturally seems just in times of plenty, but such a view could not persist amidst "lean economic realities" (97). Trouble in

quotidian life was also often attributed to divine discipline, discussed in Crenshaw's next chapter as "Stimulating Growth in Virtue." The author here, *par excellence*, is Ben Sira, whose wisdom theology describes God as a divine sage who subjects individuals to difficulty for the purpose of "forming moral character" (108). Although this scheme gives a "useful purpose" to adversity, it also has a "serious flaw" when applied more broadly; misfortune often strikes deeply and to the "point of debilitation" (108). Such instances preclude the possibility for moral formation. Finally, biblical responses often blame the victim for misfortune as "Punishment for Sin." This, perhaps the oldest and most widespread answer to the problem of evil, assumes that the world operates according to a "rational system" in which humans will be repaid accordingly for their deeds. Despite its ubiquity in the Hebrew Bible, Crenshaw dismisses the evocative power of this explanation. Modern sensibilities do not allow for such a close connection between act and consequences. Likewise, scholars have long noted that its impact on historiography—the so-called Deuteronomistic history—does not adequately explain what really happened; "any reading of the rise and fall of nations in terms of divine favor or wrath can only be categorized as theology—and bad theology at that" (120).

The third and final section is called "Shifting to the Human Scene." Crenshaw first discusses the concept of atonement, focusing primarily on Isa 52:13-53:12, the so-called "Suffering Servant" passage. The next chapter takes up the question of "Justice Deferred," especially as seen in the belief in life after death. Crenshaw argues here that an increasing belief in the deity's power and "creative might" provided the theological impetus for belief in an immortal soul and life after death. In Psa 49:16 and 73:24 he traces antecedents for what became a well-developed doctrine of resurrection in Dan 12:1-3, *2 Macc* 7, and *Wisdom of Solomon*. He also is careful to note that some traditions (e.g., Ben Sira and the Sadducees) resisted the notion of a return from the dead. His final two chapters, "Mystery" and "Disinterested Righteousness," deal with the fact that much lies beyond human ken. In biblical texts God is often described as cruel, a fact that Crenshaw tries to temper by noting it as only one side of a Janus-like God who also is described as good.

Crenshaw's book is a resounding success. He expertly presents and explains the variety of responses to evil evinced in biblical literature. His work raises two related questions, however. First, his claim to be working synchronically is one that occasionally causes tension in his analyses. This is most evident in his discussion of the growth of the concept of the adversary (ch. 3) and in the development of the belief in an afterlife (ch. 9). There was, presumably, real diachronic development of the idea of life after death that was fueled by inclement circumstances, a development that he traces well into the Hellenistic period. His discussion of the development of the shadow side of God from Gen 22 to a more personified tempter in Job, however, does not carry through diachronically to further developments. The idea of opposition to God is eventually expanded in a text such as *1 Enoch* so as to exculpate both God and humanity. Evil instead comes from a rebellious heavenly order that has invaded creation, a concept of the origin of evil also reflected in portions of the New Testament. Crenshaw's decision to follow the diachronic development of belief in the afterlife through such texts at *2 Maccabees* and *Wisdom of Solomon*, by comparison leaves his analysis of the development of a belief in Satan as God's personified opponent lacking.

The above point—about evil in *1 Enoch*—raises a related question. The subtitle to Crenshaw's book claims it as an investigation of "biblical" responses to evil. One wonders, however, what he means by "biblical." His analysis helpfully examines the Hebrew Bible, makes observations from the Septuagint, and then expands at times to discussion of Deuterocanonical, apocryphal, Christian, and Rabbinic literature. In doing so, his work is erudite and efficient. It also raises questions about the nature of the core of his project. Does he mean "biblical" in that the Hebrew Bible establishes a perimeter for the initial perspectives he investigates, which then allows him to follow threads and developments no matter how far afield they may take him? In ch. 10, for instance, the analysis begins with Ecclesiastes, but is focused mostly on *4 Ezra* and *2 Baruch*, which certainly have much to say about theodicy. One could ask, however, in what sense (i.e., for whom) are such texts "biblical?"

After the competent and interesting way in which he led his reader though the variety of biblical responses to evil, one would wish for more

than five pages of his own reflections at the culmination of such work. The structure of the book, however, perhaps hints at Crenshaw's own convictions. He seems interested in giving voice to a variety of responses—from atheism to complete human culpability—and tries to explain sympathetically the intentions of each of them. At the same time, he hints that an understanding of creation can provide a way out of the woods. He posits creation as an act of grace and claims that "life in its most fragile form far surpasses whatever evil exists in the world" (190). While humans often find themselves in the throes of theodicy, we would do well to remember that "being has replaced non-being" and that God does not owe humanity any more than that which has already been graciously bestowed (190).

MICAH KIEL
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Intertextual Studies in Ben Sira and Tobit: Essays in Honor of Alexander Di Lella. Edited by Jeremy Corley and Vincent Skemp. The Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 38. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 2005, 319 pages.

This book is a *Festschrift* in honor of Alexander Di Lella, O.F.M., Professor Emeritus at Catholic University of America. Di Lella's work was a vanguard in both the study of intertextuality and in his exegetical and philological work in sapiential and Deuterocanonical literature. The volume exhibits a variety of methodological approaches and discusses Tobit and Ben Sira in relation to the Hebrew Bible, other intertestamental literature, and the New Testament.

In part one, "Tobit and the Biblical Tradition," five essays approach Tobit and intertextuality from a variety of perspectives. Irene Nowell ("The Book of Tobit: An Ancestral Story") discusses the ways in which Tobit's plot has been modeled on patriarchal stories from Genesis. Stephen Ryan ("The Psalms and the Book of Tobit") discusses Tobit's dependence on the Psalter, although his analysis depends more on how transmission and translation of Tobit was influenced by the language of the Psalter. Anathea Portier-Young ("Eyes to the Blind") claims that, because the author of Tobit entered into conversation with Job, the reader of Tobit is invited to

do the same. While her essay uses Job to help show Tobit's distinctiveness, her aim is a conceptual conversation between the two works that seems less concerned about positing specific intertextual linkages between the two. L. Stuckenbruck and S. Weeks ("The Medieval Hebrew and Aramaic Texts of Tobit") address questions about Hebrew and Aramaic texts of Tobit not in an attempt to determine the text's original language but to examine its history in medieval times. Their analysis reveals interesting insights into the development of the text, continued Jewish use of apocryphal books, and Jewish/Christian relations. Finally, Vincent Skemp proffers some "Avenues of Intertextuality between Tobit and the New Testament." He explores both "oral-scribal" connections (i.e., a conscious literary dependence) and "cultural intertextures" (i.e., an echo without direct literary dependence). Skemp finds potential connections in the new Jerusalem motif in Revelation, in angelic and demonic activity, and in similar wisdom paraenesis, among others. His essay provides reason for NT scholars to study Tobit, a book often ignored in discussion of Christian origins.

Part two, "Ben Sira and Earlier Books," contains essays that discuss Sirach and Gen 1-11, Exodus, Kings, and Proverbs. Most of the articles in this part focus on Ben Sira's appropriation of biblical materials. The essays by Gilbert ("Ben Sira, Reader of Genesis 1-11") and Reiterer ("The Influence of the Book of Exodus on Ben Sira") examine the various ways Ben Sira appropriated Genesis and Exodus into his wisdom theology. Beentjes ("In Search of Parallels") argues that Ben Sira's use of phrases from 1-2 Kings is not a straight borrowing, but that the sage has placed the language in a new context and therefore "did much more than just re-use OT texts" (131). Leo Perdue compares "Ben Sira and the Prophets," concluding that the sage viewed himself as inspired in a way similar to the prophets. He stood in a long succession of prophetic revelation, but stopped short of affirming esoteric knowledge indicative of apocalyptic literature. Jeremy Corely ("Intertextual Study of Proverbs and Ben Sira") aims to show the complexity of the relationship between Ben Sira and Proverbs. Ben Sira clearly uses sayings from Proverbs, but he often sets them in a more biblical context and combines them with Greek thought or Egyptian wisdom teaching.

In part three, "Particular Themes in Ben Sira and Other Texts," the topics on which the essays focus become less uniform and deal with literature more contemporaneous with Ben Sira himself. The first two essays, by Hayward and Duggan, discuss Ben Sira's treatment of specific figures, Joseph and Ezra. Hayward finds reason that the Hebrew poem on Joseph (49:14-16) in Cairo Geniza MS B could be an original part of the composition, although he admits that both MS B and the LXX of this saying may differ somewhat from what Ben Sira himself actually wrote. His larger point seems to be the evocative nature of the reference to Joseph and how that reference could have been appropriated differently in various—i.e. Jerusalem or Diaspora—settings. Egger-Wenzel discusses the phrase "fear of the Lord" in Ben Sira and Job, concluding that the content of that phrase in Ben Sira is actually closer to "faith in God;" there is a "big qualitative difference" between faith and fear (226). The suggestion is then made that translators take this into account and change the way the phrase "fear of the Lord" is translated. Owens' essay on Qoheleth, Ben Sira and an "Ear to Pharaoh's Folly," adopts a methodology that aims to hear multiple voices "conversing" in the canon (227). Both Qoheleth and Ben Sira reflect on self-realized wisdom, which has an antecedent in the "memory of the Pharaohs" (239). Owens uses this not to describe the intertextual method and intention of these authors, but instead finds an opportunity "to inform our understanding of biblical theology" (239). Ben Sira teaches us that self-realized wisdom has value, but Qoheleth warns that one's pursuit of wisdom must account for its mystery. Benjamin Wright discusses Ben Sira's relationship to the roughly contemporaneous apocalyptic perspective in *1 Enoch*. He locates Ben Sira, as do many, in priestly circles in Jerusalem and describes him as a sage to whom the cult matters significantly. In the *Book of Watchers* (chs. 1-36 of *1 Enoch*), there seems to be a negative attitude toward the priesthood, whether they viewed them all as corrupt or not. On the specific issue of priestly linage—i.e., whether the texts favor a Levite or Zaddokite priesthood—Wright deftly sifts the evidence in Ben Sira and *1 Enoch* 12-16. He claims that there is not enough evidence to determine that lineage "would have been important enough in and of itself" to create animosity between the two works (254). Part three ends with two essays discussing Ben Sira and the New Testament. Calduch-Benages argues for

a direct connection between Sir 2:1 and Jas 1:2, texts which both emerge from a time of trial. Aitken's essay discusses Ben Sira in conversation with Matthew. Both texts view proverbial wisdom as a teaching tool. Aitken then engages in a long discussion of whether or not Matthew patterned Jesus' saying about wisdom's yoke (11:25-30) on Sir 51:1, 23, 26. Although Matthew looks similar to Ben Sira, which would suggest a "thoroughly Jewish Matthew," Aitken claims that one should not miss Matthew's "Hellenistic context" (279). Such a conclusion seems to miss the fact that Ben Sira himself and his wisdom theology are a complex amalgamation of Jewish and Greek traditions and concepts.

One glaring omission from this book is an essay that could have compared Tobit and Ben Sira directly. They are approximately contemporaneous texts, both employ sapiential motifs, and as the other essays in the volume demonstrate, both forged their theological perspectives in conversation with Israel's traditions, texts, and history. Nevertheless, this volume is certainly essential reading for all students of Tobit and Ben Sira. Its intertextual approach, however eclectic the methodologies may be, makes it salutary for a wider audience. The variety of texts and traditions with which Tobit and Ben Sira are intertwined stand as testimony to the depth and richness of their theological insight. They both employ and interact with the heritage of their own religion, argue with contemporaries, and influence subsequent Jewish and Christian tradition. In this way, they reflect the disposition and important contribution of Alexander Di Lella's own career.

MICAH KIEL
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Graceful Speech: An Invitation to Preaching. By Lucy Lind Hogan. Westminster/John Knox Press, 2006, 224 pages.

The rookie and veteran preacher alike have much to gain from Lucy Lind Hogan's *Graceful Speech: An Invitation to Preaching*. Hogan's work addresses a variety of homiletical concerns ranging from likely topics such as sermon form, illustrations and the preacher's role in "exegeting the

moment" to the more sensitive issues of plagiarism, clergy ethics and the use of visual images within the preaching event.

Although *Graceful Speech* is full of suggestions on how to craft and deliver a sermon, Hogan's expressed desire is for the book to serve as an invitation to, and resource for, answering these crucial questions: What is a sermon? How is God involved in what is said? What or who is the preacher? What does the congregation think I am doing when I preach? Answers to these questions lead to the articulation of one's own theology of preaching, which, according to Hogan, is a key task for every preacher. "It is all too easy to learn the nuts and bolts, the 'how-to's of preaching, without being challenged to develop a theology of preaching. Consider yourself so challenged." (13).

Hogan's theology of preaching relies heavily on the doctrine of the Trinity because it "grounds everything we are, everything we do, and everything we say." (10). Marked by the relationality, mutuality and participation of the Trinity, the preaching moment is viewed "not as the superior educating the inferior, but as all the people of God gathering to praise the God who gives them life and to declare God's saving acts among them" (12).

Graceful Speech is divided into three parts: "Becoming a Preacher," "Crafting a Sermon," "Communicating the Gospel." In Part One, Hogan explores the ongoing conversation regarding preachers' development (i.e. are preachers inspired or trained?) by distinguishing between Jerusalem, which signifies an emphasis on being called by God, and Athens, which signifies an emphasis on training in classical rhetoric. Next, Hogan explores the source of preachers' authority (God, community, education) by comparing traditional and charismatic authority, represented by Peter and Paul, respectively. Unfortunately, this section is undeveloped. Indeed, because Hogan addresses so many homiletical issues in this book, he lacks requiste space for an indepth exploration of each of these concerns. Indeed, the main benefit of *Graceful Speech* is also its primary drawback.

If the reader can accept that the book will be more of a fly-over of the homiletical landscape than a landing and an extended stay in one place, then the remainder of the book has the potential to be a rewarding and worthwhile read. Undeniably, Parts Two and Three attend to the gamut of

material covered in a seminary's introductory reaching course. Although the most approopriate use for the book might be such a classroom setting, the bibliography and stimulating questions at the end of each chapter are sure to accommodate the inquiries of most individual preachers who desire to reflect on their own preaching.

Especially intriguing is Hogan's suggestion that preachers are artists who "squint" at their sermons. Like artists of pointillism who judge their work in progress by squinting at their creations from all angles and distances, the preacher participates in "the gospel squint" in order to view the sermon as a whole (154). Hogan applies her background as an art teacher to her preaching pedagogy. She suggests various ways in which preachers can squint at their sermons. First, by outlining the sermon once the manuscript is complete, a preacher can assess the clarity and appropriateness of the movement and transitions. Secondly, a preacher can use various colors to highlight theological language and Scripture references in order to aid in reading the sermon through the eyes of one who is new to the faith. "How much do you assume on the part of the listener? Do you assume that he or she knows what you mean when you talk about love, grace, salvation, redemption? Squint at your sermon and make sure that it is hospitable, that it welcomes the person who is not well versed in the faith story or comfortable in the Christian language." (154).

The words of wisdom offered at the end of *Graceful Speech* serve as a good introduction to the book's content. Preachers are reminded that "the work of the Holy Spirit has been going on long before we became a part of the effort and will continue after we move on to other fields." Even so, the suggestions and conversations starters in *Graceful Speech* are offered because Hogan believes strongly that "our efforts at preparing, at planting, at watering, and at building are crucial." *Graceful Speech* provides an accessible, wide-ranging overview of ways in which preachers can be firmly grounded in traditional preaching skills as well as invited to consider new ways of sharing the good news.

SHAUNA K. HANNAN
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The Politics of Jesus: Rediscovering the True Revolutionary Nature of Jesus' Teaching and How They Have Been Corrupted. By Hendricks, Obery Jr. New York: Doubleday, 2006, 370 pages.

Obery Hendricks' ambitious goal for this project consists of producing "a new Christian manifesto" (10). This stimulating and well-written book is a systematic exposition of the relation of Jesus' ministry to the social policies of his time. Unquestionably, *Politics* emerges as an interesting and enlightening entry into the ongoing conversation surrounding the influence of religion in politics.

Hendricks opens his book with a biographical foray chronicling his earliest encounters with the gentle, serene and non-threatening Jesus he was introduced to during his youth. The manner in which he conspicuously locates himself in relation to his subject matter makes it clear that the province of his intellectual peregrination is not foreign terrain. In fact his personal "quest to understand Jesus" (1) began at an early age and eventually served as the trajectory into his work as a professor of biblical interpretation. Hendricks' thesis is clearly articulated. Jesus was a political revolutionary (distinguished from a political activist), who was interested in transforming institutions and structures in an effort to alleviate the systemic causes of suffering. Additionally, this model derived from Jesus is the rule which should be used to judge the political practices and religious rhetoric of openly religious politicians. He summarizes the base ethics of the politics of Jesus in one succinctly stated principle, which also appears as one of the seven strategies offered: "Treat the people and their needs as holy" (101, 331-32). Not content with merely presenting another offering on the radicality of Jesus, Hendricks' project carefully guides the reader through the political implications of Jesus' ministry and then explicates them over and against the theatre of contemporary politics.

His examination does not begin with Christianity, but Judaism. In doing so Hendricks seeks to unearth the social conditions and religious ideals that were influential in shaping Jesus' political consciousness which, according to the author, was embodied in his ministry. The substratum of Jesus' political sensibilities is the Israelite notion of *malkuth shamayim* (the sole sovereignty of God) or when rendered in its Greek forms *basileai*

ton ouranon and *basileai tou Theou* ("kingdom of heaven" and "kingdom of God" respectively). Hendricks traces the various Israelite resistance movements based on *malkuth shamayim* and identifies the three streams of meaning associated with it [1] God as king of the universe, [2] God as the sole king of Israel, and [3] God as king in the eschatological sense. Hendricks uses the words and deeds of Jesus as witnessed in the scriptures as the canon by which he judges the words and deeds of political figures. He rejects the notion of a politically docetic Jesus. According to Hendricks this perspective of Jesus denies the oppressed "the empowering example of – [Jesus'] radical response to the social and political realities of his day" (79-80). Hendricks credits Paul, who "had available to him at least a modicum of the protection that was guaranteed by the Roman state," with being a major catalyst in obscuring Jesus' political radicality (80-81).

At the heart of Hendricks' project is an exploration of seven of Jesus' discourses. Hendricks' rereading of the selected passages functions as an enema, which liberates them from their "post-Constantinian misinterpretations" (100). The results of his exegesis are ensconced in the seven strategies he advances 1. treat the people's needs as holy, 2. give a voice to the voiceless, 3. expose the workings of oppression, 4. call the demon by name, 5. save your anger for the mistreatment of others, 6. take blows without returning them, and 7. don't just explain the alternative, show it (101-188). After a schema of the politics of Jesus has been established, he commences an interrogation of U.S. politics giving special attention to Presidents Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, Vice-President Cheney and the major religious voices who have aligned themselves with them. This is the most courageous component of Hendricks' project, and it is where the prophetic mandate of speaking truth to power is executed. A few of the many issues critiqued include Reagan's unapologetic support of the tyrannical South African apartheid regime, his demonization of individuals on welfare, and opposition toward the equal rights of women. He also attacks Bush's proposed tax cuts, which he argues were skewed to the interests of the rich, his revocation of federal grants for safety and health training programs, the proposal to cut $60 million from Medicaid, and of course his infamous declaration at a fund raiser: "This is an impressive crowd. The haves and the have-mores. Some call you the elite. I call you

my base" (220). This sampling is found among the numerous instances of policies and actions that were deemed inconsistent with the politics of Jesus. In a surprising contrast, only a few of the many religious leaders that aligned themselves with both presidents are explicitly named and critiqued for compromising their prophetic voice. In the final analysis, Hendricks locates the politics of Jesus as they are embodied in three principles 1. *mishpat* (justice), the establishment or restoration of fair, equitable, and harmonious relationships in society, 2. *sadiqah* (righteousness), behavior that faithfully fulfills the responsibilities of relationship, both with God and with humanity, and finally 3. *hesed* (steadfast love), a rearticulation of "you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind... and... you shall love your neighbor as yourself."

There is no doubt that works such as this garner the criticism of some who would promote the idea that religion and politics should be kept separate. However, in light of the current cultural climate, no further argument is warranted for the need of a book of this ilk. Following the path blazed by his last book *Living Water,* in *Politics* Hendricks has established himself as an organic intellectual capable of producing work that has cultural currency for both general and academic audiences. To that I would only add the following caveats; the format of the book doesn't easily lend itself as a resource for use in the classroom. The unusual format, such as the absence of numbered note indicators in the main text, caused me to wonder if the inclusion of endnotes was added later as an after-thought. Additionally, Hendricks' claim that the testimony of the Exodus was "God's act of taking *the side* of the oppressed" (15, emphasis mine) is a risky proposal. The practice of interpreting God's intervention on behalf of any group (including oppressed peoples) as God being on the side of a particular aggregate can result in the exaltation of human factions (whether designated by class, economic status, or political affiliation) to become the axis to which God attaches himself. Is not this akin to the Evangelical right that declares God is on their side? This would depreciate an otherwise noteworthy endeavor into another case of becoming the very evil we despise.

KIRK D. LYONS SR.
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Imagining Redemption. By David H. Kelsey. Westminster/John Knox Press, 2005, 108 pages.

What initially strikes the reader of this book is its peculiar discourse. David Kelsey calls it a "systematically unsystematic" theology (92). In this book he probes the question of what redemption means in Christian theology. He first considers what this word *redemption* means and how it is used in ordinary language; he then brings that understanding (or, rather, pre-understanding) into a theological context. This move initiates a shift from soteriology as typically discussed in systematic theology. The question that Kelsey urgently asks is "What earthly difference can Jesus make here?" (6). In other words, Kelsey asks not only what redemption means then and there in biblical narratives but also what it means here and now. This requires something beyond a systematic understanding of theological concepts. Theology needs to incorporate the particularity of the present.

Kelsey does this by interweaving his theological reflection with the story of a tragedy that befalls an eight-year-old, Sam, and his family. It is a heart-wrenching story and certainly brings the problem of evil up close and personal rather than leaving it at an abstract distance. The introduction of this particular story goes to the heart of Kelsey's understanding of theology. He focuses so much on the particular because, for Kelsey, something has meaning only in its context. As much as it sounds like a truism, it has dramatic force when he applies it to a theological doctrine.

Although redemption is the theme of this book, Kelsey never asks directly what redemption is. He asks how it is used in our language. He also asks what it means theologically but nowhere does he give any kind of definition. In fact, that is exactly his point: "What redemption means in one case is not interchangeable with what it means in another case" (63). The meaning of redemption depends on each particular context and cannot be an abstraction. A doctrine makes no sense unless it is thought through in each particular context; hence, theology has to be "systematically unsystematic."

Following this line of reasoning, to *think* seems increasingly unsuitable to the task of theology. That is why Kelsey proposes to *imagine*, rather than to think about or cogitate on, redemption, and hence the title of the

book. He is careful to explain that by imagining he does not mean making up or inventing something contrary to reality. Kelsey means that one has "to grasp a concrete particular as some kind of whole" (44). Redemption, therefore, has to be imagined in its particular context, but in a way that provides an understanding of the whole.

Kelsey thus describes three ways we use the words *to redeem* and *redemption* in our daily lives: 1) making up for a bad performance; 2) freedom from bondage or alien control; 3) fulfillment of a promise. He then applies them theologically, especially to the circumstance in which Sam and his family are so hopelessly entangled. He tries to show how what Jesus has done and continues to do may be seen as making up for the bad performance on the part of everyone involved in this tragedy and the world surrounding them. Kelsey also explains how the power of evil has taken the family in bondage and how Jesus' ministry can free them by reclaiming their true identity. Lastly, Jesus' resurrection is shown as overcoming the promise broken and fulfilling a new promise.

A crucial problem remains, however. How does the ministry of Jesus relate to Sam and his family's circumstance? After all, the former cannot be found elsewhere than in the biblical narratives in their all too particular singularity. How does one particular circumstance relate to another particular one, and moreover, how does one redeem the other? This is where the power of imagination, as understood by Kelsey, becomes effective. Kelsey argues that "God's promise to all humankind is the context into which the terrible situation that befell Sam's family is relocated." Redemption means seeing the situation in a new light. It means refusing to let the forces of evil define and dictate the problem and relying instead on God's promise as the underlying background: "When their context is defined by the presence of God's promise rather than by a profoundly unpromising series of events, it amounts to their having a new context" (39).

This is a powerful point, and Kelsey gracefully applies it to Sam's story. In the end, however, Kelsey's understanding of redemption seems open to the critique that it reduces redemption to a mere change of perception. Redemption becomes merely *seeing* things anew. It may provide a great deal of consolation, but is it truly redemption in the Christian sense? To

be fair to Kelsey, he clearly rejects the modern liberal project of locating the center of Christianity in human consciousness. It is not the case that redemption is a mere change of our consciousness. It is not our trusting in God or seeing anew in the light of God's promise that redeems us but only his work of redemption (61). Kelsey admits this, but he gives no account of what this act of redemption on God's part is. While true reality lies on the part of God, Kelsey allows no place to start other than our particular situations.

The problem of reduction can be traced back to the aforementioned problem of definition. Kelsey does not ask what redemption is but only what it means and does for us in our lives. That certainly is important and indispensable to the understanding of redemption. It hangs forever, however, on the unasked question. In order to understand redemption, we would have to focus on its center of reality, i.e. Jesus Christ. Soteriology inevitably has to start from a proper understanding of Christology, but this is perhaps too much to ask for in a book intended for such brevity.

SUNG-SUP KIM
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The Cambridge Companion to Schleiermacher. Edited by Jacqueline Mariña. Cambridge University Press, 2005. 362 pages.

This collection of essays represents one of the most recent volumes to appear in the Cambridge Companions to Religion series. Its timely publication is welcomed especially in the English-speaking world of scholarship where interest in Schleiermacher has substantially grown and continues to do so. Having often been too easily dismissed as the father of liberal Protestant theology or simply overlooked in terms of his innumerable contributions to philosophy, Schleiermacher is now the subject of much scholarly writing and research. Labeled as a Schleiermacher Renaissance, this resurgent interest in his life and thought continues to flourish in part due to the work of American scholars, some of whom are contributing authors in this volume. For those who have only a passing familiarity with Schleiermacher scholarship in this country, many of the authors will be

recognized as leading figures in the field such as Brian Gerrish, Terrence Tice, Julia Lamm, Dawn DeVries, and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza.

The structure of the volume is straightforward. Sixteen essays are categorized into three divisions. Part I engages Schleiermacher as philosopher. Schleiermacher as theologian is the focus of Part II. Culture, Society, and Religion is the heading for Part III. Additionally, the editor's helpful introductory essay provides a biographical sketch of Schleiermacher's life in tandem with an overview of the essays while a bibliography of Schleiermacher's works, noting both the German texts and English translations, immediately follows the last essay.

The five essays that constitute Part I are of tremendous benefit for theologians less familiar with Schleiermacher's far-reaching efforts within the discipline of philosophy. These essays traverse a range of philosophical topics engaging Schleiermacher's distinctive contributions and ongoing relevancy to matters such as epistemology, ethics, and hermeneutics as well as his invaluable work in translating and interpreting Plato. Particularly noteworthy for theologically-minded students is the essay by Robert Adams who examines Schleiermacher's epistemology of religion. Through a lucid presentation of the feeling of absolute dependence and its implicit relational character, Adams proceeds to study the implications of Schleiermacher's understanding of religious consciousness for the dogmatic propositions of Christology and eschatology as explicated in his *Christian Faith*.

The most substantial of the three sections addresses Schleiermacher's theological contributions. Richard Crouter's essay begins this section with an examination of the *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology* in which Schleiermacher offers his remarkable and comprehensive vision of theology as an academic discipline. Also receiving careful treatment are specific doctrinal topics as developed primarily in the *Christian Faith* such as sin and redemption, the Trinity, Christology, and justification and election. This section concludes with an essay on *Christian Ethics*, a text that has often been neglected, as well as an essay on his exegetical theology that examines its function within his entire theological system and how hermeneutics and the method of the dialectic inform his approach to biblical exegesis.

The final section addressing how Schleiermacher understands the relations of culture, society, and religion is the least satisfying of the three, not because of the quality of the essays, but because the overall focus of this section is rather amorphous. That this is the case is understandable given that these areas represent the least developed aspects of research into Schleiermacher's life and thought. More extensive research examining Schleiermacher's views on aesthetics as well as his involvement in political, educational, and other social institutions is certainly in order. Nevertheless, David Klemm's careful engagement of *On Religion: Speeches to Cultured Despisers* merits particular attention as well as Thandeka's assessment of Schleiermacher and his ambivalent status within contemporary feminism.

In his concluding essay that assesses the current status of Schleiermacher scholarship, Terrence Tice makes the following observation: "In America today, we do not find a particularly strong tendency to reach into the past for assistance in present tasks; yet, growing numbers of scholars are finding Schleiermacher to be their contemporary, often to be beckoning to them from some place ahead on the routes they are taking" (312-3). This collection of essays certainly confirms the continued relevancy of Schleiermacher's philosophical and theological contributions. For that reason one can anticipate an active and ongoing engagement of his thought among scholars for some time to come. Accordingly, Tice suggests several possible avenues for future scholarship that would attend to the multiple facets of his life and work. In terms of more constructive scholarship, one may also consider the interdisciplinary possibilities that are opened up by his thought. In an age of increasingly specialized scholars and the proliferation of subdivisions within disciplines, Schleiermacher represents another route for scholars, theologians, and pastors who are willing to accept the challenge and opportunity of thinking more broadly and deeply.

While works of this scholarly genre can often vary widely in quality, this particular volume successfully achieves its primary objective to "stimulate many others to continue to investigate his work and the relevance of his insightful legacy to the world today" (10). As such, it is an indispensable guide to his thought for English-speaking readers, particularly those who

have not thoroughly engaged the scope of Schleiermacher's theological and philosophical contributions. The essays are clearly written and intellectually accessible without diminishing the complexity of his thought. While this one-volume work obviously does not intend to cover all the ground in terms of his life and thought, it is an impressive and economical collection that does indeed spark an interest in the ongoing significance of Schleiermacher as a teacher and conversation partner.

LAURA J. THELANDER
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism. By Richard Crouter. Cambridge University Press, 2005, 277 pages.

Wilhelm Dilthey, the renowned biographer of Schleiermacher, made the claim that Schleiermacher's thought and impact could not be understood apart from his biography. It is around this basic principle that Richard Crouter organizes this collection of mostly previously published essays, as he basically agrees with Dilthey's claim that biography is essential for understanding the work of a theologian. In this book, he provides us with important biographical material with respect to Schleiermacher. For Crouter, biographical work includes both a socio-political historical situating of the subject as well as a close attention to textual investigation. As the subtitle of this book implies, Crouter also seeks to place Schleiermacher in his appropriate setting amidst two different movements: the Enlightenment and German Romanticism. After attempting to define both movements, he points out that while they each had a significant influence on Schleiermacher, it is not easy to delineate the influence of one or the other at any particular moment in his life and thought.

Crouter has divided this compilation into three parts. The first part addresses both those contemporaries of Schleiermacher who were engaged in conversation with him and those followers who were influenced by his work. The second part addresses Schleiermacher's involvement in the political realm in his particular context. The third part includes close readings of several familiar Schleiermacher texts, determining their

rightful place in the history of theology and examining them on the basis of Schleiermacher's goal of reconciling religion with modern culture.

In the first part, Crouter begins with an essay evaluating the guiding principle from Dilthey as stated above, particularly as it arises from Schleiermacher's own work. His conclusion is that Dilthey learned this principle from the study of Schleiermacher himself because the historical and the theological were intertwined in Schleiermacher's work. Having determined that Schleiermacher himself would approve of this principle for engaging in study, Crouter continues to provide essays which place Schleiermacher in his historical context. His next essay compares Schleiermacher's work to that of Moses Mendelssohn, though in most cases what is comparable is more form and circumstance than content. In making this comparison, Crouter is seeking to underscore his thesis that it is impossible to draw a hard line between Enlightenment and Romanticism, and he uses the relationship between the work of Schleiermacher and Mendelssohn as a model to demonstrate the truth of this claim. In his third essay, Crouter addresses the relationship between Hegel and Schleiermacher, one which he characterizes as a sibling rivalry. He assesses their contentious relationship as partly the result of personal prejudices and also the result of the fact that neither one was willing to give up their claim on the philosophical direction of the university at Berlin or the proper elucidation of the Christian religion. Next, Crouter turns to examine Kierkegaard's debt to Schleiermacher. He notes that Kierkeaard does not make extensive reference to Schleiermacher and that Kierkegaard's final assessment of Schleiermacher's contribution is unclear. All the same, Crouter finds Schleiermacher to have had a significant influence on Kierkgaard in the area of rhetorical technique. Crouter sees the influence of Schleiermacher's *Confidential Letters Concerning Schlegel's "Lucinde"* in Kierkgaard's use of indirect communication. This essay provides the reader not only with a perspective on the influence of Schleiermacher on Kierkegaard but also an introduction to the less familiar *Confidential Letters*.

In the second part covering Schleiermacher's role as a public theologian, Crouter introduces the student of Schleiermacher to several more texts which are not as familiar as those which are generally taught.

These include: *Letters on the Occasion of the Political-theological Task and the Open Letter of Jewish Householders* and *Occasional Thoughts on the Universities in the German Sense*. The essays in this section serve to introduce the reader to the diverse range of Schleiermacher's political and cultural interests. The result is a welcome addition to current Schleiermacher scholarship, most especially for English-language readers who typically focus on theology and philosophy.

In his third section, Crouter addresses more familiar texts. He examines *On Religion*, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*, and *The Christian Faith*. His essay on the *Brief Outline* helps to support the guiding principle that historical awareness is an essential part of doing theology. Of particular interest in this section is his study of Schleiermacher's redaction of *The Christian Faith*. He compares the 1821 and 1830 editions with the intention of providing new insight into the development of Schleiermacher's mature thought. While his findings do not offer anything particularly new in the way of interpretation, Crouter still commends this comparison as one which ought to be undertaken by other historians and theologians as a means of discovering the subtle advances made by Schleiermacher in the final edition.

While this collection of essays does not provide a comprehensive account of Schleiermacher, it does offer a picture of Schleiermacher through an assortment of snapshots which reveal moments in Schleiermacher's life and thought. This compilation is obviously different from the recently published *Cambridge Companion to Schleiermacher* due to the fact that this collection is authored by one person and has strong thematic elements running throughout. However, it does serve a similar function by offering a number of different ways to approach the study of Schleiermacher. Each of these essays whet the appetite of the reader, particularly because most of the essays could have been be developed into longer works. Crouter fills the role of the historian throughout in a number of different ways. Specifically, he sheds light on the development of Schleiermacher's thought by way of Schleiermacher's redaction of his own works, and he puts Schleiermacher's work in the context of Prussia's social-political history and as a reaction to the French revolution. One might have hoped for one more essay at the end of the book to round out this collection, but

ultimately, this collection of essays provides the student of Schleiermacher solid historical background in a number of different areas which have the potential of prompting further study.

ERIN KESTERSON BOWERS
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology. By Wentzel van Huyssteen, 2006, 347 pages.

Alone in the World, the 2004 Gifford Lectures, serves as the first test case for van Huyssteen's methodological proposal for a constructive dialogue between religion and science. In the *Shaping of Rationality*, van Huyssteen argued for a postfoundationalist approach to this discourse. This approach involves being aware of one's culture and tradition and that one is always interpreting experience while at the same time reaching out to intersubjective and cross-contextual dialogue. This dialogue is possible because, van Huyssteen maintains, that while people employ different reasoning strategies in various disciplines these strategies arise from shared resources of rationality. In a postfoundationalist dialogue, specific scientists and specific theologians are "transversally" linked to discover areas of mutual interest and relevance. The dialogue is mutually informing, but it also respects the integrity of each discipline and the limits of such dialogue.

Alone in the World is a complex and thorough book that aims to explore the concept of the *imago dei* in dialogue with evolutionary epistemology, paleoanthropology, linguistics, neuroscience, and neuropsychology. The transversal moment is the consideration of our species' uniqueness in a conversation between disciplines, while the theological moment of the *imago dei* is the theological appraisal of this uniqueness from a particular Christian viewpoint. With this in mind, van Huyssteen will be critical of approaches that he sees as confusing the two moments, either by replacing species uniqueness with an abstract, speculative theological definition that never gets to the interdisciplinary table in the first place, or by offering a view that reduces any discipline to the results of another. The *imago dei* is a particularly interesting test case for van Huyssteen's method precisely

because it aims to talk about what is common to all humanity from a Christian point of view that is self-consciously contextual.

Van Huyssteen begins the interdisciplinary dialogue by creating a space for it through a consideration of evolutionary epistemology. This view of knowledge emerging from evolutionary studies highlights the fact that the capacity for knowledge is itself an adaptation emerging from the evolutionary process. This means that human cognition is a bridge between biology and culture, and suggests that religious beliefs arose out of the interactions of early humans with their environments. Before turning to this early environment, van Huyssteen explores the *imago dei* tradition in Christian theology, beginning with the Biblical texts. He discusses interpretations throughout history, which include substantive, functional, relational, and eschatological views of the image of God. Van Huyssteen then argues that human religion emerges from the cognitive fluidity and complexity of the human mind, which yields imagination, symbolic thought, and the creativity to develop complex symbols and manipulate them into new forms. The emergence of these capabilities and of religion can be seen in the cave art from the Upper Paleolithic period, found in caves of southwestern France and the Basque country in Spain (the book contains detailed pictures of the cave paintings). He argues that symbolic activity arises from our linguistic capabilities, and spirituality in turn emerges from this ability for symbolic thought. Van Huyssteen proposes that the *imago dei* emerges from nature itself – it involves the embodied, imaginative, sexual and morally aware creatures who are in a relationship with God. The entire project is carefully worked out and generates new insights into an important doctrine.

As already mentioned, Van Huyssteen is strongly opposed to abstract notions of the *imago dei*. For example, he criticizes relational interpretations of the *imago dei* that refer to a Trinitarian metaphysics because he says they are divorced from the original *imago dei* texts and move away from the interdisciplinary conversation. These more speculative interpretations of the *imago dei* are influenced by New Testament references to the Trinity, which van Huyssteen thinks have *intra*disciplinary importance but are risky for *inter*disciplinary conversation. However, it is not entirely clear why this would not be allowed under the postfoundationalist methodology.

One starts within a certain tradition and canon even if one is reaching out cross-contextually, and for some a Trinitarian metaphysics may be very close to the core of the tradition. As for the transversal dialogue on the *imago dei*, van Huyssteen points out that the naturalness of religion does not say anything at all about whether it is true. Whether one talks about God in a minimalist or robustly Trinitarian way, one is already talking in the symbolic language that this dialogue is purporting to explain in the first place. So all religious views at the interdisciplinary table are, to a certain degree, abstract and speculative. On the other hand, Van Huyssteen also criticizes Gordon Kaufman for moving too far outside the Christian framework, for rejecting the idea of the personhood of God, for denying personhood its place in the history of Christian ideas, for allowing science to "...force theology not only to minimize the philosophical influences of its own history of ideas, but to push it beyond its own heritage..." (282). However, a radical Trinitarian might be able to level the same criticism at van Huyssteen for his minimalist metaphysics. This is a small tension within an extremely fruitful book.

Van Huyssteen's first test case illustrates the level of complexity, creativity, and insight that can come from approaching interdisciplinary work from a postfoundationalist perspective. This approach helps one move beyond an overly general science-and-religion discussion to specific dialogues that yield new possibilities for rethinking and reforming specific doctrines. Van Huyssteen illustrates that one can become well-read and discerning in other disciplines while allowing them their own integrity, and at the same time retain strong and thoughtful Christian commitments. Both his method and results are highly recommended as generating rich insights for theology.

JENNIFER KILE
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities. By Roger E. Olson. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006, 264 pages.

The September 2006 issue of *Christianity Today* addresses the resurgence of Calvinism among younger evangelicals. Accompanying any such Reformed resurgence is the re-appraisal of the status of Arminians within the Evangelical camp. Although it seems odd to even question whether Arminians are welcome among some of the very institutions they established, the question is being raised and cannot be ignored.

Roger E. Olson's timely book offers a sustained description of Arminianism as a genuinely Evangelical and Protestant tradition. His motivation is both theological and sociological. Theologically, he intends to clear up misunderstandings about what Arminians actually believe. Sociologically, he aims to prevent any impending squeeze-out of Arminians from the Evangelical camp that the recent Reformed resurgence may entail. The result is an accessible introduction to Arminian theology that could be used in both Arminian and Calvinist circles – as a formative textbook for the former and as a supplemental text promoting generosity among the latter.

Olson's title reveals its unique structure. Instead of laying out a deductive presentation of Arminian theology, Olson walks through ten common myths about Arminian theology. This "myth-busting" approach fits the polemical context that generated the book. Unfortunately, some may read this book as overly defensive and so miss the robust alternative Arminianism offers. Furthermore, such an approach may serve to perpetuate the assumption that Calvinism is the gold standard by which all theologies are to be judged. However, a perceptive reader will discern that Olson is wisely engaging in a strategy of *ad hoc* apologetics: address the common objections to one's position in order to show that it has been misunderstood. Thus read, Olson's book is less a *defense* of Arminianism than it is a *description* of Arminianism.

The first three myths addressed by Olson are general in character. He argues deftly that while Arminian theology is not the opposite of Calvinism (Myth 1), the two are nevertheless incommensurable systems (Myth 2). The dialogue between the two can take place firmly within the Evangelical

camp (Myth 3). The remaining chapters address particular objections leveled at Arminians. Olson clearly demonstrates that classical Arminians affirm total depravity (Myth 6) and justification by grace alone through faith alone (Myth 9). He ably describes the alternative Arminian interpretation of divine sovereignty (Myth 5), grace (Myth 7) and predestination (Myth 8). Olson's treatment of predestination is especially insightful as he differentiates the classical Arminian view of foreknowledge from Middle Knowledge and Open Theism views. In the final chapter, Olson demonstrates that many Arminians affirm substitutionary atonement and that the tradition is not exclusively committed to the governmental view (Myth 10). Conspicuously absent is a response to the myth that Arminians deny assurance because of their views on eternal security. He concludes by suggesting some rules for engagement that ought to characterize a charitable debate on these topics.

Although this reviewer can wholeheartedly recommend this book, a note on Olson's mode of argumentation must be added. Within each chapter, Olson dispels the myth at hand by tracing the "true" Arminian position. Such a historical approach allows the classical authors to speak for themselves through copious quoting, and accordingly initiates the reader into the Arminian tradition. However, Olson's approach tends to give the impression of a united Arminian theological heritage that may overlook the genuine diversity of Arminians. Arminius, Wesley, Miley, and Wiley are all different thinkers working in different contexts with different approaches and assumptions. They form more of a web than a line, both in their relationship to each other and vis-à-vis Calvinism. Furthermore, the construction of a "true" Arminian line requires the exclusion of "false" Arminians. Olson explicitly sets aside the later proto-liberal Remonstrants, the "vulgarized" Arminianism of Finney, and contemporary process theologians as aberrant Arminians. Olson's version of the story serves his ends well by distancing Arminian theology from figures and movements on the current Evangelical hit-list. But such exclusionary tactics raise the question: on what basis does Olson differentiate a "true" from a "false" Arminian? It seems that for Olson the current strictures of American Evangelical identity are in the driver's seat, rather than what is inherent to Arminianism. Thus, Olson ironically engages in the very theological

politics practiced by Calvinists that drove him to write this book in the first place. Provided these peculiarities of Olson's argument are kept in mind, the reader will certainly find this book to be a highly readable and informative contribution to the ongoing dialogue.

JOHN L. DRURY
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views. Edited by James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006, 208 pages.

Despite being several decades old, Gustav Aulén's *Christus Victor* still stands as one of the most prominent and widely-cited volumes about the doctrine of the atonement. Part of its continuing appeal lies in Aulén's threefold typology of the classic, Latin, and subjective models of the atonement — a typology which still provides the framework from which many scholars think about the doctrine. *Christus Victor* is not without its flaws, however, including Aulén's less-than-charitable account of opposing views and his now-dated presentation of 20th century theologians. For this reason, a volume which offers a fair presentation of key atonement models while also providing irenic and incisive critiques of them would be a most welcome addition. *The Nature of the Atonement*, with its presentation of four views of the atonement placed in dialogue with one another, would seem to be the ideal candidate to be just such a volume. Unfortunately, however, it falls short of this ideal in several key respects, and the result is a useful if somewhat disappointing volume which makes a contribution but ultimately fails to live up to its promise.

Unlike Aulén's book, *The Nature of the Atonement* was intended for an evangelical audience: all of the contributors are evangelicals, and the four views are presented with evangelical presuppositions and concerns in mind. To their credit, editors James Beilby and Paul Eddy assembled a diverse cast from within American evangelicalism to represent four very different views about Christ's atoning work. Prominent open theist Gregory A. Boyd presents the Christus Victor view; the penal substitution view is championed by New Testament professor Thomas Schreiner; philosopher Bruce Reichenbach represents the healing view; and biblical scholar Joel

Green offers what he calls the "kaleidoscopic" view. The book follows the standard "four views" format. After a short and helpful introduction by Beilby and Eddy, each representative offers a chapter-length presentation of their respective view followed by three short critiques from the representative of the other views.

The presentations are uneven in quality. Boyd's defense of the Christus Victor model turns out to be the most interesting, as he seems to understand that the best type of argument for this kind of book is one centered on persuasion rather than attack. His thesis is that the aspect of Christ's atoning work emphasized in his view—Jesus Christ's victory over the powers of Satan—is more fundamental than those aspects emphasized by the other three models. He offers a well-crafted if unconvincing case in defense of this claim, utilizing both scripture and theological reasoning to present his position. Schreiner takes a different approach, however, one which seems less designed to persuade than to proclaim. He insists that penal substitution simply is *the* evangelical view, but he seems to spend less time explaining the theological strengths of it than he does pointing out the weaknesses of other views. When it comes to defending his model, he appeals to three themes—the sinfulness and guilt of humanity, the holiness of God, and the sacrifice of Christ—and then points to several important biblical passages which reflect these themes. This scriptural support, however, is not drawn together to make a unified and coherent theological case for penal substitution, and the result is an impressive array of scriptures that lacks a correspondingly convincing argument which draws them together. Given the fact that penal substitution is on the receiving end of much unfair criticism in contemporary theology, this lack of a persuasive and thoroughly theological account is disappointing.

Like Boyd and Schreiner, Reichenbach utilizes ample scripture to defend his view that Christ's atoning work takes the form of holistic healing from the damaging effects of sin. He argues that by taking on and forgiving our sins, Jesus Christ effectively heals our broken relationship with God and provides us with hope beyond death by bringing us to shalom. The account is rhetorically powerful because of its utilization of the often underemphasized idea that Jesus Christ is the "Great Physician," but like Schreiner's account it is weak on theology: it lacks an adequate

demonstration of why this theme should be taken as the dominant one and why Christ's death on the cross was a necessary part of God's healing and atoning work. Joel Green's "kaleidoscopic" view offers an alternative to the other three accounts because he proclaims that no single model can capture the significance of the atonement. He, instead, provides "anchor points" from which one can begin to interpret Christ's work. One such anchor is the fact that that Jesus' death must be seen in light of the social, political, and religious currents which Jesus set himself against, because these very currents are what ultimately led to his execution. The result, Green argues, is that our understanding of the atonement cannot be solely about an individual's relationship to God, but rather, it must also include the same kinds of social and political emphases that Jesus' ministry had. Partly for this reason, he claims, no single model can capture the breadth of the atonement event. He points to the motifs of sacrifice and revelation as helpful images, but in the end, he argues that they are simply two of the many ways of understanding the atonement, each of which ultimately adds to its mystery. Green's view seems the least convincing of the four, if only because he offers little evidence in defense of his foundational claim that there is no priority given to any one of the various aspects of the atonement presented in scripture.

When considered together, both the accounts themselves and the irenic responses provide a servicable overview of some important issues and questions surrounding the doctrine of the atonement. This survey is supplemented by the excellent utilization of scripture throughout the four accounts. While their claims sharply differ, the authors' respect for and dependence upon scripture remains consistent, and the result is a helpful guide to the most important biblical testimony to Christ's atoning work. What this volume lacks, however, is thorough attention to Jesus Christ himself. A proper account of the doctrine of the atonement must begin with attention both to the identity of the one doing the atoning work and to the Christological and trinitarian questions which result. These kinds of issues, however, receive scarcely any attention in the four accounts. For example, none of the four representatives spend time working out the significance of how the basic creedal affirmation that Jesus Christ is both fully God and fully human relates to his act of atonement. They also fail to consider the

relevance of the triune relationship between the Father and the Son to the event of the cross or the importance the theological questions this relation raises for what occurred in that event. In short, it seems as if attention to Jesus Christ himself fades into the background even as discussion of his atoning work is brought to the fore. This lack of attention to essential theological questions is a symptom of a related problem: the lack of serious engagement with the theological tradition. While some notable figures like Anselm and Abelard make cursory appearances, most of the great thinkers of Christian history are not mentioned at all. One wonders if even a limited engagement with what thinkers like Aquinas, Calvin, or Barth had to say about the atonement would have assisted the presentations by raising important issues which otherwise were left in the background. A volume in which four divergent views engaged with both scripture and the best of the Christian tradition would have been a tremendous contribution. As it stands, this book about a theological doctrine ends up providing only a cursory theological engagement with the topic. For this reason, despite its many contributions and helpful presentation of the biblical witness about the atonement, it does not reach Aulén's standard as a comprehensive account of the topic.

KEITH L. JOHNSON
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Matthew: Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible. By Stanley Hauerwas. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2006, 267pp.

At the outset of John Yoder's *Preface to Theology*, the editors appended two "Prayers of the Theologian, Set for Antiphonal Reading". The first of these prayers was used by Huldrych Zwingli at the opening of his Bible lecture series, entitled "Prophezei": "Almighty, eternal and most merciful God,/ Whose word is a lantern to our feet and a light to our path,/ Open and enlighten our hearts/ That we may understand your holy Word in its purity and holiness/ And do those things that we have rightly understood/ So that we may in no way offend your Majesty,/ Through Jesus Christ our Lord/ AMEN." It is no surprise that Stanley Hauerwas is one of the editors of the Preface, and it is equally unsurprising that he should use that prayer

to introduce Yoder's work, whose denominational heritage can be traced to the Zurich Reformer. What Hauerwas may not know, is that Zwingli's first Bible commentary was on Matthew's gospel – this, perhaps, would account for the themes Zwingli's spiritual progeny would carry forward. Hauerwas' commentary on Matthew belongs to that progeny, carries forward the Word once delivered to Zwingli, and will prove to be one of the most profitable places to discern the arrival of that Word today.

It comes as something of a blessed relief to have the Brazos series. I in no way want to suggest that the labors of biblical scholars are not an essential part of the work of the church, but it is a welcome development to have a set of modern commentaries that follow more closely what Augustine, Chrysostom, Zwingli, Luther, and Calvin once did. The series preface relates its intent to that of Irenaeus, who in his *Against Heresies* described Scripture as a "great mosaic depicting a handsome king" in which "the beautifully colored tiles need to be taken out of their packaging and put into proper order according to the plan of the artist." (9) Underlying this summary of Irenaeus' suggestive metaphor is the editors' belief that "scriptural interpretation is not purely local. The key in Genesis may best fit the door of Isaiah, which in turn opens up the meaning of Matthew." (10) Central also to this project is a belief that there is a discernible tradition of Christian scriptural interpretation that must by deferred to – though not uncritically – in order to build responsible doctrine on the basis of apostolic insight. In the process of reading Scripture again in this way, an indispensable form of training and instruction will take place for both writer and readers "in order to cleanse our minds so that we might find our way toward God" (Augustine). So it is, with all due respect, that the series editors rely chiefly on theologians, rather than biblical scholars: "War" say the editors "is too important to leave to the generals."

In seeking to revive this form of training, the series could not have chosen a better commentator for Matthew than Hauerwas. "Training", as an important help in making discernible progress in the Christian life, has been one of the key themes of Hauerwas' oeuvre. Training is required of the Christian to inculcate the virtues necessary to make faithful decisions in extreme, or subtly destructive, circumstances. The church is the community that undertakes, nourishes and sustains this training through

mutual upbuilding, especially through discerning the forms of violence it either participates in through commission or supports tacitly by omission. Indeed a "church committed to nonviolence is a more likely faithful reader of Matthew." (21)

Hauerwas' commentary arose from two seminars he conducted on Matthew, and it attempts to imitate "the form of commentaries common in the Middle Ages and Reformation that were moral allegories." (18) Herod, therefore, becomes those who represent "the politics of death," and the scribes and Pharisees are "intellectuals for hire." Rather than try to "be smarter than Matthew," Hauerwas undertakes to "submit to Matthew's discipline," in order to be better trained as a disciple of Christ. There is, therefore, no attempt to guess at the consciousness of Jesus, solve the Synoptic problem, or discern whether the destruction of the temple in 70 AD is relevant to Matthew's outlook. Instead, Hauerwas recommends John's gospel, the Pauline epistles, and the letter to the Hebrews as good commentaries on Matthew. Hauerwas makes no apologies for attempting to show in this work "how the accommodation of the church to American presumptions cannot help but distort our reading of Matthew's gospel." (21), states his intention to read it in continuity with the significance of the Shoah, and understands Matthew as a unique opportunity to "reflect on the relation between the church and the people of Israel." (21)

Just as Barth in his Römerbrief called up Luther, Calvin, the Blumhardts, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Overbeck to do battle against the regnant cultural Christianity of his time, so Hauerwas calls (to name a few) Augustine, Barth, Bonhoeffer, Yoder, and Dorothy Day to the front of an American church struggle not unlike the one Barth faced decades ago. Perhaps the most exciting chapters are those in which Hauerwas focuses on Matthew 5-7, in which he distinguishes discipleship from a "heroic ethic," demolishes the "law-gospel" ideology that produced forced readings of Matthew, distinguishes discipleship from the acquisition of virtues, and relates the visibility incumbent on the Church to the stark visibility of Jesus' witness. Through careful attention to the apocalyptic language shared by both, and pursuant to his concern to read Matthew in continuity with the people of Israel, Hauerwas shows himself particularly adept at illustrating Jesus' continuity with the prophets. Again, this is

unsurprising. Hauerwas is simply following Zwingli's good example: Matthew is read and exposited that we might understand God's holy Word, and do what we have understood. Hauerwas' Matthew is the thunder peal that has followed Zwingli's lightning strike.

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God, Truth, and Witness: Engaging Stanley Hauerwas. Edited by L. Gregory Jones, Reinhard Hütter, and C. Rosalee Velloso Ewell. Brazos Press. 336 Pages. $39.99.

The Festschrift, notes William Cavanaugh, provides an opportunity for a beloved professor to receive the "unctuous flattery" of his or her former students, who in turn get the opportunity to pad their résumés (*The Hauerwas Reader*, 17). However, this collection of essays, written in honor of Stanley Hauerwas on his sixty-fifth birthday, defies the Festschrift genre. A substantial number of essays are written by colleagues who have known him for decades. They are not afraid to throw down the gauntlet. For example, Robert Bellah claims, "I am probably one of several of Stanley's friends whose friendship with him is in good part constituted by an ongoing argument" (112). He then proceeds to further that argument with his essay on "God and King," challenging Hauerwas's account of the influence of late 19th century liberalism on American Christianity. Other essays are written by men (yes, they are all men) from around the globe, from Sweden to South Africa, who first encountered Hauerwas through his writing rather than in the classroom. Taken as a whole, the contributors to this collection are a testament to the depth and breadth of Hauerwas's influence within the global academy.

The themes "God," "Truth," and "Witness" were chosen because they reflect enduring Hauerwasian concerns. The mature expression of these concerns is found in his Gifford Lectures, published under the title *With the Grain of the Universe*. Here Hauerwas provides a Christian account of creation that manages both to affirm Karl Barth's "Nein!" to natural theology and at the same time to provide a space for Christian public witness. He argues that this witness is best exemplified in the lives of

saints such as Dorothy Day, John Howard Yoder, and Pope John Paul II. Their witness resonates with the world because it is in line with the grain of creation. They embody who we were created by God to be.

The essays in *God, Truth, and Witness* are arranged into four sections: 1) witness and friendship 2) being a Christian in a (Post-)Christendom world 3) the church in the public square and 4) the practice of theology. Here Aristotle, Karl Barth, Alasdair MacIntyre and John Howard Yoder, all instrumental thinkers in Hauerwas's development, are often invoked. A look at four essays from the collection, each representative of a section, serves as a good overview.

Hans Reinders' article, "The Virtue of Writing Appropriately," mines Aristotle's notion of friendship in order to makes sense of his own relationship with Ronald, a mentally handicapped man. Ideally, friendship involves a shared life of virtue, and for Aristotle virtue requires a rational principle. Is friendship based on virtue possible with a person whose life does not appear to have a rational principle? Reinders wrestles with this question within the Aristotelian framework, and then from the Christian point of view. As Christians we are called to be fellow sufferers with Christ. That participation in suffering is a part of our friendship with him. This puts Reinders' relationship with Ronald in a different light. Rather than see the friendship in terms of an initiation on his part, he is called to consider it in light of Ronald's initiating claim to be his friend. He is called to receive that gift, rather than to consider the relationship in terms of what he has to give.

In "Christian Civilization," Robert Jenson's musings about culture and Christianity center on the question of whether or not there is warrant for a Christian high culture. Jenson considers the possibility that Constantine might have chosen Christianity because it provided richer cultural resources than the Roman pagan religions. Since then, Christianity has had a long run as a dominant cultural influence, and is particularly responsible for powerful works of art from the Middle Ages to the present. But the church has always had to compete with barbarians whose tastes run toward the muck. According to Jenson, they now appear to have the upper hand. It does not seem possible that something on the order of Beethoven's *Missa solemnis* could be produced today, given the fracture between art and the

church. The richness of the life of the triune God, whose own interior life is itself a high culture, deserves better. Christians ought to be makers of high culture, a task that takes time and patience, counter to the pace of production of the world around us.

Arne Rasmussen's essay, "The Politics of Diaspora," examines the church's impotence in the face of two world wars, and reflects on the theologies of Karl Barth and John Howard Yoder in light of that impotence. Rasmussen traces the impact politics had on Barth's theology from 1914, with the beginning of the First World War, up to and including Barth's post World War II work on the *Church Dogmatics*. He criticizes Barth for having both an abstract politics and an abstract ecclesiology. Here John Howard Yoder provides the missing detail in terms of his ecclesiology, while holding on to much of Barth's theology. Yoder's account of the church is non-Constantinian, rooted instead in Christianity's Jewish heritage, a heritage marked by a "nonsovereign, nonterritorial, and 'not-in-charge' existence" (105). This existence is nonviolent in character, reflecting a theology of trust in God's sovereignty over historical events. Rasmussen sees the non-hegemonic church, affiliated with the pacifism of diaspora Jews, as a powerful witness against the rampant nationalism that comes with today's nation-state.

Alasdair MacIntyre and John Howard Yoder provide Harry Huebner the imaginative and theological resources necessary to re-conceive the direction of American universities. In his essay "Learning Made Strange," Huebner considers ways to overcome the estrangement between the modern university and the church. Birthed and nurtured by the church, the university has only shed its association over the course of the last century. Huebner notes, "...one of the most profound factors is that the universities have succeeded in educating themselves *as well as the church* in the belief that the university is able to give account of itself quite apart from the church" (302). In order for the strange world of the Christian gospel to be heard again, the conception of what the university is must be reconsidered. Huebner draws from MacIntyre's tradition-based historicism, and Yoder's "Jesus-is-Lord" historicism, to challenge the dominant universal historicism found in universities.

This is just a sampling of the fifteen essays included in this volume. Three of these essays deal with ecumenical and inter-religious matters. H. Tristram Engelhardt writes from the perspective of an Orthodox Christian who challenges Hauerwas to be even more politically incorrect when writing about authentic Christianity. George Lindbeck's essay explores the current options in ecumenical efforts and why the movement is so important for Hauerwas's project, despite the fact that Hauerwas has not written much about it. Peter Ochs employs the theological pragmatism evident in *With the Grain of the Universe* to explain how authentic inter-religious dialogue can take place without apologetics. Other essays examine issues of truth, freedom, imagination, and idolatry inspired by Hauerwas's work.

One serious lacuna in this body of essays is the absence of any female voice. Hauerwas's emphasis on the place of authority and tradition has raised concerns among feminists. Is his community of virtue necessarily patriarchal? Maybe not, but the range of voices represented here extends only from tenor to bass. A feminist response to Hauerwas's project would provide a place for women in the Christian community to express their concerns. Despite this major oversight, *God, Truth, and Witness* demonstrates that Hauerwas's vision holds both a means to criticize regnant notions of the church and the nation-state, and a direction for the imaginative reconstruction of those notions.

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